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„Ḥamā lam tamut” (“Hama did not die”) – Remembering the Hama Massacre after the Fall of the Assad Regime

By Anna Christina Scheiter 

With the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, the brutal violence with which the regime had held on to power for 54 years came increasingly and overwhelmingly into the public eye. The Hama massacre in February 1982 is a momentous example of this violence. This central and defining event of Assad’s rule, which was a strong taboo for decades and has never been discussed or dealt with publicly, is now openly and freely commemorated for the first time and the victims are mourning on the occasion of its 43rd anniversary in February 2025.

Photo by Zeina Halabi, taken in Syria in December 2024, after the fall of the Assad regime.

There is little doubt that the massacre in Hama had far-reaching consequences for life in Syria for a long time. It is often considered an important factor in maintaining the regime’s power and a sign of its ruthlessness and unconditional will to retain power. As a consequence, the name of the city Hama has become a symbol of fear, violence and oppression under the Assad regime and a synonym for silence over the last four decades. The author Manhal al-Sarraj from Hama characterises the effect of the massacre as follows: “The Hama events have ruled over the silent Syria for many years.”[1] With the term ‘the Hama events’ (aḥdāth Ḥamā) she refers to the massacre perpetrated against the city of Hama in February 1982 by the regime under Hafez al-Assad, the father of the recently toppled Bashar al-Assad. It occurred in the context of a phase of open protests by various opposition groups against the regime, which began around 1976 and is often referred to as fatrat al-aḥdāth (‘phase of the events’). At the time, the city of Hama was considered a stronghold of the opposition, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, the strongest opposition force in Syria in the early 1980s. As the conflict escalated and the regime saw its power seriously jeopardised, state army units commanded by the president’s brother Rifaat al-Assad sealed off the city of Hama from the outside world and razed large parts of the city to the ground. It is estimated that 40,000 people – mainly civilians – were killed and many more arrested, whose fate often remained uncertain for their relatives for decades and in some cases to this day. The Hama massacre was the culmination of the regime’s violent response to the protests and ended the last major open resistance against the Assad regime until the 2011 uprising.

Since there was hardly any reliable information, as only rumours leaked out of the blockaded city during the fighting, the Assad regime subsequently prevented the dissemination of information about the massacre extremely effectively. According to state rhetoric, the massacre had not taken place; instead, the regime claimed that there had only been targeted operations against violent Islamists. For decades, the massacre was almost completely absent from public discourse. As a result, the Hama massacre became the strongest taboo in Syria and any conversation about it was associated with great risk. Even the regime’s version was neither included in historiography nor in school textbooks, nor was it explicitly commemorated in public. While hardly any concrete information about the massacre was available to the public, anti-Muslim Brotherhood rhetoric became an integral part of the political culture and was omnipresent in Syria for decades. The public memory of the Hama massacre established by the Assad regime in Syria thus primarily consisted of a portrayal of the Muslim Brotherhood as the enemy of society as a whole. This strategy was ambivalent, as on the one hand the massacre was never directly addressed, but on the other hand the memory of it was implicitly anchored in society in the form of omnipresent and frequently repeated slogans against the Muslim Brotherhood.

Due to the strong taboo and the overpowering presence of the official narrative, there was, for a long time, hardly any room in public discourse for remembering the massacre beyond this dichotomous conception of the conflict between the Assad regime on the one hand and the Muslim Brotherhood on the other. As a result, any form of remembrance that deviated from this was largely suppressed discursively. This applies above all to the experiences of the victims and survivors in Hama, where the effects of the massacre continued to dominate life for decades and the violence was not limited to the event itself but continued in an ongoing process. In the decades following the massacre, life in Hama was permanently overshadowed by the profound consequences of the massacre, according to witness accounts and literary texts by authors from Hama. A witness from Hama describes the presence of the violence in the daily life as follows:

“On its thirtieth anniversary, and I am four years older, I want to talk about Hama … although I did not live through the massacre … but I lived through Hama … I am not an eyewitness to the killing, slaughter and rape, but I am a witness to everything else … and who said that massacres end with killing, slaughter and rape?”[2]

Various forms of violence, which were deeply inscribed in everyday life in the city, led to a multi-layered silence. In addition to the regime’s denial, the incomprehensibility of the extreme violence also contributed to the silence of the survivors in Hama and made it almost impossible for the witnesses to formulate their own version of the events and oppose the dominant narrative of the regime. In her novel ʿAṣī al-dam from 2012, Manhal al-Sarraj describes being from Hama as equal to permanent “humiliation, fear, pain and bitter memories”[3]. However, due to the state suppression of any open commemoration, these memories remained almost exclusively confined to the private sphere and oral forms of transmission. The painter Khaled al-Khani, who witnessed the massacre as a child, describes the resulting practice of remembrance as “writing in the mind”[4] in order to prevent oblivion of the atrocities denied in the public discourse.

Photo of destruction in Hama following the Hama Massacre in 1982. Photograph shows the destroyed Al-Nuri Mosque, on the western bank of the Orontes River, next to the Hama Castle. Author Unknown. Public Domain, via Wikimedia Commons.

