Constitutional Imperative vs. Parliamentary Defiance in Albania: The Unresolved Case of an Alleged Mandate Incompatibility
By Arnisa Tepelija
Introduction
When can a constitutional court compel a democratically elected parliament to act against its will, or compel it to vote in a certain way? Or, to put it differently, can a parliament ignore the decisions of the constitutional court? These questions lie at the heart ofa protracted standoff between the National Assembly in Albania (the Assembly) and its Constitutional Court (the Court). For over two years, the parliamentary majority has repeatedly defied Constitutional Court orders while claiming to defend democratic mandates’ autonomy. The standoff reveals competing visions of democracy: one prioritising majority rule and legislative autonomy, the other emphasising constitutional obligation and political party minority protection. These competing visions are reflected in the unwavering positions of the Albanian Assembly and the Constitutional Court respectively, reflected further in wider debates related to parliamentary primacy vs. constitutional supremacy.
The short analysis proceeds as follows: firstly, it chronologically establishes the development of the standoff between the Assembly and the Constitutional Court throughout the three (unimplemented) decisions of the latter; secondly, it positions the conflict within debates of shifting lines between parliamentary primacy and constitutional supremacy; the third part concludes.
The Constitutional Court’s Three Decisions (2023–2024)
The conflict began in 2022,with two similar parliamentary motions filed by two separate opposition groups to the Council on Rules of Procedure, Mandates and Immunity of the National Assembly. They claimed that MP Olta Xhaçka’s mandate was incompatible with the Albanian Constitution due to a conflict of interest (specifically under Article 70 (3), which prohibits MPs from profit-making activities involving state property).[1] The two motions were based on the newly gained position of Xhaçka’s husband as a strategic investor in the south of Albania, granting his one-shareholder company the management of state coastal areas and a privileged fiscal position vis-à-vis the state.[2] The coalition also filed a motion, interpreting the ban on making profit as only applying directly to the Member of Parliament herself and not to related persons such as her husband. The Assembly vote reflected that view, declining the opposition motions and approving the motion of the majority not to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court.[3] In response, the two groups of MPs from the opposition challenged these two decisions of the Assembly before the Constitutional Court, claiming they were unconstitutional.

In February 2023, the Constitutional Court adopted the first judgment regarding the opposition’s claims. It argued that despite the Assembly having the procedural autonomy to verify the legal pre-conditions to send the issue to the Constitutional Court, it does not have the prerogative to decide on the merits of the case. The merits of the issue of incompatibility, the Court argues, are a prerogative that belongs to the Constitutional Court.[4] The Court had established the notion of procedural autonomy of the Assembly on this matter in earlier judgments, stating its role in verifying the formal legal conditions for sending the matter to the Constitutional Court, by means of its own rules of procedure.[5] Based on this reasoning, the Court decided that in its decisions, the Assembly had overstepped its prerogatives of formal review and had instead considered the merits of the case. The merits of the case belong to the constitutional review process. Therefore, both Assembly decisions were considered unconstitutional, granting validity to the opposition’s claims and automatically forcing the Assembly to send the matter for review to the Court. However, the Constitutional Court has consistently denied the opposition the possibility directly to bring the alleged incompatibility of mandate for review on the merits in front of the Court (no legal standing).[6] The Court held that only the Assembly as a whole, not a fraction of its members (the opposition), can formally activate the Court for a substantive review.[7] This was based on the consistent interpretation of constitutional provisions by the Court.
The Assembly received the two decisions of the Court for discussion, and instead of executing them, it referred those decisions to its Council on Rules of Procedure, Mandates and Immunity. This speaks of a de facto appropriation of the constitutional adjudication function by the Assembly and breaches the constitutional provisions on the enforceability of the Court decisions.[8] By leaving the decision of the Constitutional Court to a council within the parliament, it effectively stripped the Court of its final say in matters of constitutional interpretation. In the plenary session, the Assembly’s majority voted against constitutional review again, this time framing it as a matter of the freedom associated with the nature of the democratic mandate.[9] In a third judgment requested by the opposition and adopted in July 2024, the Constitutional Court, reaffirming their stance, held that the Assembly had acted in violation of the Constitution by refusing to act. Yet it did not claim competence to decide on the incompatibility of the mandate in the absence of a formal parliamentary referral as required by the constitution.[10]
The Assembly, led by the majority, ultimately chose to remain uncompromising on the matter.
