Cognitive Dissonance in Stay-Leave Decisions of Ukrainian Forced Migrants
By Natalia Zaitseva
The findings outlined in this text came as a surprise to me as a researcher. Since the beginning of the Russian war on Ukraine, I have been researching the motives for mobility/immobility among Ukrainian women during wartime. However, in the course of interviewing them, it became clear that the conclusions drawn from the collected material were quite predictable and had hardly changed in recent years. Instead, my attention was drawn to how Ukrainian women describe the advantages and disadvantages of living in Germany and Ukraine, as well as the contradictory nature of their assessments of economic, social and living conditions in both countries. The difference between those who want to live in Germany and those who want to return or have already returned to Ukraine is particularly striking. The former emphasise the advantages of living abroad and criticise the conditions in Ukraine; the latter, on the contrary, focus on the difficulties in Germany and see prospects at home. Importantly, both groups give radically different assessments of the same phenomena (e.g., the healthcare system, opportunities to achieve prosperity, the friendliness of local residents). At times, it seems as if they are describing experiences of living in parallel realities.
Of course, this position may be determined by their individual experiences. However, it is difficult to believe that some of the forcibly displaced women had mainly negative experiences after moving to Germany, while others had mainly positive ones. It seems that the differences in how women evaluate and explain why they choose to live in Germany or Ukraine are less an objective assessment of the quality of life, but an attempt to consistently justify their emotional choice.
This assumption correlates with Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance.[1] According to it, people strive to maintain consistency between their thoughts, beliefs and behaviour. In particular, they adjust their beliefs to match their behaviour: they find additional explanations that justify contradictions or avoid information that may increase dissonance.
I assume that in our case, Ukrainian forcibly displaced women subconsciously sought additional arguments in favour of their already made decision (to stay or to leave): „exaggerating“ those aspects of reality that supported their choice and avoiding information that would cast doubt on their decision.

Conflicting assessments are largely driven by the prolonged psychological strain experienced by forcibly displaced Ukrainian women. Most of them did not plan to emigrate and saw their departure as a temporary safety measure, spending a long time expecting the war to end or remaining uncertain about their plans for the future. As the war dragged on, this uncertainty turned into a persistent state of “suspension,” marked by ongoing doubts between “staying” and “returning”. In such circumstances, decisions are often made to end the exhausting process of decision-making rather than because of the emerging of an ideal option. Over time, this choice is reinforced by arguments that rationalise it after the fact rather than accurately reflect the logic by which it was originally made. This partly explains why identical living conditions are described so differently depending on the final decision a person makes.
In this context, the motives for mobility and immobility, recorded several years after forced displacement, cannot be considered indicators of the causal mechanisms of decision-making. They are rather the result of a secondary reflection on experience, adapted to new life circumstances and existing structural constraints. Therefore, at the current stage of the war, it is more productive to focus not on reconstructing the motives for displacement, but on investigating how forcibly displaced persons interpret and experience their countries of residence. It is these perceptions that allow for a deeper understanding of the dynamics of (im)mobility in the context of a protracted war.
In this text, I would like to show the differences in the assessments of living conditions in Ukraine and Germany among Ukrainian women who found themselves in a situation of forced migration after the start of the full-scale war. I propose to consider their assessments not as a reflection of “real” differences between countries, but as socially constructed interpretations that serve to justify and legitimise their chosen life strategy.
My analysis is based on 15 in-depth interviews conducted with women (aged 18 to 70) in February 2025. Seven of them are in Germany (three do not plan to return and four want to return to Ukraine), eight of them in Ukraine (four have returned from Germany to Ukraine, and four plan to leave Ukraine for Germany).
Let’s see how each of these groups perceive life in Germany and Ukraine ‒ women who want to live permanently in either Germany or Ukraine. I will try to compare their vision according to the following criteria: well-being, quality of life, attitude towards/of local residents, and assessment of the countries‘ prospects.
For women in each of these groups, the perception of the likelihood of achieving well-being in Germany and Ukraine differs significantly. In this context, both groups of interviewees compare earning opportunities and social welfare features.
