Addressing Value Pluralism: The Lithuanian Constitutional Court Enhances Democracy by Resolving the Deadlock of Civil Unions
By Donatas Murauskas
The issue of civil unions for same-sex couples has long been one of the most contentious and sensitive topics in Lithuanian politics, reflecting deeper societal tensions. This changed on 17th April 2025, when, in a significant development, the Lithuanian Constitutional Court (the Court) addressed the long-standing issue of legal recognition for same-sex and opposite-sex civil unions (the Ruling). In doing so, the Court effectively took the initiative from the Parliament, which had been deadlocked for years due to the challenges of resolving a complex issue rooted in value pluralism.[1] In this blog post, I examine how the Constitutional Court addressed one of the fundamental challenges of deliberative democracy in practice – value pluralism – which had stalled the Parliament for many years.
Since 2000, Lithuanian law has formally recognised the right to enter into a civil union as an alternative to marriage. However, this right was contingent on the adoption of a separate law regulating civil unions – a law that has never been enacted. Moreover, civil unions were defined as being available exclusively to opposite-sex couples. In the Ruling the Court held that both – same and opposite sex – unions fall within the scope of constitutional protection, and it imposed a clear obligation on the legislature to enact the necessary legal framework within a reasonable timeframe. The Court empowered ordinary courts to adjudicate individual requests concerning civil unions on a case-by-case basis which have indeed received numerous applications since and generated pressure on the legislature to act. This landmark ruling represents a substantial shift after years of legislative inactivity and unsuccessful attempts to regulate same-sex unions. For the first time, a constitutional authority has provided a binding interpretation affirming that the absence of legal recognition for same-sex couples is incompatible with the Constitution’s guarantees of human dignity, private and family life, and equality.

This judicial intervention not only resolved a specific legal impasse but also invites a broader theoretical inquiry: what institutional forms are best equipped to mediate deep moral disagreements in a pluralistic society while remaining faithful to the principles of deliberative democracy? Elstub and McLaverty pose a fundamental question at the intersection of political theory and institutional design: What kinds of institutions are necessary to reconcile the ideals of deliberative democracy with the empirical reality of pluralistic, diverse, and often divided societies?[2] In response, I explore the recent Ruling of the Constitutional Court through the lens of deliberative democratic theory, to reflect on the potential and limitations of constitutional adjudication as a site of public reasoning.
What was the issue in national law before the Ruling?
Under Lithuanian law, the concept of civil unions (which is formally called “partnership”) has formally been recognised but is not actually functioning. The Civil Code allows for the conclusion of a partnership exclusively between a man and a woman, thus excluding same-sex couples from this legal arrangement. The Civil Code sets out a basic legal framework for regulating such partnerships. However, the relevant provisions of the Civil Code shall only enter into force once a separate law regulating the procedure for partnership registration is adopted. By enacting such a requirement, the legislature created a “suspended” legal regime for civil unions. For 24 years, however, Parliament failed to adopt the necessary law, leaving the partnership provisions legally dormant.
This legal design created a paradoxical situation: the Civil Code implied the existence of a partnership institution, thus acknowledging the legal need for recognising non-marital unions—but limited it to heterosexual couples and rendered it non-functional due to the absence of implementation legislation. As a result, while certain provisions concerning property relations between different-sex partners who might enter such a union exist on paper, the partnership framework lacked legal effect. This conditional norm effectively suspended the legal recognition of civil partnerships, leaving same-sex couples with no access to comparable legal protection.
The Ruling as a constitutional breakthrough
The Court declared that the restriction of partnership to different-sex couples is incompatible with the Constitution. Such a limitation violates the constitutional principles of human dignity, equality, the protection of private and family life and the principle of the state under the rule of law. The Court reaffirmed that the Parliament retains an obligation to adopt the necessary legislation to regulate partnerships in a manner that includes both same-sex and different-sex couples.
