Between Trade-Based Food Security and Self-Sufficiency: Agricultural Policies and Sectors in Tunisia
By Emile van Ommeren
Around the globe, countries are rethinking their food policy strategies in response to the increasingly uncertain geopolitical situation and climate change. Recent events, such as the sharp rise in cereal prices due to the war in Ukraine, have highlighted the interdependencies and vulnerabilities of the global food system. Many countries have expressed their interests in improving their levels of food self-sufficiency– i.e., the extent to which a country can satisfy its food needs from its own domestic production.[1] The call for greater self-sufficiency is also strong in Tunisia, which is highly dependent on food imports to satisfy domestic needs, and where, according to the latest estimates, 11.3 percent of the population faces severe food insecurity.[2] Given this crisis, it has been noted, for instance in La Presse de Tunisie, that increasing the production of cereals should be a “priorité nationale”while acknowledging at the same time that important questions need to be addressed such as: “à quel prix et par quels moyens? [at what price and by what means?]”[3]
Indeed, there are different trade-offs to consider as every agricultural policy reform has distributive consequences. Over the centuries, Tunisia’s food system has been profoundly shaped by (geo)political developments and international trade, which has often generated domestic tensions. For instance, under bey Muhammad al-Sadiq in the 1860s, increasing exports of agricultural products such as wheat and olive oil made these staples more expensive locally, which led to demonstrations in the centre of Tunis.[4] During (and prior to) the colonial period, the agricultural sector was further reoriented toward producing crops for export to Europe, which had become lucrative – especially for French settlers – due to the removal of tariffs. In the late 20th century, neoliberal policies facilitated large-scale imports of subsidized foreign food products such as cereals.[5] These historical economic forces have significantly influenced the distribution of resources both within Tunisia and on a global scale, impacting patterns of food trade and creating winners and losers in the process. These distributional outcomes have sparked political battles over agricultural trade policies, with some advocating for trade liberalisation, while others favour trade barriers.
Rather than taking a state-level perspective, my goal is to understand the role and position of Tunisian farmers in the current debate about food and trade policy. Is there broad support among farmers for a shift towards policies that prioritize local agricultural production (as opposed to trade-oriented strategies)? Or are producers in Tunisia divided over the question of how higher levels of food security can be attained? Some scholars argue that Tunisia’s agricultural relations are best understood through the lens of class conflict, where the interests of farmers (or peasants) are pitted against those of capitalists and absentee landowners.[6] For instance, studies have described how farmers’ class struggles in the countryside have critically contributed to the Tunisian uprisings in 2011.[7] However, an alternative perspective suggests that farmers are not an unified political group. Instead, their preferences may be shaped more by the sectors in which they are active rather than their class background. As political scientists Jamal and Milner argue, incomes and political preferences are tightly linked to specific sectors in Tunisia.[8] Thus, farmers working in export-oriented sectors, such as date production, may have very different interests from those in import-competing sectors, like wheat.
In this essay, I explore how colonial capitalism and subsequent (neo)liberal reforms led to more mechanisation, crop specialisation, and intensification, driving a wedge between different agricultural producers and fragmenting their political mobilisation.
French colonial rule and neoliberalism
Until the early 19th century, the Regency of Tunis – within the Ottoman empire – held considerable control over international commerce. Despite the trade privileges granted to Europeans in the 1535 capitulations, the influence of foreign economic interests remained limited: e.g., only nine French merchants were present in Tunis in 1760.[9] While Tunisia was involved in agricultural trade, most food products circulated within regional markets, following the Ottoman theory of kingship based on the so-called ‘circle of justice’ – i.e., “a statement of imperial governance meant to ensure peace and security so that rural cultivators could produce agricultural goods that would benefit their own lives and ultimately sustain the empire’s administration.”[10] However, growing European competition strained state finances, leading to increased interventions by the beys in the mid-1820s. Tax burdens on rural households increased, and proposed tax reforms in 1863 led to protests and bankruptcy in 1867. An international commission, led by France, subsequently managed Tunisia’s finances, resulting in a surge of European interference and the establishment of the French ‘protectorate’ in 1881.