Ukrainian women who consider Germany a country for long-term residence note that achieving financial stability here seems much more feasible than in Ukraine. Higher wages, an established social protection system and relative economic stability create a sense of security and confidence in the future.
After arriving here, I saw how much people earn here. A nurse, for example, she earns around €3,500 here. I have never seen such salaries for nurses in Ukraine.
18-year-old woman who wants to stay in Germany
In contrast, according to them, achieving material well-being in Ukraine is perceived as problematic. According to the respondents, the average salary in Ukraine is often only enough to cover basic needs, while spending on leisure or improving living conditions remains unaffordable for many households. In addition, incomes are constantly being eroded by high inflation.
On the other hand, women who want to live in Ukraine have a completely different perspective on the opportunities for achieving prosperity in Germany. Those interviewees who do not have support from the state (have not registered as displaced persons) are particularly critical on this issue. According to them, despite the high median salary in Germany (€2,660 net per month, compared to €455 net in Ukraine at the end of 2024)[2], a simple comparison of nominal statistical indicators is not entirely accurate.
Firstly, based on their own experience, the interviewees note that Ukrainian women in Germany are mostly offered low-skilled jobs with low pay. In practice, they can only claim the minimum wage ‒ around €1,600-1,800 per month after taxes.
It’s difficult to find work in Germany. Furthermore, let’s say you’re a packer or warehouse worker, you have nowhere to go because Germans always have priority. You can’t climb the career ladder, you can’t do anything.
44-year-old woman who wants to return to Ukraine
Secondly, the everyday expenses in Germany are significantly higher than in Ukraine. First and foremost, this concerns the significantly higher cost of housing and utilities, as well as more expensive food and a wide range of services. As a result, incomes that are nominally higher than in Ukraine are largely levelled by the amount of mandatory expenses, which respondents describe as almost impossible to optimise. As a result, people who earn less than the average German salary cannot afford even the standard of living they had in Ukraine after paying for rent and are forced to save on basic needs (such as heating and electricity). It is noteworthy that women who, at the time of the study, were focused on returning to Ukraine, regularly emphasised the significant increase in prices in Germany in their statements, while never mentioning the problem of inflation in Ukraine, despite the fact that in the context of the war, its annual rates fluctuated between 10 and 15%.
The narratives regarding social welfare differ significantly between the two groups. Women who are focused on living in Germany often emphasise the established social support system in that country. Decent pensions, unemployment benefits, child allowances – provide a sense of economic security, even in circumstances where it is not possible to work. Those who prefer to live in Ukraine are not prepared to rely on the local social welfare system. Their motives vary: some mention the possibility of deportation after the end of the war, while others point to the late start of their working careers in Germany, which, in their opinion, will not allow them to count on pension payments in the future. Some of the interviewees also note that the German social protection system does not always provide sufficient support even for German citizens, but they do not raise concerns about the weak level of social protection in Ukraine.
Another important criterion by which Ukrainian women compare the two countries is quality of life. It is important to note that women who want to live in Germany focus on certain aspects, while those who want to live in Ukraine focus on completely different ones. For example, women who want to live in Germany often emphasise the significantly better state of local infrastructure, particularly roads and public transport. Women who want to live in Ukraine discuss how much worse the quality of food is in Germany (and/or ignore the topic of infrastructure).
When it comes to the same phenomena (e.g., medicine, working conditions, order), they articulate opposite experiences and emphasise different aspects of these phenomena. For example, women who want to live in Germany point out the advantages of health insurance, which allows them to receive quality services and even surgery without excessive costs. In Ukraine, they emphasise, operations have to be paid for out of pocket, and their cost is quite high.
On the other hand, women who want to live in Ukraine are highly critical of the German healthcare system. They point out the long waits to see a doctor and doubts about the professional competence of medical staff.
It’s a huge myth that medicine in Germany is good. It’s not good. Starting with dentists and family doctors. A family doctor can’t even remove stitches! And if you want an MRI, you have to wait three to four months for an appointment.
66-year-old Woman, returned to Ukraine
Ukraine has a state medical insurance system, which is funded by taxes (and therefore no insurance costs). Family doctor services are free, and doctors’ appointments are available within the first two days of illness. The services of specialists and examinations in state hospitals are also free, but the waiting time for an appointment is the same as in Germany. However, they can be obtained at a private clinic at a cost thats affordable for the working population.