This attitude is the first of its kind for the institution,[11] making it a prime example of a deadlock where lapse of time appears to be the final arbiter. Indeed, the matter of the potential invalidity of MP Xhaçka’s mandate was resolved due to the expiry of her mandate and the constitution of the new Assembly in September 2025, which no longer features her as a deputy. This allowed her to finish her mandate unperturbed. The ‘frozen conflict’ has de facto created a precedent that goes in favour of the Assembly having the final say in matters of conflict of interest of its members, marginalizing the constitutional role of the Court for substantial review.
Constitutional Limits to Democratic Mandates: Where to Draw the Line?
The framing of the conflict is often contingent upon the institutional perspective from which it is approached. The clash is most visible in a request that the speaker of the Assembly sent to the Venice Commission in September 2024, in the aftermath of the two decisions of the Constitutional Court.[12] The speaker of the parliament, voicing the majority, was not convinced whether the“MPs can be forced to vote a certain way”[13] by the Court. With such question framing, the parliamentary majority claims that MPs cannot be compelled by the Constitutional Court or anyone else to vote a certain way. This view stems from the constitution, which states that MPs “represent the people and are not bound by any obligatory mandate.”[14] On the other hand, the Albanian Constitution also enshrines the “binding nature” of “the decisions of the Constitutional Court”.[15] Logically, from the perspective of the Constitutional Court, the question is: Can parliamentary majority discretion override constitutional obligations when it comes to MP mandate incompatibilities?
In fact, the Court tries to frame these contradicting views as a false dichotomy. It does so by conducting a multi-level analysis of the procedural and substantive aspects of the process of establishing incompatibilities of a parliamentarian’s mandate. Its reasoning can be summarized as follows:
a) The conservative interpretation of the Court on who can activate the Court for judicial review on the incompatibility of deputy mandates is of crucial importance. The Court considers that one-tenth of the MPs can initiate motions in the Assembly concerning mandate incompatibilities[16]; they can also activate the Constitutional Court regarding the constitutional validity of the decisions of the parliament on those motions. Yet, the opposition parties have no standing to directly request a substantial review of the Constitutional Court on this matter of incompatibility of mandates, since this prerogative rests with the National Assembly. Thus, there is no enforceable guarantee that their requests will reach adjudication on the matter of concern. On issues of incompatibility of mandates, that actor is the Assembly. At the same time, the Court reminds of the duty that the constitution sets upon the implementation of its decisions, which are a source of law.[17] All the doctrine it has developed in matters of enforceability of its core arguments[18] warns against non-compliance, as this would endanger the whole constitutional order, and ultimately the supremacy of the constitution.
b) The Court’s interpretation of the shared competences between the Assembly and the Constitutional Court in establishing the incompatibility of mandates is the second important layer of the analysis. The Court acknowledges certain parliamentary prerogatives while insisting that certain procedural obligations are non-discretionary. The Assembly has a right to procedurally review the formal criteria for sending the matter to the Constitutional Court, the latter being in charge of the review of the merits of the case.[19] In the 2023 decision, the Court stated that during the constitutional review of the case, no formal-legal obstacle was verified for the motion to be blocked by the Assembly.[20] In the Court’s view, forwarding an incompatibility motion is an apolitical, constitutional obligation that stems from the duty of enforcement of Court decisions.[21]Despite the autonomy of the mandates, interpreted as free from any influence from the electorate or from the will of the party, or from any impediment of changing parties, the mandate is not unlimited in its nature[22], especially in view of the supremacy of the constitution, and in view of the Court’s framing of the rule of law. The Court concludes that such a decision of the parliament not to abide by duties derived from the constitution creates a dangerous precedent and “a constitutional crisis which not only violates the foundations of the democratic state and loses public trust in the state and its organs, but also calls into question the role and function of the Court itself.”[23]
The Constitutional Court’s position is also shared by the Venice Commission in its opinion, delivered in December 2024. In fact, they are cross-referenced, especially on matters of the autonomy of the parliamentary mandate.[24] The commission highly values the autonomy of the democratic mandate as a concept which should be independent from the electorate’s wishes and the party’s wishes.[25] However, it does not see autonomy, so understood, as inherently in contradiction with the principle of the binding effect of the decisions of the Constitutional Court.[26] Instead, it considers constitutional loyalty as foundational to the existence of the rule of law[27], and places the enforcement of the Court decisions by the Assembly at the core of this concept. Ultimately, it concludes that “there can be no political discretion on whether or not to abide by and implement the judgments of the Constitutional Court.”[28] This is the criterion both the Constitutional Court and the Venice Commission use to differentiate between the political and the non-political function of the Assembly, and the limits to the autonomy of the parliamentary mandates.