Following colonisation, a decree allowed European settlers to purchase ‘public’ lands, dispossessing Tunisian farmers. Between 1881 and 1912, French control over agricultural land expanded from 100,000 to 882,000 hectares, claiming the most productive lands for the cultivation of export-oriented crops. To compete in world markets, Tunisian agriculture underwent a process of mechanisation and specialisation, which meant that traditional crops were replaced by food production that was demanded by the capitalist centres. As noted by food policy scholars Lappé and Collins, colonising powers “took over the best agricultural land for export crop plantations” while they simultaneously “encouraged a dependence on imported [staple] food” through the removal of tariffs and subsidies.[11] The focus on labour-intensive export production, such as olive oil and grape vines, led to monocropping and a system reliant on trade with France. By the time of political independence, 62% of Tunisia’s exports and 72.5% of its imports were linked to France.[12]
From independence in 1956 onward, Tunisia’s agrarian system underwent several crises and transformations, but the structural imbalances remained intact. In many countries, the advancement of agricultural technologies contributed to a process of intensification under the banner of the ‘Green Revolution’ (which was, in fact, not so revolutionary, and certainly not green) and a paradigm shift resulted in further liberalisation of international trade, which had a major impact on farmers in Tunisia. Under President Bourguiba, the state continued the export-oriented model while nationalising and collectivising (foreign-owned) farmland. At the same time, massive agricultural subsidies in Europe and North America worsened Tunisia’s (relative) competitiveness, especially in capital-intensive sectors such as wheat production, meaning that the reliance on foreign staple food increased. This process was accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s when Tunisia, under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, implemented structural adjustment programmes that resulted in a further reduction of agricultural tariffs and an even stronger focus on the cultivation of specialised crops for exports (such as dates). These trends have persisted until the present day, which has led to a picture in which Tunisian farmers are not only facing import-competition, but are also strongly export-oriented in a number of sectors.[13]

Where does this leave Tunisian farmers, and where to from here?
There is a broad consensus that the colonial-capitalist expansion created new divisions and reinforced old ones – but how exactly? Many have pointed out how capitalists and absentee landowners have gained economically at the expense of small-scale farmers and agricultural labour, which has resulted in increased impoverishment and discontent among rural workers. Others have focused on how international market forces have aggravated the inequalities between regions, because the largest investments were made in the most profitable areas while the other ones were left behind. A third and much less common explanation is that not class nor regional differences are most important to understand agricultural politics in Tunisia but, rather, that farmers’ attitudes and positions are primarily determined by the sector in which they operate. Although I do not dispute the relevance of class-based and regional perspectives, I argue that sectoral divisions among Tunisian farmers deserve more attention. Why?
First, I contend that the processes of mechanisation and crop specialisation (under French rule), and the rapid intensification of land use (following the ‘Green Revolution’) are likely to have made it increasingly difficult for the owners of land, labour or capital to move between agricultural sectors in Tunisia. For example, when large investments are made in specialized harvesting machinery, changing to a different crop can be very costly, and it seems unlikely that farmers who have optimized the production of a certain crop (e.g., with specific knowledge, irrigation techniques, and distribution networks) can easily switch to the cultivation of another crop. Therefore, scholars note that shifting between activities within the agricultural sector, or between agriculture and other segments of the economy, can be very challenging.[14] This means that farmers are often ‘stuck’ in a particular sector, irrespective of the region or class to which they belong. While some farmers are dependenton sales to global markets (such as olive oil producers), other farmers are in fact suffering from foreign competition (such as producers of cereals), which probably leads to opposing views when it comes to agricultural trade policy.
Second, the sectoral approach can shed light on the trade-offs that emerge when choosing between different food policy strategies. Rather than depicting farmers as a group with relatively homogeneous preferences for (or against) national self-sufficiency in food, I suggest that farmers’ stances are more accurately understood by considering their sector-specific involvement in international trade. This does not necessarily contradict a class-based perspective that describes the marginalisation of the rural areas in the historical process of colonial-capitalist expansion. However, it adds to our understanding of sectoral divisions – most crucially between import-competing and export-oriented farmers – that give rise to conflicting policy preferences which, in turn, can lead to the fragmentation of political mobilisation. Following economists Drèze and Sen, I highlight that “the importance of cooperative elements in social relations should not make us lose sight of the extensive and vital role that interest conflicts can play in worsening the predicament of some groups as it improves the position of others.”[15]
Trade-based food security and self-sufficiency
Focusing on sectoral interests may also illuminate the long-standing debate on how to achieve higher levels of food security. According to some, international trade should be at the heart of food policy strategies because greater specialisation and liberalisation, the logic goes, can lead to lower prices and more food supply. Miguel Rodríguez Mendoza, then Deputy Director-General of World Trade Organisation (WTO), said in 2002 that “[f]ood security nowadays lies not only in the local production of food, but in a country’s ability to finance imports of food through exports of other goods.”[16] In contrast, others have emphasized the need to prioritize domestic production over imports to achieve national food self-sufficiency. Of course, this should not be portrayed as a binary policy choice between fully liberalised markets and autarky in the agricultural sector, but still, countries can move along the continuum towards one end or the other.