Importantly, the Court also addressed the interim legal vacuum created by the legislature’s prolonged inaction. It ruled that until the necessary legislation is enacted, individuals have the right to seek the recognition of their partnership through the courts. This means that courts now have a constitutional mandate to adjudicate such cases and to ensure protection of fundamental rights, even in the absence of specific statutory regulations (they successfully started to do in first decision on 8 August[3]).
This Ruling represents a constitutional breakthrough in Lithuania’s human rights jurisprudence. For the first time, the Constitutional Court not only declared the current legal regime discriminatory but also created a practical pathway for same-sex couples to seek legal recognition, thereby reinforcing the judiciary’s role as a guarantor of constitutional rights in the face of legislative inertia. While the Ruling has implications for advancing equality, it also reopens the debate about institutional foundations of deliberative democracy in Lithuania.
Drawing on the distinction between ‘political’ and ‘legal’ constitutions,[4] we may view the parliament as the primary arena for resolving morally and politically divisive issues. However, this assumption may be contested in the light of real-life politics. Critics note that modern parliaments often face structural constraints – ranging from entrenched party interests[5] to declining legislative autonomy vis-à-vis the executive,[6] that can stale genuine deliberation. Mansbridge questions whether parliaments are representative of the broader community when minority rights are at stake.[7] The Constitutional Court’s intervention compensates for parliamentary deadlock but, as I argue, it does so in a deliberative democratic spirit. The Ruling encourages the legislature to overcome the previously stalled deliberation and thus nudging the parliament to fulfil its legal obligation while adhering to value pluralism.
Value pluralism in difficult political debates
To understand the benefit of thinking of value pluralism in the context of constitutional adjudication and democracy, it helps to ask why people so often reject arguments they disagree with, even when those arguments are well-reasoned and supported by evidence. Is it merely a matter of lacking a suitable platform for open, respectful discussion? While the absence of structured dialogue certainly plays a role, the answer is likely far more complex, rooted in human psychology, educational background, personal lived experience and other internal and external factors. These factors can shape how individuals interpret information, evaluate competing values, and, ultimately, determine what they perceive as persuasive or legitimate. Sometimes, even the most compelling argument fails, not because it is weak, but because it clashes with deeply held beliefs or identity commitments.
Although deliberative democracy strives to make political decisions that are the product of fair and reasonable discussion,[8] it nevertheless faces several fundamental problems. Facing the difficult political choices, the proponents of deliberative democracy argue for a regulative setting in which the free discussion ensures the victory of the better argument. Habermas focused on such idea of deliberative democracy.[9] However, the free and unconstrained debate is the ideal world perception, which is sometimes unrealistic in real life. It is exactly why the so-called third generation of theorists of deliberative democracy made the way for more practical questions on the implementation of deliberative democracy in practice.[10] Among them, Dryzek developed the argument about the potential for the discussion in divided societies[11], that is applicable in Lithuania in the context of same-sex partnerships.
Value pluralism denotes the coexistence of multiple values within a democratic society. For a long time, this reality was underappreciated by many deliberative democracy theorists, who assumed that reasoned discourse could always lead to mutual understanding or normative agreement.
As Cinalli and O’Flynn point out, the recognition of value pluralism presents a serious dilemma: if values cannot be rationally compared or ranked, then the Habermasian deliberative model struggles to function. In such cases, outcomes may be shaped less by persuasion and more by bargaining, voting, or even the exercise of brute force. When values diverge, deliberation may no longer serve as a meaningful path to consensus, as there may be no common ground from which to begin convincing others that one’s values are preferable.[12]
This insight invites us to reconsider the assumptions behind deliberative processes, especially in “divided societies” in Dryzek’s terms. It also raises important questions for constitutional courts: can they still serve as platforms for reasoned dialogue, or are they increasingly merely arenas of negotiated power?
How has the Constitutional Court’s reconciled value pluralism in the society?
