Bridging the Mediterranean: Collaborative Pathways or Power Struggles in Renewable Energy?
By Mustapha Majidi
Despite the numerous benefits associated with renewable energy, projects aiming to harness this form of energy face significant challenges when implemented through partnerships, especially within the complex context of North Africa. This study critically examines the main disadvantages of renewable energy project partnerships in the region, focusing on Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, which represent key actors in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) with ambitious and dynamic energy goals. Using a well-established analytical framework, the study explores the limitations of these partnerships from multiple perspectives: organizational, planning, contractual, financial, governance, regulatory, and social.
It first reviews the major projects that emerged in the early 2000s, highlighting the interest of Northern Mediterranean countries, including EU members, in exploiting renewable energy resources from the South. It then analyses the structural imbalances in partnerships between Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries, arguing that cooperation in this sector remains largely tilted in favour of the North.
Background: European Projects in Southern Mediterranean Countries
Over the past two decades, several renewable energy strategies and initiatives have been launched in Europe, many of which focus on exploiting the renewable energy potential of the South and importing it into Europe. The instability of the Middle East, the gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, rising oil prices, and European commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions have all pushed European countries to take greater interest in the untapped energy potential of the southern Mediterranean. North Africa, with its vast solar and wind resources, offers an attractive solution to Europe’s growing demand for clean energy. The vast deserts of North Africa provide ideal locations for installing solar panels and wind turbines.[1]
This northern interest has materialized through several large projects, notably the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) and Desertec, both emblematic of Europe’s ambition to secure access to southern renewable energy. Launched in November 2008 as one of the six priority projects of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)[2], the Mediterranean Solar Plan aimed to generate 20 GW of additional low-carbon electricity capacity by 2020, primarily solar, and to develop interconnections that would allow the export of 5 GW to the European Union.[3] To achieve this, the Mediterranean Solar Plan Project Preparation Initiative (MSP-PPI) was established to accelerate renewable energy and energy-efficiency projects across nine Mediterranean partner countries.[4]
“The MSP-PPI covers 100% of the costs associated with Technical Assistance for preparing sustainable energy investments projects in nine Mediterranean partner countries (MPCs): Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and West Bank & Gaza.”[5]
In parallel, the Transgreen (Medgrid) initiative (as part of the MSP) was launched to study the feasibility of a power transmission network linking the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean and to develop broader interconnections around the basin. Since then, projects at various stages of development have been initiated between Portugal and Morocco, Tunisia and Italy, Libya and Greece, and Israel and Cyprus, all presented as opportunities for regional integration.[6] However, the MSP’s original goal of 20 GW by 2020 has not been reached; it has instead evolved into fragmented initiatives tailored to national contexts.

Photo by DESERTEC Foundation, www.desertec.org, via Wikimedia Commons.
The Desertec Initiative followed a similar vision. Established in 2009 by a coalition of scientists, politicians, and economists from across the Mediterranean, the non-profit Desertec Foundation sought to supply renewable energy from deserts to consumers worldwide, contributing to prosperity and climate protection.[7] Its goal is to provide renewable energy from deserts around the world to as many people and businesses as possible, contributing to both prosperity and climate protection. The Desertec Project was presented as a response to multiple global challenges: climate change, gas conflicts (notably between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009), fears of peak oil, and the 2009 global food crisis. Inspired by this vision, the Desertec Initiative was launched in autumn 2009, bringing together 13 private companies and funding organizations. The initiative aims to harness the solar energy of southern countries to produce electricity for northern ones, with a long-term goal of installing 2 GW of solar and wind power capacity, mainly across North Africa and the Middle East, by 2050.
These large-scale “megaprojects,” primarily focused on electricity export, have shaped national renewable energy plans in the southern Mediterranean. Today, southern Mediterranean countries have developed their own strategies, often within partnership frameworks between public and private actors from both sides of the Mediterranean, often benefiting from European support and assistance. Yet these projects continue to reflect the same vision: harnessing the solar and wind potential of the South to serve Europe’s clean-energy needs.
Renewable Energy Partnerships in North Africa: Disguised Domination?
While renewable energy projects developed in the early 2000s carry significant potential benefits, they are also fraught with persistent structural imbalances. Three key issues undermine the fairness and sustainability of these partnerships: economic dependence, technological dependency, and socio-environmental impacts.
