Southward Bound: Maghrebi Entrepreneurs and the Making of Real Intra-African Trade Corridors
By Youssef Cherif
This contribution is based on a talk presented as part of the MECAM Policy Talk 2025 and its side events, aimed at exploring the interlinked dynamics between Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa. The events took place from June 25 to 27, 2025, in Berlin.
In recent years, a new migratory dynamic has emerged in Africa: the movement of Maghrebi entrepreneurs toward sub-Saharan Africa. This is a development that remains largely underexplored, despite its growing significance. While most public and scholarly attention has focused on the northbound migration of West Africans or the outward mobility of North Africans toward Europe, the southward shift of North African entrepreneurs—particularly from Tunisia and Morocco—offers a window into how regional economic integration is already happening, from below.
This article reflects on the insights I shared during the recent MECAM expert workshop and policy roundtable in Berlin, where we explored entanglements between the Maghreb and the Sahel. State-to-state relations continue to be problematic, as seen in the Algeria-Morocco rivalry or in the different geopolitical crises popping up in the Sahel and West Africa. Therefore, my focus here is on actors – from Tunisia, Morocco, and until recently Libya – who are creating new commercial corridors across Africa, not through official state channels or grand strategies, but through the everyday realities of market-driven mobility.
A new route, not an old one
Trade has always been part of North–West African relations. Trans-Saharan routes connected these regions for centuries, enabling commerce, pilgrimage, scholarship, and slavery. What is new today is not trade itself, but the settlement of North African entrepreneurs in sub-Saharan Africa. Historically, it was more common to see West Africans move north—whether to study, work, or transit toward Europe. Now, we are witnessing a different trend: Maghrebis, especially Tunisians and Moroccans, moving south to live, invest, and build businesses.
In this context, the Tunisian case stands out. Unlike their Moroccan – or previously Libyan – counterparts, most Tunisians head south without institutional backing. Their journeys more closely resemble the Lebanese diaspora model of the 20th century: small and mid-sized entrepreneurs, acting independently, building commercial footholds in unfamiliar markets, and relying on personal networks rather than state support. While Morocco’s – and previously Libya’s – expansion into Africa is structured and state-driven, Tunisia’s is fragmented, informal, and entrepreneurial.
Tunisia: going south by necessity
Since the 2011 uprisings—and more so since 2019—a growing number of Tunisians have sought opportunity in West Africa. Côte d’Ivoire stands out as a preferred destination, hosting around 150 Tunisian companies and a community of some 8,000-10,000 Tunisians. Senegal and Cameroon come after. The reasons are numerous: Tunisia’s stagnating economy, restrictive foreign currency regulations, declining access to European markets, and a general sense of disenchantment with traditional economic avenues.
Tunisian entrepreneurs operate in a wide range of sectors: agribusiness, construction, ICT, pharmaceuticals, education, and health care. While larger companies like Soroubat, Poulina, and Wevioo have been present in African markets since the 1990s or 2000s, the real story today lies in the new wave of small and mid-sized entrepreneurs. These are individuals and families who have migrated south in recent years to open fast-food restaurants in Dakar, sell clothing in Abidjan, or offer consulting services in niche sectors. Their businesses may be modest in scale, but their collective impact is substantial—creating jobs, building trade linkages, and reshaping how Tunisians engage with sub-Saharan Africa.

In parallel, private Tunisian universities, who attract substantial numbers of sub-Saharan students, are increasingly turning their attention to West Africa as a region of expansion, exploring options to open branch campuses and enroll more students. Organizations like CONECT—founded in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution—and the Tunisia Africa Business Council (TABC), which emerged in the last decade, have played critical roles as facilitators and matchmakers, organizing trade missions and helping these entrepreneurs access African markets.