There is a big problem with healthcare there. We have specialists! They are fast, and our specialists are great and helpful, they treat us and we have everything we need.
36-year-old woman, 36, returned to Ukraine
Women who want to live in Ukraine often raise the issue of how difficult it is in Germany to access the most basic medications (antipyretics, painkillers, blood pressure medication). In Ukraine, these medications can be purchased without a prescription at any pharmacy. According to the respondents who had experience of living in Germany but returned to Ukraine, they had to endure pain and discomfort for a long time, because a doctor’s appointment can be scheduled a week or two after the symptoms appear. On the other hand, women who have chosen to live in Germany do not raise this issue in their interviews at all.
Also, women who aspire to live in Germany are much more likely to bring up the topic of the quality of local education. Among its key advantages are a more balanced workload for children (unlike Ukrainian schools with more lessons and a more complex curriculum), and European recognition of educational institution diplomas. Sometimes they also mention the excellent educational opportunities for adults (free education and financial support while acquiring skills).
Here I can develop myself. I couldn’t do that in Kherson, I wouldn’t have gone to study in Ukraine. But here I can. And it will be free. I don’t have to pay thousands of euros for tuition.
38-year-old woman who wants to stay in Germany
Meanwhile, women who want to return to Ukraine mention this topic only in passing, emphasising that they would like their children to receive a European education.
There is also a difference in the emphasis placed on aspects of the functioning of the state system. Women who plan to stay in Germany highly value its order and discipline. Respondents who are focused on returning to Ukraine, on the other hand, criticise Germany’s excessive bureaucracy, contrasting it with the convenient state digital services in Ukraine, where most issues can be resolved quickly and remotely, literally “with one click”. At the same time, both groups agree that Germany has a significantly lower level of corruption and significantly better support for people with disabilities.
However, women place the main emphasis on the intangible benefits of living in the country they choose. In this context, the difference in the perception of the social environment in both countries is revealing. Respondents who choose to live in Germany consistently emphasise the friendliness of the local population, their openness and willingness to help. They also acknowledge that after moving, their attitudes towards Germans improved.
For some reason, I thought Germans were mean. In fact, that’s not the case at all! All people are good people there. There are no such negative manifestations.
18-year-old woman, wants to stay in Germany
On the other hand, respondents who are oriented towards Ukraine note that the local population in Germany is quite closed-off. Some of them highlight cases of bullying and discrimination against Ukrainians at work and in educational institutions.
There is a lot of hatred from the Germans. They tell each other what they think of me. And living with that… they don’t think about the fact that we understand a lot, that I am slowly learning the language. This bullying… It’s the same with children. Class teachers pretend that this child simply does not exist.
44-year-old woman, wants to return to Ukraine
Ukrainian women who choose to live in Germany often talk about feeling protected and cared for by the state. On the other hand, those who choose Ukraine perceive the German way of life as overly regulated by rules that leave no room for personal initiative, which could significantly improve their quality of life. Instead, Ukraine appears to them as a space of freedom and self-realisation.
Women who want to live in Germany often point out that this country is not at war, so it guarantees safety and survival. Women from Ukraine, on the other hand, avoid this topic (even though the key motive for their stay in Germany is precisely safety). Moreover, this audience tends to ignore the discomfort of living in a war zone and the significant risks posed by constant air strikes in Ukraine, or to downplay their significance.
I was in Ukraine [recently]. To say that something has changed a lot, well… Of course, there are air strikes, there is destruction. But everything will be rebuilt, and everything will be fine. I felt very good when I returned.
52-year-old woman, wants to return to Ukraine
Finally, the two groups of women have very different perspectives on life in Ukraine. Women who want to live permanently in Germany have an extremely pessimistic view of Ukraine’s future (they expect protracted military action, the division of the country, the collapse of the economy and a decline in living standards, and the need to pay off debts to Europe for years to come).
Those who choose to live in Ukraine have an optimistic view of Ukraine’s future (they believe in the end of the war and the achievement of lasting peace, economic recovery and the return of a significant number of migrants to Ukraine).
