“Russia is Unequivocally a ‘Cannibal Country’”: How Ukrainian Officials Talk About the ‘Russian World’
By Liudmyla Pidkuimukha
What is the ‘Russian World’ – russkij mir – and how is it understood today from a Ukrainian perspective? Officially, this doctrine is built on a mix of shared language, culture, Orthodox Christianity, historical memory, and reverence for the so-called ‘Great Patriotic War’[1], often framed as the Soviet Union’s greatest victory.[2] However, in Ukraine, this ideology has taken on a very different meaning, especially in the shadow of the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war.
As a Ukrainian, I have been thinking about how russkij mir is being framed and rejected in public discourse. One way to understand this rejection is through the metaphors and expressions used by high-ranking Ukrainian officials – not just in formal statements but also across X (formerly Twitter), Facebook, Telegram, interviews, and public appeals. That is why I turned to these platforms, gathering examples from March 1, 2022, to April 15, 2023 – a time when the rhetoric around russkij mir became sharper and more emotionally charged. I focused on figures like President Volodymyr Zelenskyj, presidential adviser Mychajlo Podoljak, the Metropolitan Epiphanius, Dmytro Kuleba, Foreign Minister (2020–2024), and Oleksiy Danilow, Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council (2019–2024).

Metaphors do not exist in a vacuum – they reflect the cultural norms, values, and comparisons that shape how people think and communicate, especially during conflicts. As linguist Andreas Musolff points out, metaphors are not just one-off comparisons between two things. Instead, they often draw on broader cultural ‘scenarios’ – familiar mental images or storylines that help people make sense of complex ideas.[3] While talking about russkij mir, Ukrainian officials draw on powerful imagery – from monsters and killers to cesspools and cannibals. These are not just colorful insults. They are part of a broader effort to make sense of violence, occupation, and loss – and to challenge the narratives coming from Moscow.
In social media posts, interviews, and public speeches, high-ranking Ukrainian officials often use vivid metaphorical scenarios to grab attention and persuade their audience. I have closely followed how Ukrainian officials use language, not just to inform, but to fight. In a time of full-scale war, words become weapons, too. In this fight, metaphors play a crucial role in shaping how people perceive the aggressor.
One of the most powerful metaphors is presenting russkij mir as a living, breathing, and terrifying body. Drawing on vivid imagery, for instance, Oleksiy Danilow describes this doctrine as a monster, a violent creature with a face and a belly,one that thrashes in pain but still is able to spread destruction:
Ukraine has delivered a fatal blow to the ‘Russian world’, tearing apart the foul belly of its unending armoured columns. Though this monster may still thrash and cause further grief and suffering, the dead will never overcome the living. At this moment, through Ukrainian blood and pain, the true history of the nation and a new chapter are being written […].[4]
The metaphor of blood evokes a range of emotions and carries different connotations depending on whether it refers to Ukraine or Russia. In the context of Ukraine and Ukrainians, it symbolises a nation reborn through suffering and sacrifice, serving as a metaphor for new life. In contrast, when associated with Russia, it connotes violence and death, underscoring its role as the aggressor: “1.6 million deportees (including 260,000 children), filtration camps, torture, and extrajudicial executions – this is the true bloody face[5] of the ‘Russian world’ […].”[6]
Furthermore, the ‘Russian world’ is depicted as a killer, a cruel barbarian, a murderer. And not just any murderer, but a mass murderer, drunk on cruelty, a chauvinist intent on shedding more blood and inflicting greater grief. This portrayal is achieved through different narratives. For example, in the following statement, the ‘Russian world’ is seen not as a political doctrine but rather as a threat to the whole civilisation: “Ukraine is fighting for the 27th day for its freedom, against the invasion of barbarism, inhumanity & massacre of civilians. Against everything that symbolizes the ‘Russian world’ […].”[7]
In a similar way, Metropolitan Epifanii declares this moral rupture, underlining that “[t]he ‘Russian world’ has inflicted terrible grief upon our land, making it imperative to break forever from this bloody chauvinist ideology.”[8]
Furthermore, Ukrainian public leaders call on international responsibility in condemning this ideology by stating that, as Nazism was condemned and Bolshevism should, at last, be condemned, the ‘Russian world’s’ ideology of murder deserves to be equally universally condemned.[9]
These metaphors reflect lived trauma and paint a clear moral picture: the ‘Russian world’ is an ideology soaked in blood and pain. The grotesque imagery does not stop there. We see references to cannibalism, bloodthirst, and necrophilia. On social media, Mychajlo Podoljak has called Russia a cannibal country, and the ‘Russian world’ a doctrine that devours lives, destroys cities, and thrives on death:[10]
‘RU-speaking population is oppressed!’ – favorite concoction of Russian wars scriptwriters as a reason to attack others… The reality is different: the most cynically Moscow destroys…ru-speaking cities in Ukraine. Like Kharkiv. ‘Russian World’ proves its bloodthirstiness and necrophilia.