In my view, Tunisian farmers are unlikely to express a unified position on this matter. While most agricultural producers may be in favour of changing the status quo, I expect their policy preferences to vary in different ways. On the one hand, producers of cereals can be expected to push for more trade protection and self-sufficiency in food as imports have steadily reduced their profitability. In fact, wheat farmers have already organized several protests and sit-ins in Beja, Jendouba, Le Kef, and Siliana over the past years to demand higher grain prices, and companies such as Rose Blanch Group – a major player in grain milling and trading – have stated that it is their mission “to contribute to food self-sufficiency in Tunisia”.[17] On the other hand, farmers in export-oriented sectors, such as olive oil and date production, can be expected to call upon the government to improve their competitive position in international markets, for which there is some suggestive evidence. For instance, exporters such as Boudjebel SA VACPA are “constantly lobbying for the date sector” (e.g., simplification of export procedures)[18] while the Centre de promotion des exportations (CEPEX) is marketing Tunisian olive oil around the globe. Not only large organisations, but also smaller-scale farmers have mobilised – in Sfax and Kebili for example – to voice their disapproval of export restrictions, demanding more favourable conditions to sell in foreign markets. It seems plausible that agricultural producers in these export-oriented sectors support trade-based food security policies rather than national self-sufficiency in food.
For the Tunisian government, it is difficult to navigate between these conflicting interests because of the reciprocal nature of the trade obligations. If Tunisia raises the tariff rate for cereals (above negotiated levels) to protect and stimulate domestic production, then foreign buyers of Tunisian products – such as the European Union – may take countermeasures that hurt the interests of date and olive oil exporters. In other words, the Tunisian government must carefully balance these competing demands that are stemming from sectoral trade interests.
Concluding remarks
In this essay, I have argued that the divergent interests among Tunisian farmers are an inheritance from the past. Starting in the early 19th century, European merchants began to exert increasing control over Tunisia’s trade,[19] which led up to the imposition of French rule in 1881. The food system was progressively restructured to serve external markets, laying the foundation for export dependency in sectors like olive oil production. In the 20th century, (neo)liberal reforms accelerated this dynamic, causing a further erosion of domestic food diversity and a growing reliance on imports to meet basic needs, especially in cereals. Many scholars have argued that the agricultural system needs to be reformed to reduce these dependencies, to improve living conditions for the rural population and to achieve higher levels of food security. For instance, the Tunisian human geographer Sethom stated that “[l]’objectif de la politique agricole doit consister à éviter à tout prix d’être à la merci des pays agricole dominants [The objective of agricultural policy must be to avoid being at the mercy of dominant agricultural countries at all costs.]” (emphasis added).[20] Although it is beyond the scope of this essay to offer an opinion on agricultural and food security strategies, I have demonstrated the usefulness of a sectoral perspective in understanding the distributional consequences and preferences of Tunisian farmers with respect to the different policy options.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Max Ajl, Julius Dihstelhoff and other participants of the MECAM International Conference ‘A Decolonial Mediterranean?’ in Tunis for valuable comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful and constructive feedback. Financial support from the European Union – Next Generation EU – and the Italian Ministry of University and Research (PRIN grant P202233ZTR) is gratefully acknowledged.
Notes
[1] Clapp, Jennifer. “Food self-sufficiency: Making sense of it, and when it makes sense.” Food policy 66 (2017): pp. 88-96.
[2] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Fund for Agricultural Development, United Nations Children’s Fund, World Food Programme, World Health Organization. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024. Flagship Publication. Rome, Italy (2024).
[3] Ferchichi, Kamel. “Crise céréalière: Eriger l’autosuffisance alimentaire en priorité nationale.” La Presse de Tunisie (14 October 2024).