The Venice Commission Opinion echoed differently on both sides of the political spectrum. The opposition read it as an ultimatum of the international community for the Assembly to implement the Court’s decisions[29], while the majority read it as validating its (non)actions, extrapolating only the analysis on the freedom of mandates that the commission makes in the first paragraphs.[30] It is the final act in many acts that illustrate the majorities’ view of constitutional cooperation as a zero sum game, and it further underscores the difference in practice between parliamentary discretion and obstruction. Never has the parliament subjugated a decision of the Constitutional Court to reinterpretation by its legal councils, before this case. Never has there been any doubt in the doctrine of supremacy of the constitution, nor where its final interpretation lies, until this case. Finally, never has a political prerogative of the legislative branch been used as a political obstruction to this extent.
Conclusion: The Boundaries of Democracy in Constitutional Adjudication
The case of the alleged incompatibility of MP Olta Xhaçka’s mandate represents more than a dispute over one parliamentarian’s eligibility; it exposes the fragile equilibrium between constitutional supremacy and parliamentary autonomy in Albania. What began as a conflict of procedure escalated into a constitutional deadlock where the Assembly openly refused to implement the binding decisions of the Constitutional Court. In doing so, the legislature not only asserted a questionable prerogative to reinterpret constitutional obligations but also tested the very boundaries of the rule of law and compromised its own integrity.
The Constitutional Court attempted to navigate this standoff by distinguishing between parliamentary procedural autonomy and the non-discretionary obligation to respect its judgments. Yet its own recognition of limits on standing and enforceability created a paradox: the Court defended constitutional supremacy in principle but could not guarantee it in practice without parliamentary cooperation, as the judges believed they were bound so by the constitution and by their own jurisprudence. Even though the relevant provision could be changed in the constitution, granting the opposition the right to raise the issue of incompatibility directly before the Constitutional Court, the conundrum of the political majority blocking this would again persist. The Venice Commission, while affirming the value of the free democratic mandate, likewise underscored that such autonomy cannot override the fundamental duty to preserve the integrity of the constitutional order.
Ultimately, the deadlock resolved itself not through institutional compliance but through the passage of time, with the expiry of the contested mandate. This outcome is a stark reminder of the dangers posed when constitutional mechanisms rely solely on good faith. The precedent set is that a parliamentary majority may defy constitutional rulings without consequence and risks normalising defiance and undermining the authority of constitutional adjudication in Albania.
These cases suggest three design flaws in Albania’s constitutional system. First, the lack of enforcement mechanisms for Constitutional Court decisions creates vulnerability to majoritarian defiance. Second, the gatekeeping role assigned to the Assembly creates perverse incentives when the Assembly itself is the subject of review. Third, minority rights protections prove illusory when dependent on majority cooperation. Future constitutional reforms should consider these structural weaknesses.
The entire episode thus forces a difficult but unavoidable question: Where should the line be drawn between democratic autonomy and constitutional obligation? Albania’s experience demonstrates that unless constitutional courts are equipped with mechanisms to ensure compliance, the supremacy of the constitution remains vulnerable to erosion by parliamentary will. The case stands as a cautionary tale, not only for Albania but for all systems navigating the tension between majoritarian politics and constitutional constraint.
Digital and Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools have been strictly and specifically employed to ensure: 1. Translations from Albanian to English of provisions and court decisions as references – digital tools have been used exclusively to assist in translating content; 2. Improvement of grammar and syntax – AI was employed to help refine the grammatical structure and syntax of the text, enhancing clarity and coherence. After AI-assisted modifications, the work was thoroughly reviewed and rechecked by the author to ensure its academic integrity and originality.
Notes
[1] The full text of the provision reads as “Deputies may not carry out any profit-making activity that stems from the property of the state or of local government and may not acquire the property of either of the latter.” Article 70 (4) provides “For every violation of paragraph 3 of this article, on the motion of the Speaker of the Assembly or of one-tenth of its members, the Assembly decides on sending the case to the Constitutional Court, which decides on the incompatibility.”