Economic Dependence and Financial Arrangements
The neoliberal approach adopted by North African governments in their energy transition centred on large-scale projects and has increased the risk of excessive dependence on foreign investors and the marginalization of local populations and companies. Morocco and Tunisia[8], for example, illustrate how centralized political economies[9] tend to favour large, often foreign players while limiting opportunities for smaller domestic actors.[10]
As the researcher on renewable energies, Marina Blohm (2023), notes, small and medium-sized enterprises, particularly in rural areas, lack the technical and financial capacity to participate in these large projects.[11] Despite some benefits for certain groups,[12] households, rural communities, local companies, and the rural workforce are frequently among the main losers of the energy transition, while most construction contracts go to firms based outside the region.[13]
The long-term economic implications and ownership structures of these projects also reveal unbalanced ownership structures. Tunisia’s Solar Energy Plan, for instance, requires about €8 billion in investment for 2015–2030, with €6.3 billion for equipment and €1.7 billion for electrical grid development.[14] Morocco has invested roughly 130 billion dirhams ($13 billion) since 2009, while Algeria plans to invest $30 billion by 2030. Such large financial commitments place heavy pressure on public budgets and heighten dependency on foreign direct investment (FDI). Domestic investment remains constrained by high national debt[15] and limited expertise in renewable energy financing among local banks and investors.[16] This situation partially explains the underdevelopment of domestic renewable energy industries in these countries.
The financial gap becomes unsustainable when we consider that public authorities support large-scale renewable electricity (RES-E) projects through various mechanisms, notably Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs)[17], used in Morocco and Algeria, which recently introduced technology-specific feed-in-tariffs (FITs).[18] In other countries, such as Tunisia, support mechanisms exist only for small-scale projects. This has little direct impact on exported electricity, which must compete with market prices in the destination countries.[19] In such cases, these mechanisms may encourage investors, but the host country ultimately bears the cost difference. As a result, these financial arrangements remain unbalanced, with public authorities assuming the debts linked to these projects, leading to an uneven distribution of risks and benefits.[20]
Technological Dependence
Do Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria have the technological capacity to manage and maintain these projects independently in the long term? At present, the answer remains no. Despite numerous international partnerships and substantial foreign investments, technology transfer has been limited, and domestic renewable energy industries remain weak.
Empirical evidence highlights the limited diffusion of knowledge in the sector: local companies remain largely confined to low-value construction activities rather than advancing into manufacturing or technological innovation. The region continues to depend heavily on imported technology, with no country yet achieving a self-sustaining renewable energy industry. The anticipated industrial upgrading has not materialized, leaving the renewable energy landscape reliant on external expertise. In short, while North Africa has made notable progress in deploying renewable infrastructure, genuine technological independence remains out of reach due to persistent gaps in knowledge transfer and industrial capacity.
Recently, several photovoltaic solar panel manufacturing initiatives have emerged in Morocco. In 2018, Almaden Morocco,[21] a subsidiary of the Chinese company Almaden, which produces solar glass and modules and operates a plant in Dubai, launched operations in Al Hoceima, following a Moroccan-Chinese partnership. Two additional factories are expected to become operational soon: one by a French company in Marrakech and another by a Polish company in Tangier.
In the wind sector, developments are similarly slow. Following the Siemens Gamesa plant inaugurated in 2017, a second turbine-blade factory owned by the Chinese group Aeolon is expected to become operational in 2025.[22] In Algeria and Tunisia, the renewable industry remains limited mainly to component assembly.
Moreover, the Noor Ouarzazate project in Morocco illustrates the consequences of inadequate technological choices. Noor III was shut down for a second time due to technical problems linked to concentrated solar power (CSP) technology. The forced shutdown, which lasted from March to November 2024, was caused by a leak in the molten-salt tank. This incident raises serious concerns about the reliability of the chosen infrastructure and has reignited debate over the need to diversify energy storage options.[23] Developed in both Morocco and Algeria, CSP technology remains significantly more expensive than alternative systems[24] and is among the least-used globally compared to photovoltaic technologies.[25] These issues call the suitability and long-term sustainability of such technological choices in both countries into question.

Overall, the lack of effective technology transfer and the limited development of a qualified workforce continue to hinder innovation and deepen North Africa’s dependence on northern partners.