[4] Perkins, Kenneth. A History of Modern Tunisia (second edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2014).
[5] Ajl, Max, Ayeb, Habib and Bush, Ray. “North Africa: the climate emergency and family farming.” Review of African Political Economy 50 (2023): pp. 173-196.
[6] Ayeb, Habib, and Ray Bush. Food insecurity and revolution in the Middle East and North Africa: Agrarian questions in Egypt and Tunisia. Anthem Press (2019).
[7] Gana, Alia. “The rural and agricultural roots of the Tunisian revolution: When food security matters.” The International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food 19 (2012): pp. 201-213.
[8] Jamal, Amaney, and Milner, Helen V. “Economic self-interest, information, and trade policy preferences: Evidence from an experiment in Tunisia.” Review of International Political Economy 26 (2019): pp. 545-572.
[9] Hunter, F. Robert. “Rethinking Europe’s conquest of North Africa and the Middle East: the opening of the Maghreb, 1660–1814.” The Journal of North African Studies 4 (1999): pp. 1-26.
[10] Mikhail, Alan, and Philliou, Christine M. “The Ottoman Empire and the imperial turn.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 54 (2012, p. 736): pp. 721-745.
[11] Lappé, Frances Moore, and Collins, Joseph, with Fowler, Cary. Food First: Beyond the Myth of Scarcity. Houghton Mifflin (1977, p. 85).
[12] Bennoune, Mahfoud. “Primary capital accumulation in colonial Tunisia.” Dialectical Anthropology 4 (1979): pp. 83-100.
[13] Riachi, Roland, and Martiniello, Giuliano. “Manufactured regional crises: The Middle East and North Africa under global food regimes.” Journal of Agrarian Change 23 (2023): pp. 792-810.
[14] Clapp, Jennifer. Trade liberalisation and food security: Examining the Linkages. Quaker United Nations Office (2014).
[15] Drèze, Jean, and Sen, Amartya. Hunger and Public Action. Clarendon Press (1989, p. 49).
[16] World Trade Organization. Trade Liberalisation and Food Security. Speech by Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza, Deputy Director-General of the WTO to the World Food Summit, Rome (11 June 2002).
[17] Boudjebel SA VACPA. “About: Our Company”. Available at: https://www.boudjebeldates.com/dattes-tunisie-boudjebel-vacpa/ (Accessed: 25 July 2025).
[18] Rose Blanche Group. “About us: Mission, Vision, Values”. Available at: https://www.rose-blanche.com/en/mission-vision-values/ (Accessed: 25 July 2025).
[19] Chater, Khalifa. “Introduction à l’étude de l’establishment tunisien: l’Etat Makhzen Husseinite et ses mutations.” Cahiers de la Méditerranée 49 (1994): pp. 1-18.
[20] Sethom, Hafedh. Pouvoir urbain et paysannerie en Tunisie: qui sème le vent récolte la tempête. Cérès Producitons (1992, p. 334).
About the Author
Emile van Ommeren is a postdoctoral researcher at the School of International Studies in Trento (Italy), where he works in the project ‘Food Connections: Intended and unintended consequences of trade on food and nutrition security’. He obtained his Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of Antwerp (2023), and he has previously worked as a policy officer at the Dutch Ministry of Finance. He studied International Economics and Business at Utrecht University and Political Science at the Free University of Brussels.
Other Recent Articles in the TRAFO Series A Decolonial Mediterranean
Mustapha Majidi, Bridging the Mediterranean: Collaborative Pathways or Power Struggles in Renewable Energy?, 27.11.2025.
Said Chemlal, A Reverse Shot of Migratory Narratives in Matteo Garrone’s Io Capitano (2022), 13.11.2025.
Rim Naguib, Solidarity against Empire in a Colonial Port City, 23.10.2025.
Citation: Emile van Ommeren, Between Trade-Based Food Security and Self-Sufficiency: Agricultural Policies and Sectors in Tunisia, in: TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 25.12.2025, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/63353
OpenEdition suggests that you cite this post as follows:
Forum Transregionale Studien (December 25, 2025). Between Trade-Based Food Security and Self-Sufficiency: Agricultural Policies and Sectors in Tunisia. TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research. Retrieved January 22, 2026 from https://doi.org/10.58079/15ezs