[2] See the report on the alleged conflict of interest here: Minister Xhaçka defends her husband’s declaration as a strategic investor, https://www.reporter.al/2022/06/23/ministrja-xhacka-mbron-shpalljen-e-bashkeshortit-si-investitor-strategjik/.
[3] Decision no. 83/2022 of the Assembly (not to accept a report of the minority); and Decision no. 84/2022 of the Assembly (to accept a report of the majority).
[4] Judgment no. 1/2023, Constitutional Court, para 46-51.
[5] Judgment no. 7/2016 and Judgment no. 1/2023 of the Constitutional Court.
[6] See Decision no. 1/2023, para 24; The Court held that Article 70 (4) of the Constitution precludes the opposition from directly requiring a substantive adjudication on the matter of incompatibility of Mandates of MPs. See Article 70(4), wording at supra note 1.
[7] The matter of legal standing of the opposition has been consistently held in Judgment no. 7/2016, Judgment no. 1/2023; Judgment no. 2/2023 and Judgment no. 55/2024 of the Constitutional Court.
[8] Article 132 (1) of the Albanian Constitution.
[9] Decision no. 41/2024 of the Assembly.
[10] Judgment no. 55/2024 of the Constitutional Court.
[11] See Case 93/2016. Despite the Assembly not approving a motion of the opposition in a similar case, after a Court decision on clashes of competence it accepted to send the matter to the Constitutional Court for substantial review.
[12] CDL-AD(2024)040-e Albania – Opinion on the implementation by Parliament of Constitutional Court decisions adopted by the Venice Commission at its 141st Plenary Session (Venice, 6-7 December 2024).
[13] Ibid, p. 6.
[14] See Article 70 (1), supra note 1.
[15] Article 132 (1) of the Albanian Constitution.
[16] See Article 70 (4), supra note 1.
[17] Decision no. 55/2024, para 42-43.
[18] See Decision no. 10/2021; Decision no. 49/2017; Decision no. 15/2017 of the Constitutional Court.
[19] See supra note 4.
[20] Decision no. 1/2023 of the Constitutional Court, para 53.
[21] Decision no. 55/2024 of the Constitutional Court, para 61.
[22] Ibid., para 58.
[23] Ibid., para 63.
[24] Ibid., para 50.
[25] Venice Commission Opinion, supra note 12, para 18-20.
[26] Ibid, para 20-21.
[27] Ibid, para 22.
[28] Ibid.
[29] See A2CNN News, December 2024: Xhaçka’s mandate, Bardhi reacts after the Venice opinion: It was confirmed that the SP’s position was a constitutional coup, https://a2news.com/shqiperia/politike/mandati-i-xhackes-bardhi-reagon-pas-opinionit-te-venecias-u-k-i1135035.
[30] See Shqiptarja.com News: Venice Commission’s opinion on Xhaçka’s mandate and Klotilda Bushka: Confirmed that Parliament is not forced to vote on issues outside its competence, https://shqiptarja.com/lajm/publikimi-i-opinionit-te-venecias-per-mandatin-e-xhackes-kryetarja-e-komisionit-te-ligjeve-klotilda-bushka-konference-per-shtyp-ne-ora-1230.
About the Author
Arnisa Tepelija is an SJD candidate in Comparative Constitutional Law at Central European University. She holds a Bachelor of Law and Master of Science degree in Law from the Faculty of Law, University of Tirana, and an MA in European and International Studies from Centre International de Formation Européenne – CIFE (summa cum laude). Her research topic and research interests span around judicial independence as a cornerstone of the rule of law in European Constitutional law, as well as processes of judicial reformation and Europeanization. She has a demonstrated history of working in the law practice industry, international organizations and governmental agencies, providing expertise in judiciary reforms, anti-corruption, and Europeanization integration processes for pre-accession countries.
Citation: Arnisa Tepelija, Constitutional Imperative vs. Parliamentary Defiance in Albania: The Unresolved Case of an Alleged Mandate Incompatibility, in: TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 13.01.2026, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/63823
OpenEdition suggests that you cite this post as follows:
Forum Transregionale Studien (January 13, 2026). Constitutional Imperative vs. Parliamentary Defiance in Albania: The Unresolved Case of an Alleged Mandate Incompatibility. TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research. Retrieved February 7, 2026 from https://doi.org/10.58079/15ho5