We see that the respondents consciously or subconsciously emphasise the advantages of the country they have chosen and the disadvantages of the country they want to leave. The consistency of their views – signals an attempt to rationalise decisions they have already made. If we want to understand the motivations and intentions of Ukrainians regarding (im)mobility during the war and post-war period, then research on rationalisation is important for a number of reasons.
Firstly, the risk of mixing declared and real motives should be taken into account. Rationalisation leads to respondents tending to explain decisions already made with “logical” and socially acceptable arguments that do not always coincide with the initial emotional, situational or forced motives. Without taking this phenomenon into account, the researcher risks accepting post-factum constructed explanations as the real reasons for migration.
Secondly, systematic distortion of assessments of countries of origin and destination should be expected due to the formation of a binary opposition: the country of departure is described predominantly negatively, while the country of residence is described positively. This distorts comparative assessments of quality of life, institutions and social relations.
Thirdly, such studies have limited predictive value. If rationalisation is not taken into account, predictions about return, re-migration or long-term immobility may be inaccurate. The declared “finality” of decisions often reflects a need for psychological self-justification rather than stable intentions, which reduces the accuracy of predictive models. On the other hand, the more powerful the rationalisation, the more stable the decision on mobility/immobility becomes. Therefore, when studying the motives or intentions of migration, the time/historical period in which we conduct the research is important.
Rationalisation is part of the adaptation mechanisms: it helps to reduce the cognitive dissonance associated with loss, uncertainty and the breakdown of social ties. Ignoring this aspect leads to a reductionist interpretation of motivation, without taking into account the psychosocial dimension of migration.
The interpretation of research results may be subject to the risk of erroneous political and managerial decisions. Data that does not take into account the effect of rationalisation but is used to develop migration or reintegration policies may contain erroneous steps that do not correspond to the real needs and expectations of migrants. For example, overestimating the “push” factors in the country of origin may devalue the role of structural conditions in the host country. However, rationalisation is not a “mistake” on the part of the respondent, but a socially and psychologically natural process that must be taken into account in research methodologies aimed at analysing migration motives, intentions and trajectories.
Notes
[1] Festinger, Leon. (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford University Press.
[2] The median salary in Germany at the end of 2024 was around €3,800 gross per month or €2,280-2,660 net per month (according to DW data at the end of 2024). https://www.dw.com/uk/zarplati-v-nimeccini-zrosli-hto-de-i-skilki-otrimue/a-69763055. The median salary in Ukraine at the end of 2024 was €455 net per month, according to the website Business on OLX. https://business.olx.ua/statti/yakym-buv-2024-rik-na-rynku-pratsi-daydzhest-vid-olx-robota/ What was 2024 like on the labour market? Digest from OLX Work.
About the Author
Natalia Zaitseva-Chipak is a sociologist and a professor in the Department of Sociology at the Ukrainian Catholic University. Prior to this position, she was a professor in the Department of Sociology at the Lviv Ivan Franko National University. In 2002, she graduated from the Lviv Ivan Franko National University, and in 2007, she completed her Ph.D. at the Classic Private University. Since 2007, she has also worked as an analyst at the Socioinform Ukrainian Center for Public Opinion Research. She has either participated in or managed more than 20 sociological studies of Ukrainian society. Her scientific interests focus on problems of modern Ukrainian society and individual social groups, such as youths or internally displaced persons (IDPs). Natalia Zaitseva-Chipak has been a non-resident Prisma Ukraïna fellow and member of the War, Migration, Memory research group. She is a 2024-25 fellow of the Gerda Henkel Foundation at the Forum Transregionale Studien in Berlin.
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Citation: Natalia Zaitseva, Cognitive Dissonance in Stay-Leave Decisions of Ukrainian Forced Migrants, in: TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 05.03.2026, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/64657
OpenEdition suggests that you cite this post as follows:
Forum Transregionale Studien (March 5, 2026). Cognitive Dissonance in Stay-Leave Decisions of Ukrainian Forced Migrants. TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research. Retrieved April 18, 2026 from https://doi.org/10.58079/15tbs