In its 2025 ruling, the Court resolved a long-standing legal deadlock of absence of a functional provision of civil unions by acknowledging that the Parliament missed the time to adopt the necessary legislation on the civil unions. In effect, the Ruling, for the first time, enabled the formal functioning of existing legal provisions of civil unions. The Court did so without directly engaging in the deeper conflict of values such as equality in family relations versus preference to heterosexual family concept that had paralysed parliamentary decision-making for over two decades.
Why was the parliamentary deadlock an issue of value pluralism? As discussed above, the Court was asked to adjudicate the 24-year old legal dilemma of a “legally dormant” framework for civil partnerships, caused by the absence of a separate law regulating the registration procedure that was a condition for the framework to be activated.
Attempts to enact such a law, however, ran into value-based disagreements. Proponents of inclusive partnership legislation consistently grounded their arguments in constitutional principles such as equality, human dignity, and non-discrimination. In contrast, the opponents argued with tradition, which they interpreted as embracing the concept of heterosexual family, protection against the erosion of such a family model, fears of a slippery slope toward legalising same-sex marriage or adoption, and general discomfort with non-heteronormative relationships.
These claims, often emotional or ideologically charged, proved resistant to rational deliberation. As a result, public debate around civil unions became a contest between the allegedly majority-driven argument for the traditional family concept values and the need to ensure equal protection of same-sex families – a type of discourse that is especially difficult to reconcile within the framework of reasoned democratic deliberation.
In its ruling, the Constitutional Court did not engage directly with this antagonism of values. It did not attempt to identify or deconstruct the normative foundation of the traditionalist position. By invoking established constitutional principles, the Court effectively undermined the legitimacy of arguments rooted solely in majority sentiment or cultural tradition and ‘restored’ value pluralism in the democratic deliberative process. The Court identified positive measures to tackle discrimination, which is considered risky redistributing measure substituting for the legislature.[13] Citing its prior rulings, the Court emphasised that:
“Only a state that is guided by respect for the dignity of every person can be considered genuinely democratic. It should be emphasised that, as the Constitutional Court has noted, the Constitution is an anti-majoritarian act – it protects the individual” (Rulings of 19 August 2006 and 11 January 2019).
It further clarified that:
“In a democratic state governed by the rule of law, the prevailing views or stereotypes held by a majority of society at a given time cannot constitute a constitutionally justifiable basis – even when pursuing constitutionally important objectives, inter alia public order – for discriminating against individuals solely on the grounds of their sexual identity and/or sexual orientation, including by restricting the protection of private and family life, as guaranteed under Article 22(1) and (4) of the Constitution” (Ruling of 11 January 2019).
Through this reasoning, the Court implicitly rejected arguments based on “traditional values” by reaffirming that maintaining cultural norms is not a sufficient justification for infringing fundamental rights. In that sense, the Court did not engage in moral evaluation of competing value systems but instead drew a constitutional boundary against majoritarian discrimination. The Court raised the debate to deliberative democracy in Rawlsian terms, by engaging in shared political values that are embedded in “reasonable comprehensive doctrines” asserted by “reasonable persons”[14].
This approach affirmed the Constitution as a normative shield for individuals, especially in situations where legislative inertia or cultural resistance threatens the protection of minority rights. In doing so, the Court not only resolved a specific legal question but also reinforced the broader principle that constitutional democracy is not simply about reflecting the majority’s will, but about safeguarding the dignity and equality of all.
By declaring that 24 years is too long to enact the required legislation, the Court effectively set a new constitutional standard that democratic institutions must engage in individual-oriented, timely deliberation, particularly where legislation concerns vulnerable or marginalised groups. This marks a shift away from a purely procedural model of governance and toward a more substantive, responsive, and constitutionally grounded form of democratic practice.
Conclusions
In the face of value pluralism, the Constitutional Court did not attempt to reconcile competing conceptions of values directly. Instead, it elevated the debate by anchoring its reasoning in general constitutional principles such as dignity, equality, and the rule of law. By framing the issue at this higher level of abstraction, the Court provided a rational, constitutionally grounded foundation for deliberation.