Socio-Environmental Impacts
Large-scale solar projects have undoubtedly contributed to reducing carbon emissions. However, they have not significantly decreased dependence on fossil fuels in the countries mentioned earlier, nor have they led to a substantial decline in overall greenhouse gas emissions. On the contrary, gas and oil extraction projects have in some cases expanded, depending on each country’s context, resulting in a net increase in emissions.[26] These renewable energy projects have also caused notable disruptions in land use and usage of water resources in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, particularly as most are located in desert areas where water is already scarce. Moreover, these regions are home to nomadic pastoral communities whose traditional knowledge of land management is increasingly at risk of being displaced by the large-scale deployment of renewable energy infrastructure.[27]
The Borj Salhi Wind Farm in Tunisia exemplifies these tensions. Residents have expressed discontent over the proximity of turbines, some only 50 meters away, and the constant noise affecting both people and livestock. Environmental degradation, including soil erosion and olive-tree dieback, has also been reported, alongside complaints about poor maintenance leading to accidents.[28]
In addition, the socioeconomic benefits of these projects have not been distributed evenly across different segments of the population. In the case of the Ouarzazate solar plant in Morocco, the local impact of the project was minimal. Local actors were excluded from the decision-making process, and land was sold at low prices without their knowledge or consultation.[29]
More broadly, the social dimension remains marginalized in national energy transition plans, despite the crucial role local communities play in ensuring political and social stability for renewable energy initiatives. To address this imbalance, project leaders and supervisory authorities should build long-term partnerships with local groups, provide transparent information about project goals, and include them in meaningful consultation and debate.[30]
In Algeria, the situation differs considerably from that of its neighbours. Unlike Morocco and Tunisia, where renewable energy strategies have progressed further, Algeria’s efforts continue to lag behind for several key reasons.
“Barriers to renewable energy deployment obviously include subsidies for conventional forms of energy, lack of skills or information, poor market acceptance as well as structural and institutional factors.”[31]
In practice, the oil lobby has slowed development by insisting on the local manufacturing of equipment required for renewable projects—an approach that has often delayed or discouraged investment.[32]
“A lack of political will, the limited commitment of Sonelgaz, Algeria’s national electricity and gas company, to the program it was tasked with implementing, along with clear conflicts of interest, have ultimately led to the failure of all renewable energy initiatives.”[33]
Although the renewable energy sector has strong potential for job creation, access to these opportunities remains limited, and local communities are seldom involved in the process—factors that can foster a sense of exclusion.[34] Across North Africa, decision-making for renewable energy projects remains highly centralized, with projects implemented through a top-down approach that often overlooks local needs and knowledge.[35] This centralized model, common throughout the region, results in unequal distribution of benefits and can undermine public support, reinforcing socioeconomic inequalities and feelings of marginalization, particularly in rural areas.[36]
Conclusion
These sectoral strategies demonstrate a clear commitment to adopting and promoting new energy directions that have gained momentum in recent years, setting the pace for the energy transition urgently needed in North African countries. However, an analysis of renewable energy projects in the region reveals persistent imbalances in North–South partnerships. While these projects contribute to the production of clean energy, their financial, social, and environmental impacts remain uneven and often problematic. Many are built on unequal partnerships that primarily benefit the private sector, especially international companies. Recognizing and addressing these structural asymmetries is essential to unlock the full potential of renewable energy collaborations and to ensure a truly sustainable and inclusive energy future for the region.
Notes
[1] The region of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean is endowed for important renewable energy resources notably for solar and wind energy. The hours of sunshine vary between 2700 and 3400 hours per year. Cited in: «Efficacité énergétique et les énergies renouvelables», in Abdenour Keramane (dir.) (2010). Énergies renouvelables en Méditerranée: un pari à gagner. Les Notes IPEMED, (IPEMED, 2010), n.8, p. 4. Available via this link: https://urlr.me/vy8unN.
[2] Launched on July 13, 2008, as part of the French presidency of the European Union, the UPM promotes a new co-development policy in the Mediterranean region. It brings together states bordering the Mediterranean and all member states of the European Union, making a total of 43 countries.
[3] Mohammed Chentouf & Mohamed Allouch, “Assessment of Energy Security in MedRing Countries and Regional Trends towards Renewable Energy Deployment,” Journal of Renewable and Sustainable Energy 9, no. 6 (2017): p. 28, https://doi.org/10.1063/1.5001825.
[4] European Investment Bank, Mediterranean Solar Plan , Project Preparation Initiative (MSP-PPI), European Investment Bank, 2015. https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2867/55111.
[5] Israel is part of the UFM, which gives it institutional legitimacy in projects such as the PSM. This represents an indirect normalization with other Arab states, especially at a time when the peace process between Israel and Palestine was at a standstill. Thus, technical cooperation (energy, water, climate) became a soft power strategy for Israel, allowing it to assert its legitimacy in the region, especially since Palestine was reduced to the West Bank and Gaza. Official web page of UFM: https://urls.fr/DnSPjy.