In a further declaration, he warns that this cannibalistic ‘Russian world’ is not comprised of a few dozen cities already fighting but is ready to extend its devastation to hundreds more across Ukraine.[11] Later, in his Telegram channel, Podoljak elaborates on his evaluative epithet “cannibalistic” and draws a comparison between Russia and a cannibal. In the following context, not only is the agent of the ‘Russian world’ characterised as a cannibal desiring more blood and pain from its victims, but Russia as a country itself: “Russia is unequivocally a cannibal country […] seeking safety in the mouth of a cannibal is futile.”[12]
The ‘Russian world’ embodies a hybrid of human and animal characteristics, acting either as a singular entity, “the monster”, symbolising a generalisation, or as “the collective identity of the nation-state”[13] of Russia and collective groups, such as those advocating for the ‘Russian world’ in Ukraine, whose hands [are] stained with blood”: “Everyone who was invoking the ‘Russian world’ here has their hands stained with blood”, he said.[14] Even non-human metaphors like cloaca (sewer) or cesspool have been used to drive home how morally rotten this ideology is: “One way or another, the occupied ‘Russian world’ has proven to be a cesspool. Devoid of meaning, ideas, or a future, but emanating a very foul odour.”[15]
In their statements and posts, Ukrainian officials aim to engage various senses to vividly describe the ‘Russian world’. To engage visual perception, they use phrases such as “just imagine” and “could you imagine”. Additionally, photos accompanying posts on Twitter and Telegram are intended to affect the visual sense. In some fragments, they stimulate the olfactory system with terms like a cesspool and a very bad smell, creating a multimodal perception of the ‘Russian world’ doctrine.
These metaphors are not just angry outbursts; they are carefully crafted narratives. Ukrainian officials use metaphors that appeal to all the senses: sights of ruined cities, the imagined stench of destruction, the taste of blood in the air. It is a strategy to make the horror tangible, relatable, and undeniable.
Irony, as well, plays a strong and crucial role. It involves a gap between what the speaker or author literally states and what is actually meant, and is one of the ways of evaluating specific information, which helps to develop an appropriate attitude towards this information in the reader. Irony becomes a form of resistance, mocking the invader’s logic and revealing its contradictions. For instance, when Russian Duma members have been ‘invited’ to holiday in the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic[16] / Luhansk People’s Republic’[17], Mychajlo Podoljak ironically asks: “Is this the ‘Russian World’ Travel Agency? What’s the excursion programme: the ruins of Severodonetsk, the ruins of Popasna, Donetsk concentration camps?”[18]
Or when Dmytro Kuleba quips that Russian maritime doctrine must mean even Black Sea fish speak Russian, the absurdity of Russia’s propaganda is laid bare. Irony becomes a form of resistance, mocking the invader’s logic and revealing its contradictions.
Putin has recently approved the new Maritime Doctrine, in which he specifically called the waters of the Black Sea a ‘zone of national interests’ of Russia… If I am not mistaken, they used to say that their national interests are everywhere the Russian language is spoken. Obviously, in their view of the world, the fish in the Black Sea also speak Russian, so they must be protected (smiles).[19]
Such statements are intended to highlight Russia’s ridiculous excuses that a full-scale invasion was launched ostensibly to protect Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine. In their posts, high-ranking officials also quote messages from Russian propaganda, which are inherently contradictory, to emphasise their senselessness: “negative growth,” “war is peace,” and the especially vivid ‘popovsko-kyrylivske’ [often used by Patriarch Kirill – L.P.] “we have never attacked anyone” are trending among Russians.
And sometimes language is deeply symbolic. On their social media pages, Ukrainian high-ranking officials also ridicule the looting by the Russian army, underscoring that warriors with stolen goods are becoming the symbols of the new Russia. There are known and recorded cases of Russian servicemen stealing and bringing to Russia washing machines, toilet bowls, refrigerators, and other items from the homes of Ukrainians:
In the occupied territories, the key idea was the restoration of monuments to Lenin. It turned out that this relic is the only Z-symbol of the new ‘Russian world’ […] By the way, a Russian soldier with a toilet bowl is a fitting monument to the new Russia.[20]
There is also a sharp use of contrast – life versus death, freedom versus fear, future versus past. These binary oppositions underscore what is at stake. President Zelenskyj has put it simply: “We are fighting for our future, they are fighting for someone else’s past”.[21] The third-person pronoun they is used to refer to others in us versus them comparisons. Moreover, the pronouns our and ours are also aimed at delineating ethical and moral boundaries between two sides, namely two nations: “Fight for your own! Do not invade our land, our soul, and our culture.”[22] The “we and they” dichotomy runs deep. It is not just rhetorical; it shapes how national identity is communicated in wartime. “We” represents a democratic, independent Ukraine. “They” stands for authoritarianism, destruction, and imperial nostalgia.