However, economic figures do not mirror these developments: In 2022, Tunisia’s trade with sub-Saharan Africa totaled about 7 percent of its overall trade. By contrast, more than 55 percent of Tunisia’s trade remains with the European Union. Unlike Royal Air Maroc (RAM), Tunisia’s national airliner Tunisair is facing financial and operational difficulties, and it serves only a few cities in West Africa, notably Dakar and Abidjan.
Many Tunisians I spoke with lament the lack of solidarity among their compatriots abroad. They described arriving in cities like Abidjan or Dakar and receiving little to no assistance from other Tunisians already established there. This absence of mutual support, they note, stands in sharp contrast to the community-based models seen among Moroccans and Lebanese, where experienced businesspeople often help new arrivals gain a foothold.
Morocco: the state as facilitator
The Moroccan case offers a sharp contrast. Since the early 2000s, Morocco has pursued a deliberate Africa-focused economic strategy, supported at the highest levels of government. This approach was not just rhetorical. It translated into diplomatic missions, high-level visits across the continent, and the strategic positioning of Moroccan businesses throughout West and Central Africa.
Moroccan banks, such as Attijariwafa Bank and Bank of Africa, have acquired or established subsidiaries in more than a dozen African countries. In the finance sector, these institutions are not only present but dominant players. Construction firms like TGCC have secured major infrastructure contracts, and OCP Africa, a subsidiary of the phosphate giant OCP Group, is deeply engaged in agricultural development and fertilizer distribution. These companies are often backed by Morocco’s sovereign wealth structures and conglomerates like Al Mada, ensuring they have both the capital and political backing to succeed.
In parallel, Morocco’s soft power strategy has included investments in education, religious diplomacy, and cultural ties. The establishment of scholarships and professional exchanges with African countries has helped to foster long-term relationships that benefit Moroccan companies operating abroad. Morocco’s return to the African Union in 2017, after a decades-long absence, also signaled its intention to be a continental player.
RAM, a key enabler of Morocco’s integration strategy, now flies to over 30 African destinations. In West Africa alone, it serves cities such as Dakar, Bamako, Conakry, Abidjan, Niamey, Ouagadougou, Cotonou, Lomé, Accra, and Lagos. These connections are critical for facilitating trade and people-to-people exchanges.
In 2022, 9 percent of Morocco’s exports went to African markets, compared to 56 percent to the EU. Imports from Africa made up only 3.5 percent of Morocco’s total imports. Yet these numbers understate the political and economic significance of Morocco’s African orientation. Moroccan citizens can be found all over, particularly in Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Senegal, and Mali, where they often operate within structured, state-linked networks. In countries like these, Moroccan banks and telecom companies are household names. The growing number of African governments recognizing the Western Sahara as part of Morocco, which represents a major blow to Algerian foreign policy, is a testament to Morocco’s influence.
This state-backed, strategic approach contrasts sharply with the Tunisian model. Morocco’s integration into African markets is a top-down process, characterized by scale, coordination, and long-term vision. It reflects not only economic ambitions but a geopolitical recalibration of Morocco’s role on the continent.
Libya: a broken path
Libya’s experience under Gaddafi offers yet another variation. Between the 1980s and 2000s, Libya was not only a major destination for sub-Saharan African migrants, but also an ambitious investor all over the continent. Through a number of state-run institutions, Gaddafi sought to position Libya as a pan-African economic hub. Two of the most prominent vehicles were LAICO and LAIP.
The Libyan African Investment Company (LAICO) managed dozens of hotels, office towers, and real estate projects in over 20 African countries, including flagship assets in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Kampala. LAICO’s footprint symbolized Libya’s desire to weave itself into the fabric of African urban economies—from hospitality and tourism to construction and retail.
Meanwhile, the Libyan African Investment Portfolio (LAIP) was established to manage long-term strategic projects. LAIP invested in agriculture, infrastructure, and transport—often in undercapitalized sectors. One of its more ambitious proposals was to build trans-Saharan highway links connecting Libya with Niger, Nigeria, and Chad—projects that would tie together the Maghreb and Sahel in a tangible, physical sense.