[6] Antoine-Tristan Mocilnikar, “L’Europe, la Méditerranée et l’énergie,” Annales des Mines – Réalités industrielles Février 2018, no. 1 (2018): p. 20, Cairn.info, https://doi.org/10.3917/rindu1.181.0016.
[7] Desertec non-profit foundation and Desertec Industrial Initiative (DII) are very different from each other. The first is the non-profit foundation, a network of scientists, politicians and economists from around the Mediterranean. In contrast, the second (DII) is a consortium of international companies that aims to translate the Desertec concept to a profitable business project. In 2013, the Desertec foundation decided to withdraw from the Desertec Industrial Initiative, citing fundamental disagreements over future strategy, commitments, and the leadership approach within DII. See Schmitt, Thomas M. 2018. “(Why) Did Desertec Fail? An Interim Analysis of a Large-Scale Renewable Energy Infrastructure Project from a Social Studies of Technology Perspective.” Local Environment 23 (7): 747–776. doi:10.1080/13549839.2018.1469119.
[8] For Tunisia see: Chafik Ben Rouine and Flavie Roche, ‘Renewable’ energy in Tunisia: An unjust transition, 31 March 2022. https://urlz.fr/uGxL.
[9] The core problem, therefore, is not centralization itself, but rather who it serves—in this case, multinational corporations and foreign capital, to the detriment of local communities and the environment.
[10] Marina Blohm, Towards a Sustainable Energy Future: Analysing Existing Barriers and Lost Benefits of Energy Transitions in the MENA Region with a Focus on Morocco (PhD diss., Europa-Universität Flensburg, 2023), p. 128.
[11] Ibid.
[12] The author considers that while large international companies, primarily foreign, the government, and the rural areas electrified through the electrification program are the winners.
[13] For Morocco see: Georgeta Vidican et al., Achieving Inclusive Competitiveness in the Emerging Solar Energy Sector in Morocco (Bonn: German Development Institute [DIE], 2013), p. 57. For Tunisia see: Chafik Ben Rouine and Flavie Roche, op cit.
[14] Agence Nationale pour la Maitrise de l’Energie (ANAM), Nouvelle version du plan solaire tunisien, 2015, p. 16.
[15] Unlike Algeria, which relies on internal debt, Morocco and Tunisia are heavily indebted to foreign countries, with 69.06% and 41.7% of GDP respectively. See more details see: https://urls.fr/MpqaNP or: https://urls.fr/Kg9nCc.
[16] Andreas Beneking et al., “Renewable Energy Cooperation between the EU and North Africa,” International Journal of Energy Sector Management 10, no. 3 (2016), p: 324, https://doi.org/10.1108/IJESM-11-2014-0005.
[17] An agreement for the long-term delivery of electricity between two parties, usually a manufacturer and an electricity buyer (consumer or negotiator), is known as a power purchase agreement (or PPA). Every condition of the sale of electricity is recapped in detail by the PPA, including the amount of electricity to be delivered, the agreed upon price, the method of calculation, and the penalties for breach of contract.
[18] A feed-in tariff is a policy mechanism that obliges regional or national electric grid utilities to buy renewable electricity (electricity generated from renewable sources, such as solar power, wind power, wave and tidal power, biomass, hydropower, and geothermal power) from all eligible participants at a fixed price over a fixed period of time.
[19] Beneking et al., “Renewable Energy Cooperation between the EU and North Africa,” p. 321.
[20] Mustapha Majidi, «Le partenariat public privé dans la production d’électricité de sources renouvelables : apports et limites». Revue Marocaine de L’administration et Développement (REMALD), 2020, n°150-151, p. 216.
[21] Almaden Morocco is a subsidiary of Almaden, Chinese company that manufactures solar glass and solar modules, and has a plant in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
[22] Chinese investments cover the entire value chain, promoting technology transfers and rapid implementation, particulary in renewables. European investments, while strictly adhering to ESG standards, remains limited in local transformation and slower to materialize. Facing these differences, African countries are diversifying partnerships to strengthen local industrialization and better leverage their natural ressources. See more details: Di Ciommo, Mariella, Pauline Veron & Nadia Ashraf. The EU and China in the Global South: Perspectives from African countries. Discussion Paper No. 373. Maastricht: ECDPM, 2024.