And with metaphors, some repulsive, some darkly funny, but all full of symbolism, Ukrainian politicians are telling a story about who we are, what we think, and why we’re fighting. They do not just want to vilify the ‘Russian world’; they want to lay bare its mediocrity, embarrass it, and strip it of the last remaining pretenses of virtue. As someone who is very much part of this world of language and culture, I see how language helps the Ukrainians to fight back, not just with weapons, but with words. And at times, maybe that will be our greatest weapon. In the struggle, words are both a reflection and an instrument, holding up a picture of the shared trauma and making a vision of the future. They create a shared moral space in which the ideology of the aggressor not just rejected but made senseless and unthinkable. In this way, Ukrainian discourse reaffirms that the fight for sovereignty is simultaneously a fight over meaning itself.
Notes
[1] Russia’s name for World War II.
[2] Oleksii Polegkyi/Dmytro Bushuyev, “Russian foreign policy and the origins of the ‘Russian World,’”. Forum for Ukrainian Studies, September 6, 2022, https://ukrainian-studies.ca/2022/09/06/russian-foreign-policy-and-the-origins-of-the-russian-world/.
[3] Andreas Musolff, “Metaphor scenarios in public discourse,” Metaphor and Symbol 21, no. 1, 23–38, https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327868ms2101_2.
[4] Oleksiy Danilow , “Misjats vijny. Dovhi dni, napovneni krovju.” [A month of war. Long days filled with blood, author’s trans.]. Facebook, March 25, 2022, https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1398005103947069&id=100012127781936.
[5] Italics added by the author.
[6] Mychajlo Podoljak (@Podolyak_M), “1.6 million deportees (260.000 children), filtration camps, torture, extrajudicial executions — a true bloody face of the ‘Russian world’.” Anyone who says “give” Twitter (now X), July 14, 2022, 9:40am, https://twitter.com/Podolyak_M/status/1547486256824713216.
[7] Mychajlo Podoljak (@Podolyak_M), “Viina tochytsia ne za terytorii, torhivliu chy naftove embarho. 🇺🇦 voiuie 27-y den za svoiu svobodu ta proty masshtabnoho vtorhnennia varvarstva, zhorstokosti ta maso.” [The war is not about territory, trade or an oil embargo. 🇺🇦 is fighting for the 27th day for its freedom and against a large-scale invasion of barbarism, cruelty and mass, author’s trans.]. Twitter (now X), March 22, 2022, 12:03pm, https://twitter.com/Podolyak_M/status/1506224959844143109.
[8] “Zvernennja Mytropolyta Epifanija”, Address of Metropolitan Epiphanius, Pravoslavna cerkva Ukrajiny, March 5, 2022, https://www.pomisna.info/uk/vsi-novyny/zvernennya-mytropolyta-epifaniya-5-bereznya-2022-r/.
[9] Mytropolyt Epifanij,“Borimosja – poboremo!” [Let’s fight – we will win!], Ukrajinska Pravda, April 16, 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2023/04/16/7397972/.
[10] Podolyak_M (@Podolyak_M), “”RU-speaking population is oppressed!” – favorite concoction of 🇷🇺 wars scriptwriters as a reason to attack others… The reality is different: the most cynic” Twitter, July 24, 2022 03:17pm, https://twitter.com/Podolyak_M/status/1551194869695217665.
[11] Mychajlo Podoljak (@Podolyak_M), “Yevropi, yaka vse shche boitsia zalyshytysia bez hazu/nafty, chas zrozumity: Bucha – lyshe pochatok pravdy pro suchasnu RF. Dali budut sotni inshykh ukrainskykh mist, de pob” [It is time for Europe, which is still afraid of being left without gas/oil, to understand: Bucha is only the beginning of the truth about the modern Russian Federation. Hundreds of other Ukrainian cities will follow, author’s trans.] Twitter (now X), April 5, 2022, 12:59pm, https://twitter.com/Podolyak_M/status/1511297381404397573.
[12] Mychaijlo Podoljak (@M_Podolyak), “Rosija, vidrizajuchy holovy… Krajina, jaka nazhyvo vidrizaje holovu liudyni” [Russia, cutting off heads… A country that cuts off a person’s head live, author’s trans.] Telegram, April 12, 2023, 11:14am, https://t.me/M_Podolyak/133.
[13] Andreas Musolff, Political Metaphor Analysis: Discourse and Scenarios. (Bloomsbury, 2016), 94.
