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Sahel–North Africa Relations: Addressing Common Threats in a Fragmented Cooperation Landscape


By Ornella Moderan

This contribution is based on a talk presented as part of the MECAM Policy Talk 2025 and its side events, aimed at exploring the interlinked dynamics between Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa. The events took place from June 25 to 27, 2025, in Berlin.

In a moment of deep transformation for both North Africa and the Sahel, understanding the entangled dynamics between these two regions is more critical than ever. Shared histories, geographic contiguity, and transnational challenges have long made the Maghreb and the Sahel deeply interdependent. Yet despite these linkages, security cooperation remains largely fragmented, burdened by geopolitical rivalries, mismatched strategies, limited cross-regional trust, and a legacy of externally-driven responses. Now, with the rise of allied military regimes in the Sahel and the weakening of Western-led interventions, the contours of regional security engagement are shifting—and with them, the potential roles of Algeria and Morocco.

This blog post offers reflections on the complex web of relationships between the Maghreb and the Sahel, focusing in particular on evolving regional security dynamics, the divergent postures of Algeria and Morocco, and the opportunities and risks inherent in current cooperation patterns. Drawing on developments since 2020—including the emergence of the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), the rise of Wagner and Russia’s influence, and the collapse of multilateral frameworks—it highlights the urgent need for more grounded, politically viable, and locally owned approaches to regional security governance.

The analysis explores five dimensions of this entanglement: the long-standing historical and geographical interdependence between the regions; the post-intervention shifts in security cooperation; the diverging approaches of Algeria and Morocco; the limits of current responses to governance and illicit economies; and the possibilities for a more inclusive and cooperative regional agenda.

Globe showing the Sahara and Sahel regions highlighted in orange.
Map of the Sahara and Sahel regions. Illustration by M. Bitton via Wikimedia Commons.

Historical and Geopolitical Interdependence: Interconnected Regions, Intertwined Challenges

The Sahara is often imagined as a vast separation between North Africa and the rest of the continent. In reality, it has long served as a zone of exchange, interaction, and circulation. It connects, at least as much as it separates. The porous borders between the Maghreb and the Sahel facilitate not only cultural and economic ties, but also transnational threats—from violent extremism and weapons trafficking to climate-induced displacement and governance vacuums.

The collapse of the Libyan state in 2011, for instance, became a pivotal moment that unleashed flows of weapons, fighters, and financial capital across the Sahel. The influence of Maghrebi jihadists in the early formations of groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its Sahelian affiliates underscores the ideological and operational continuities across the region. Similarly, large-scale smuggling and trafficking networks spanning from the Gulf of Guinea to the Mediterranean depend on the strategic corridors that link North Africa and the Sahel.

This interconnectedness has made regional stability indivisible: insecurity in one region fuels and amplifies threats in the other. Yet, despite this reality, no coherent regional security architecture has emerged. Instead, responses remain ad-hoc, bilaterally driven, and often shaped by domestic or geopolitical interests that undermine the prospects for collective solutions.

Fragmented Cooperation in a Post-Intervention Era

With the departure of French forces from the Sahel, the gradual collapse of the G5 Sahel framework, the downsizing or withdrawal of UN and EU missions, regional security cooperation has entered a new phase. Military-led governments in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have turned toward bilateral partnerships—especially with non-Western powers such as Russia and Turkey—and away from traditional multilateral set-ups.[1] While this shift is often couched in the rhetoric of sovereignty and Pan-African renewal, it has created a more atomized and unpredictable security environment.

Maghreb countries, for their part, have had to adapt to this new reality. Bilateralism is now the dominant mode of engagement, and each North African country has adopted a distinct approach. Libya, fractured and volatile, remains a conduit for foreign influence—particularly Russia’s. Tunisia, amid its own political turmoil and resurgent nationalism, has largely turned inward. Its main point of articulation with Sahel countries now revolving around issues of migration that are addressed by others on this platform. Egypt’s role is less prominent in the Sahel context, compared to how critical it is in Sudan, for instance. The spotlight, therefore, falls on Algeria and Morocco—two regional heavyweights whose rivalry extends deep into the Sahel.

Timeline of Key Events. Content selected by the author, turned into visual with the help of AI.

Algeria vs. Morocco: Competing Visions, Divergent Strategies

Algeria has long positioned itself as a political and military heavyweight in the Sahel. Its sponsorship of multiple iterations of peace negotiations in Mali and its past success in defeating domestic insurgencies lend it legitimacy as a security actor. However, this influence is in decline.[2] The failure of the 2015 Algiers Agreement, which Algeria brokered, has exposed both the fragility of imposed peace processes and the limits of Algeria’s diplomatic leverage. Recent tensions with Mali—compounded by drone strikes near the Algerian border and Algeria’s inability to dissuade Bamako from engaging with Russia’s Wagner Group—highlight a loss of trust and relevance.[3]

In contrast, Morocco has pursued a quieter, but arguably more effective, strategy grounded in soft power, economic diplomacy, and elite co-optation.[4] It has invested heavily in religious, educational, and military cooperation—training Sahelian imams in moderate Islam, hosting military officers in its royal academies, and expanding scholarships for Sahelian students (which Algeria also does, but perhaps less effectively). Its military partnerships are selective and non-intrusive, avoiding troop deployment while focusing on training, exercises, and intelligence sharing. In 2024 alone, Morocco signed new military cooperation agreements with both Burkina Faso and Niger.