The Constitutional Court’s ruling imposed the constitutional imperative of effective deliberation in the Parliament. By explicitly stating that a 24-year delay in adopting necessary legislation is not constitutionally acceptable, the Court has set an important precedent. This finding challenges declarative forms of deliberation, in which decision-makers simulate engagement without genuine intent to act. The Court’s intervention sends a broader democratic message – deliberation must also be timely and result-oriented when fundamental rights are at stake.
AI Declaration: Grammarly was used in the preparation of this text for editing purposes only. All substantive content was created by a human author.
Notes
[1] The Ruling of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court of 17 April 2025, no. KT21-N5/202.
[2] Stephen Elstub and Peter McLaverty, ‘Introduction: Issues and Cases in Deliberative Democracy’, in Deliberative Democracy: Issues and Cases, ed. Stephen Elstub and Peter McLaverty (Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 11.
[3] See https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/2637695/teismas-pirma-karta-pripazino-tos-pacios-lyties-poros-partneryste?srsltid=AfmBOooZTZ3xlYzPwvPIwUwcQblGzFacsNLVVT5agzut2F2nVXjQbFQe.
[4] Graham Gee and Grégoire C. N. Webber, ‘What Is a Political Constitution?’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30, no. 2 (2010): 286–90, https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqq013.
[5] Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, ‘Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party’, Party Politics 1, no. 1 (1995): 5–28, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068895001001001.
[6] Philip Norton, ed., Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe (Frank Cass, 1998).
[7] Jane Mansbridge, ‘Rethinking Representation’, American Political Science Review 97, no. 4 (2003): 515–28, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055403000856.
[8] See: https://www.britannica.com/topic/deliberative-democracy.
[9] Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Polity, 1990).
[10] Elstub and McLaverty, ‘Introduction: Issues and Cases in Deliberative Democracy’, 6.
[11] John S. Dryzek, ‘Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia’, Political Theory 33, no. 2 (2005): 218–42, https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591704268372.
[12] Manlio Cinalli and Ian O’Flynn, ‘Pluralism and Deliberative Democracy’, in Deliberative Democracy: Issues and Cases, ed. Stephen Elstub and Peter McLaverty (Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 83.
[13] See, for example, Niels Petersen, ‘Mapping Equality Case Law Around the World— Conceptual Preliminaries’, in Equality’s Guardians: How Courts Conceptualize Equal Protection and Non-Discrimination Guarantees, ed. Niels Petersen (Oxford University Press, 2025), 15.
[14] John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Second edition (Columbia University Press, 1996), 59.
About the Author
Donatas Murauskas is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, Vilnius University. His current research focuses on the European Court of Human Rights case-law, constitutional identity, freedom of speech, and the socio-legal impact of constitutional court decisions. In addition to his academic work, Dr. Murauskas is an experienced lawyer specialising in human rights litigation. He has represented clients, including on a pro bono basis, before the European Court of Human Rights and national courts. Before entering private practice, he served as Head of the Representation Division for the Government of Lithuania before the European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Committee. He currently directs the U.S. Law Centre at Vilnius University. He was a Fulbright Research Scholar at Wake Forest Law School. Dr. Murauskas holds an LL.M. in Law and Economics.
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Citation: Donatas Murauskas, Addressing Value Pluralism: The Lithuanian Constitutional Court Enhances Democracy by Resolving the Deadlock of Civil Unions, in: TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 18.11.2025, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/62459
OpenEdition suggests that you cite this post as follows:
Forum Transregionale Studien (November 18, 2025). Addressing Value Pluralism: The Lithuanian Constitutional Court Enhances Democracy by Resolving the Deadlock of Civil Unions. TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research. Retrieved December 6, 2025 from https://doi.org/10.58079/155v7