In 2001, Gaddafi also launched Afriqiyah Airways, a pan-African airline designed to connect the continent through Tripoli. By the late 2000s, it served more than 17 African destinations. During those years, Libyan investors and middlemen were traveling across the continent. However, this project, like many others, collapsed following the 2011 revolution.
Prior to 2011, Libya also hosted an estimated 1 million sub-Saharan African migrants (a fifth of the population). These figures underscore Libya’s importance as a regional node of labor, trade, and investment. However, following the 2011 revolution and the collapse of central governance, these networks disintegrated. Trade volumes with sub-Saharan Africa are now minimal, and Libya’s economic relations remain focused on recovery and internal stabilization.
Challenges and frictions
As I have shown, Maghrebi entrepreneurs in West Africa face a range of challenges shaped by their national contexts.
Tunisian entrepreneurs confront state indifference, bureaucratic red tape, restrictive currency regulations, and limited logistical support. Their airlines only connect to a few West African cities, and support from their compatriots abroad is often lacking. Competition with Moroccan, Lebanese, Turkish, and Chinese groups is tough. Interestingly, many Tunisians find their most reliable commercial allies not in fellow Maghrebis, but in French companies, who frequently contract them as consultants or regional managers.
In Morocco’s case, while the state provides strong backing, Moroccan entrepreneurs still face stiff competition from entrenched Lebanese networks as well as Chinese and Turkish firms, particularly in infrastructure and construction. Navigating local bureaucracies and ensuring long-term sustainability in politically volatile contexts are ongoing concerns.
Meanwhile, Libyan entrepreneurs face a different set of hurdles. The collapse of the Libyan state after 2011 dismantled the institutional infrastructure that once supported outward economic initiatives. Libya also has a relatively small entrepreneurial class and limited diaspora networks in West Africa.
Policy implications and conclusion
The European policy conversation often focuses on migration—typically framed as movement from Africa to Europe. But another trend is quietly reshaping the landscape: southward mobility within Africa, led by entrepreneurs, professionals, and small business owners. Supporting this dynamic can serve shared interests. By fostering economic growth and integration within the continent, European partners can help reduce some of the pressures that fuel instability in their southern neighborhood: unemployment, inequality, and economic exclusion. Strengthening intra-African commercial ties is therefore not only good for African development—it is a forward-looking investment in regional stability.
The story of Maghrebi entrepreneurs in West Africa is one of agency and regional reintegration. The borders between Algeria and Morocco remain closed, and integration in that part of the world remains minimal. But new trends are emerging. Whether state-backed, as in Morocco and previously Libya, or individually driven, as in Tunisia, these actors are reshaping how Africa connects with itself. They are not waiting for summits or treaties, they do not pose in front of cameras—they are making integration real, every day, on the ground.
About the Author
Youssef Cherif is the Founding Director of the Columbia Global Center Tunis, Columbia University’s hub for North and West Africa. A political analyst and researcher, he is an Extractivism Fellow at Philipps University Marburg and a member of the Carnegie Civic Research Network. Youssef is a regular contributor to leading think tanks and media outlets. He previously consulted for the United Nations, The Carter Center, IWPR, and other institutions, and served as an expert at the Tunisian Institute for Strategic Studies. He holds degrees from Columbia University, King’s College London, and the University of Tunis El-Manar. He is currently a PhD researcher at Leiden University.
Citation: Youssef Cherif, Southward Bound: Maghrebi Entrepreneurs and the Making of Real Intra-African Trade Corridors, in: TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 18.09.2025, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/61464
OpenEdition suggests that you cite this post as follows:
Forum Transregionale Studien (September 18, 2025). Southward Bound: Maghrebi Entrepreneurs and the Making of Real Intra-African Trade Corridors. TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research. Retrieved February 11, 2026 from https://doi.org/10.58079/14pda