[23] Beyond molten salts, several alternative thermal storage alternative solutions exist. These include solid-media systems that utilize refractory concrete, ceramics, or rock beds heated by air or heat transfer fluids. Additional options encompass latent heat storage using phase change materials and thermochemical storage systems. For additional details see: Longuet, Gérard, et Gérard Leseul. Comparer les modes de stockage de l’énergie. Note n° 42. Paris : Office parlementaire d’évaluation des choix scientifiques et technologiques, septembre 2023. Available via this link: https://urlr.me/B7XUZE.
[24] Rapport du Conseil économique social et environnemental (CESE), économie verte, opportunités de création de richesses et d’emplois, (Rabat : 2020), p. 59.
[25] International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), Renewable energy statistics 2024, Abu Dhabi, 2024.
[26] For reasons of energy stability and economic efficiency, these countries are pursuing a dual-track strategy: the development of renewable energies and fuels, in this case oil and gas. See: io consulting. North Africa’s Energy Transition: Pioneering Regional Transformation. Londres: io consulting, 2024. Or see: Amani Othmen, Roundtable Report – In Pursuit of Energy Transition: Will Tunisia Escape Green Colonialism? (Arab Reform Initiative, 19 juin 2025), https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/will-tunisia-escape-green-colonialism/.
[27] Roberto Cantoni and Karen Rignall, “Kingdom of the Sun: A Critical, Multiscalar Analysis of Morocco’s Solar Energy Strategy,” Energy Research & Social Science 51 (May 2019), p.7, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.12.012.
[28] Chafik Ben Rouine, Flavie Roche. Les énergies renouvelables en Tunisie, une transition injuste, (transnational institut, 2022). URL : www.tni.org/fr/article/renewable-energy-in-tunisia.
[29] Sandra Müller et al., Achieving Inclusive Competitiveness in the Emerging Solar Energy Sector in Morocco, Studies no. 79 (Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), 2013), p. 58, https://hdl.handle.net/10419/199204.
[30] Mokrani, Mohamed Adem. La transition énergétique en Algérie, au Maroc et en Tunisie. Natural Resource Governance Institute, Septembre 2022, p. 1.
[31] Saliha Haddoum, Hocine Bennour, and Toudert Ahmed Zaïd, “Algerian Energy Policy: Perspectives, Barriers, and Missed Opportunities,” Global Challenges 2, no. 8 (August 1, 2018): p. 3, https://doi.org/10.1002/gch2.201700134.
[32] Althought this requirement appears justified at first glance, the absence of strategic vision for establishing a local industrial base exposes its true nature: a hindrance to development that the oil lobby frames as a threat to its rent-seeking economic model.
[33] Hasni, Tewfik, Redouane Malek, et Nazim Zouioueche. L’Algérie 100 % Énergies Renouvelables : Recommandations pour une stratégie nationale de transition énergétique. (Alger : Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2021), p. 11.
[34] Benyoh Emmanuel Kigha Nsafon & al., “The Justice and Policy Implications of Clean Energy Transition in Africa,” Frontiers in Environmental Science 11 (January 2023): p. 2, https://doi.org/10.3389/fenvs.2023.1089391.
[35] Mokrani, Mohamed Adem. La transition énergétique en Algérie, au Maroc et en Tunisie. Natural Resource Governance Institute (Tunisie : Septembre 2022), p. 7.
[36] Nsafon & al., “The Justice and Policy Implications of Clean Energy Transition in Africa,” p. 2.
About the Author
Mustapha Majidi is an Associate Professor of Public Law and Political Science at Hassan I University, Morocco, within the Faculty of Legal and Political Sciences. He holds a PhD focused on Energy Governance and Sustainable Development in Morocco, a topic that continues to inform his academic work. He also coordinates the Political and International Studies program at the same faculty. Currently, he is a Visiting Fellow at Philipps University of Marburg (Germany), where he contributes to the international research project Extractivism. His research explores issues related to sustainable development, energy transition, water policies, climate change, and extractivism, through an analytical approach rooted in political science.
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Citation: Mustapha Majidi, Bridging the Mediterranean: Collaborative Pathways or Power Struggles in Renewable Energy?, in: TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 27.11.2025, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/62509
OpenEdition suggests that you cite this post as follows:
Forum Transregionale Studien (November 27, 2025). Bridging the Mediterranean: Collaborative Pathways or Power Struggles in Renewable Energy? TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research. Retrieved December 7, 2025 from https://doi.org/10.58079/158bf