This divergence reflects a broader geopolitical calculus. Algeria, an African Union top-tier actor and leading military power on the continent, prefers formal multilateralism and political assertiveness. Morocco, which operated outside the AU continental framework for decades and was declined membership in the ECOWAS, prioritizes flexible bilateralism and influence through development, religion, and trade. While Algeria’s approach appeals to principles of non-interference and historical solidarity, Morocco’s model aligns better with the Sahel’s emerging preference for pragmatic, transactional partnerships.

The Western Sahara dispute looms large in this strategic rivalry. Algeria’s continued support for the Polisario Front contrasts with Morocco’s push for broader international recognition of its sovereignty over the territory. This fault line increasingly plays out in the Sahel, where both countries court influence. As the region’s new military governments distance themselves from traditional diplomatic positions, Algeria risks losing ground. Post-Hirak Algeria must recalibrate its foreign policy to remain relevant—especially as its historical solidarity-based ties with the Sahel come under strain. Failure to adapt could leave Algeria isolated, particularly if its principled stance on Western Sahara becomes a liability rather than an asset in a context of transactional regional diplomacy.

Why Security Sector Reform and Governance Matters

Despite years of investment in regional security, one element remains consistently under-addressed: security sector reform and governance. The collapse of state authority in parts of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso is not merely a result of external threats—it is rooted in decades of exclusion, corruption, impunity, and the failure of state institutions to earn public trust. Any sustainable security framework must grapple with these governance deficits, not simply the military symptoms.

Here, Maghreb countries could play a constructive role. Algeria’s experience in building relatively autonomous and capable security institutions—albeit in an authoritarian framework—could offer lessons if it can pivot toward more cooperative and trust-based engagements. Morocco’s engagement in countering violent extremism and developing moderate religious curricula provides another avenue for shaping security cultures more rooted in social legitimacy.

Yet these efforts must go beyond elite-to-elite cooperation. Effective security sector reform requires inclusive dialogue, civilian oversight, and accountability mechanisms—particularly in societies embattled in or emerging from conflict or military rule. So far, neither Algeria nor Morocco has engaged seriously with these dimensions in their Sahelian partnerships. If North African powers are serious about contributing to regional stability in the Sahel, they must prioritize not only security assistance, but also governance, transparency, and rights-based approaches to security provision. A key challenge to doing so might be their limited credibility in these areas.

Beyond the Military: Crime, Climate and Local Realities

Among the many security challenges faces by both regions – Sahel and North-Africa – terrorism, armed rebellion, and organized crime are not isolated phenomena. They thrive in governance vacuums where the state is absent or predatory, and where communities are forced into illicit livelihoods and self-arrangement of basic services to survive. The Sahel’s borderlands are sites of both vulnerability and resilience—hosting populations who have long been neglected by capital-focused state institutions, yet who remain central to any solution.

The drug trade is one illustration of this complexity. Cocaine and cannabis shipments increasingly transit through the Sahel and North Africa[5], enriching local intermediaries, corrupt officials, and in some cases, insurgent groups. Trafficking routes concentrate toward Morocco, which acts as a key gateway to Europe, while new flows from Libya and the Gulf of Guinea diversify the map of illicit economies.

Climate change compounds these challenges. Desertification, drought, and flood risks are eroding livelihoods and fueling resource conflicts—especially between pastoralist and farming communities. These stressors intersect with governance deficits and social exclusion, creating fertile ground for recruitment by violent groups. Yet so far, neither Maghreb nor Sahelian governments have articulated a coordinated, regional response to these shared environmental threats. Climate security, often perceived as less politically contentious than terrorism or migration, could provide a mutually-beneficial entry point for renewed cooperation, a gateway to imagining a new form of problem-solving oriented multilateralism.

A road in the Saharan desert, a flat building on the right side.
Trans-Saharan Road, Western Sahara (2007). Photo by Radosław Botev via Wikimedia Commons.

From Interventionism to Regional Ownership

If there is a unifying thread in the current crisis of Sahel–North Africa cooperation, it is the erosion of trust—between governments, between regions, and between societies and the state. Past initiatives have faltered in part because they were externally driven, overly securitized, and inattentive to political realities on the ground. Going forward, regional cooperation must be reimagined around three principles: political viability, local ownership, and inclusive governance.

This requires bold thinking. The revitalization of dormant regional mechanisms like the 25-state member Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) or CEMOC (a regional military coordination mechanism created in 2010 by Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger to coordinate their efforts against terrorism and transnational crime in the Sahara-Sahel region) could provide institutional platforms—if reformed and adapted. The African Union may have a role to play, but it would have to reconsider the effectiveness or efficiency of its regional economic communities. In West Africa, ECOWAS is ill-positioned to serve as a conduit for cooperation involving its three former Sahelian member states which broke away to form their own Alliance des États du Sahel (AES). Meanwhile, in North Africa, the Union of the Arab Maghreb (UMA) has never really been effective.