[14] Mychajlo Podoljak (@Podolyak_M), “‘RU-speaking population is oppressed!’ – favorite concoction of 🇷🇺 wars scriptwriters as a reason to attack others… The reality is different: the most cynic” Twitter (now X), July 24, 2022, 03:17pm, https://twitter.com/Podolyak_M/status/1551194869695217665.
[15] Mychajlo Podoljak (@Podolyak_M), “Vitryna zla… Shcho vidbuvaietsia na okupovanykh terytoriiakh? Yakshcho styslo – znyshchennia tsyvilizatsii, totalna kryminalizatsiia suspilnykh vidnosyn, maroderstvo. A sproby ro” [A showcase of evil… What is happening in the occupied territories? In short, the destruction of civilisation, the total criminalisation of social relations, and looting. And attempts to restore the, author’s trans.] Telegram, August 1, 2022 06:26pm, https://t.me/M_Podolyak/99.
[16] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is a self-proclaimed, unrecognised separatist entity located in the Donetsk Oblast of Ukraine.
[17] The Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) is a self-proclaimed, unrecognised separatist entity located in the Luhansk Oblast of Ukraine.
[18] Mychajlo Podoljak (@Podolyak_M), “Deputatam Derzhdumy Rf proponuiut provesty vidpustku v «DNR/LNR». Turystychne ahentstvo «Russkyi myr»? Yaka prohrama ekskursii? Zruinovanyi Sievierodonetsk, ruiny Po” [Deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation are offered to spend their holidays in the ‘DPR/LPR’. What is the Russian World travel agency? What is the programme of excursions? Destroyed Sievierodonetsk, the ruins of Po, author’s trans.] Twitter (now X), July 6, 2022 02:25pm, https://twitter.com/Podolyak_M/status/1544658698198568960.
[19] Nadiya Yurchenko, Oleksandr Xarchenko, “Dmytro Kuleba, ministr zakordonnych sprav. Ne bude takoho momentu v istoriji, koly nam bude ‘ne do Krymu’” [Dmytro Kuleba, Minister of Foreign Affairs. There will not be such a moment in history when we “will not care about Crimea”, author’s trans.], Ukrinform, August 03, 2022, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-polytics/3542380-dmitro-kuleba-ministr-zakordonnih-sprav.html.
[20]Mychajlo Podoljak (@M_Podolyak), “Rf nastolko „uverenna” v svojej pravote, chto vnutri srtany i na vremenno okkupirovannych territorijach” [Russia is so “confident” in its rightness that inside the country and in the temporarily occupied territories], Telegram, May 1, 2022, 09:18am, https://t.me/M_Podolyak/62.
[21] “Zvernennja Prezydenta Volodymyra Zelensʹkoho do studentsʹkoji spilʹnoty providnykh universytetiv Velykoji Brytaniji” [Address of President Volodymyr Zelenskyi to the student community of leading universities in Great Britain, author’s trans.], Oficijne internet-predstavnyctvo Prezydenta Ukrajiny, June 10, 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/news/ukrayina-voyuye-za-svoye-majbutnye-rosiya-za-chuzhe-minule-s-75741.
[22] Ynna Andalyckaya, “Zelenskyi znovu zvernuvsja do rosijan: boritʹsja za svoje i ne lizʹte na nashu zemlju” [Zelenskyi once again appealed to the Russians: fight for your own and do not step on our land, author’s trans.]. UNIAN, September 28, 2022, https://www.unian.net/war/zelenskiy-snova-obratilsya-k-rossiyanam-borites-za-svoe-i-ne-lezte-na-nashu-zemlyu-11994186.html.
About the Author
Liudmyla Pidkuimukha, PhD, is a sociolinguist and slavist specialising in language policy, ideology, and cultural studies. Since May 2025, she has been a KIU Research Fellow at the European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder). From May 2022 to April 2025, she was a postdoctoral researcher at Justus Liebig University Giessen. She earned her PhD in 2016 and has served as an Associate Professor at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and a visiting lecturer at the Jagiellonian University. Pidkuimukha has been a visiting scholar at the University of Toronto, Dresden University of Technology, and Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
This research has been conducted and funded in the framework of the project “Competence Network Interdisciplinary Ukrainian Studies Frankfurt (Oder) – Berlin (KIU)” and by the DAAD with funds from the German Federal Foreign Office.
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Citation: Liudmyla Pidkuimukha, “Russia is Unequivocally a ‘Cannibal Country’”: How Ukrainian Officials Talk About the ‘Russian World’, in: TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 02.09.2025, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/61073
OpenEdition suggests that you cite this post as follows:
Forum Transregionale Studien (September 2, 2025). “Russia is Unequivocally a ‘Cannibal Country’”: How Ukrainian Officials Talk About the ‘Russian World’. TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research. Retrieved March 11, 2026 from https://doi.org/10.58079/14k31



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