Extra-continental powers, for their part, must resist the temptation to dictate or bypass local actors, and even to incentivize the creation of multilateral platforms that do not come from a committed intention of their own members. In a region marked by deep skepticism toward Western interventionism, the most helpful role international partners can play is clearly to support without steering, adapting to the pace and intentionality of regional actors, as challenging as this may be.

Strategic Rivalries and Regional Repositioning

Finally, the geopolitics of influence remain central. Morocco’s growing presence in the Sahel—through scholarships, trade deals, and migration management agreements—has implications not only for Algeria, but also for ECOWAS, the African Union, and even Europe. Its December 2023 offer to grant Sahelian countries access to Atlantic ports, though vague in implementation, is a clear bid for regional leadership. If Morocco channels this project through Dakhla—located in the disputed Western Sahara—it would implicitly push Sahelian partners to navigate the delicate issue of tacit recognition of Moroccan sovereignty. To date, only Niger has supported Morocco’s position on Western Sahara, but evolving alliances could shift that balance. Should countries like Mali or Burkina Faso recalibrate their official stances in exchange for economic or logistical incentives, Algeria would face both symbolic and strategic setbacks. Western Sahara is therefore not a frozen conflict but a moving piece in the broader chessboard of Sahel–Maghreb dynamics.

Algeria, meanwhile, risks being sidelined unless it can adapt its approach. Its traditional emphasis on formal diplomacy, including mediation steering, and hard security must evolve to meet the new realities of Sahelian politics: informal influence, transactional partnerships, and a renewed emphasis on sovereignty and local solutions. This will require political courage and institutional flexibility—qualities that are in short supply in post-Hirak Algeria.

Conclusion: Is a Joint Maghreb–Sahel Vision Possible?

The Sahel and North Africa are bound by geography, history, and common, cross-border challenges. But shared issues do not automatically produce joint responses. Political rivalries, fragmented institutions, and mismatched strategies have prevented the emergence of a coherent regional security architecture.

Still, there are openings. Climate cooperation, experience-sharing on the challenges of and paths towards inclusive security sector reform, and coordinated investments in borderlands development and local governance offer possibilities for constructive engagement. Whether Algeria and Morocco can move beyond their zero-sum rivalry—and whether Sahelian states can harness external support without sacrificing sovereignty—will shape both regions’ trajectories for years to come.

At stake is not only the security of individual states, but the future of interregional cooperation in an increasingly multipolar and uncertain world. To meet this challenge, the Maghreb and the Sahel must move from fragmented diplomacy to a shared political project—grounded not in paternalism or competition, but in mutual respect, shared responsibility, and the urgent imperative of peace. Easier said than done, but seating at a common table could be a starting place.


Notes

[1] International Crisis Group. “Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger: A New Alliance Facing Internal and External Challenges.” Africa Report N°324, 27 February 2024.; Tanchum, Michaël. “The Sahel Is Pivoting toward Turkey: Here’s What That Means for Washington.” Atlantic Council, 12 July 2025.

[2] PSC Insights: Algeria–Mali tensions demand swift attention (June 2025) notes that “Mali formally withdrew from the 2015 Algiers Accord, which had failed to achieve sustainable peace with the separatists.”

[3] Le Monde: La grande désillusion algérienne au Sahel (November 2023).

[4] European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). Shifting Sands: Hedging Strategies in Sahel–Maghreb Relations. EUISS Brief, 2024.

[5] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Drug trafficking undermining stability and development in Sahel region,” April 2024. United Nations.; Observatory of Illicit Economies in West Africa, “Conflict, coups and containers: why Sahel cocaine routes were disrupted,” Risk Bulletin, May 12, 2025.


About the Author

Ornella Moderan is a Senior SSR Advisor at the Geneva Center for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) and Non-resident Fellow with the Clingendael Institute’s Conflict Research Unit. She has more than 15 years of professional experience as a researcher and policy advisor, programming specialist and published author in security sector reform and governance, adult trainer and CSO mentor. Her other domains of competence include political analysis, gender equality and inclusive governance, humanitarian assistance as well as peacebuilding and mediation, with a geographic focus on West Africa and the Sahel.


More articles concerning the MECAM Policy Talks

Clara-Auguste Süß, André Bank & Julius Dihstelhoff, Bridging the Maghreb-Sahel Divide in Policy and Research: Take-aways from the MECAM Policy Talk 2025, 28.08.2025.


Citation: Ornella Moderan, Sahel–North Africa Relations: Addressing Common Threats in a Fragmented Cooperation Landscape, in: TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 04.11.2025, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/62192


OpenEdition suggests that you cite this post as follows:
Forum Transregionale Studien (November 4, 2025). Sahel–North Africa Relations: Addressing Common Threats in a Fragmented Cooperation Landscape. TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research. Retrieved November 11, 2025 from https://doi.org/10.58079/1539p


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