While life in Hama itself was strongly characterised by the experience of the massacre and its concrete consequences, its influence on the rest of Syrian society was more abstract and less direct. Nevertheless, it had a lasting effect and is considered one of the most important reasons why there was hardly any open resistance against the regime in Syria until 2011. In the context of the revolution in 2011, the abstract and not directly visible effects of the massacre on a Syrian-wide level were more widely discussed and forms of commemorating the Hama massacre became a part of the revolutionary narrative. In this context, it became particularly clear that the massacre had by no means been forgotten despite the state’s suppression and years of silence. Rather, the memory of it had remained latent and the event still had enormous significance for many Syrians in connection with the power structures of the Assad regime. During this time, the Hama massacre was referred to as an unhealed wound in Syrian society. Its significance was therefore not limited to Hama or the Muslim Brotherhood anymore, but extended to the whole country. According to this understanding, the entire country of Syria is permanently marked by the violence of the massacre and significantly characterised by the Assad regime’s associated power strategy.

In this context, the massacre in Hama was often seen as a central means of maintaining the Assad regime’s power and as a backdrop to the social divisions that became clearly visible during the war. For example, in Dima Wannous’ novel The Frightened Ones (2017), it is not only a concrete fear of extreme violence as a reaction to any resistance, but also a more elusive and more powerful feeling, which the writer calls ‘fear of fear’, i.e. a permanently present diffuse anticipation of fear which results mostly from the Hama massacre and has a lasting impact on the Syrian society. In the anticipation that anything could happen at any time, that uncertainty and absolute arbitrariness prevailed, the presence of the Hama massacre, often described as haunting, seems to exist in Syrian everyday life under Assad. In this way, the massacre of Hama became a collective experience of all Syrians and an instrument with which power was permanently exercised over them, even decades after the events. The memory of ‘Hama’ thus possesses a haunting presence and leads to a widespread fear that is an invisible, indeterminate and silent mediator of power.

The fact that the memory of the Hama massacre came to the surface in the context of the revolution can be attributed on the one hand to such an analysis of the background to the violence and the increasing openness and directness with which former taboo topics were addressed publicly in Syria during this period. On the other hand, the extreme violence of the Assad regime that could now be seen and experienced throughout the country made it possible for many Syrians to understand the events of 1982 in Hama. Although ‘Hama’ had previously existed in the subconscious as a rather abstract and difficult-to-grasp symbol of the regime’s violence and its unconditional will to maintain power, the complete concealment and tabooing made it impossible to access concrete information or images. This made it particularly difficult to comprehend the extent of the almost completely undocumented events of the time. Regarding the uprisings in 2011, Salwa Ismail states that “the politics of the massacre rose to the surface.”[5] The previously largely latent violence with which the regime dominated the country now became visible throughout Syria. The images of the Assad regime’s brutal crackdown on protesters in 2011 led to a change in this respect, as they conveyed an idea of the events of 1982 and made their extent and significance comprehensible. The Syrian writer Amal Hanano describes the effect that the images and videos from 2011 had on her in a similar way:

“So we watched the events of March 2011 while in our hearts we were watching the events of February 1982. The YouTube videos projected the present but they also replayed the past. Finally we had the evidence, the images of what we had never seen but only imagined. Though it happened in another time, in another city, at the hands of the son instead of the father, we watched and remembered.”[6]

“Hama after Assad”, photo by Hikmat Hamadi al-Khani, 13.12.2024

While the massacre had long been seen as a deterrent to protests against the regime and retained this effect to some extent during the revolution, it was now reinterpreted in the oppositional narrative. After Hama had been a symbol of fear, silence and death throughout Syria since 1982, it was transformed into a symbol of survival and unbroken resistance during the revolution, especially when some of the largest demonstrations against the regime took place in the city in summer 2011. In an interview, a Syrian from Hama expressed his overwhelming emotions about these demonstrations, which continued even after the regime’s violent reaction, with the words “We are still here, we are still alive”[7], asserting the city’s rejection of the violence inscribed by the regime after the massacre and its intention to define its own identity. The notion of Hama’s survival is also reflected in the slogan “Hama did not die, but Hafez died. And Syria will not die, but Bashar will die”[8]. This slogan illustrates particularly vividly the extent to which Hama has become a symbol of resistance and revolution in this interpretation of events: with its survival, the city is seen as a role model for the whole of Syria, which – like Hama in 1982 – is now affected by the massive violence of the regime. In February 2012, a nationwide public commemoration of the massacre took place to mark the 30th anniversary. On this day, demonstrations took place in several Syrian cities under the motto “Sorry, Hama, forgive us”, acknowledging publicly the decades-long marginalization of the city’s residents and the role of the collective silence in perpetuating the violence of the massacre.

Even though the Hama massacre was increasingly discussed in the context of the revolution, it must be noted that no political or social reappraisal took place. The regime under Bashar al-Assad continued to suppress the memory of the massacre and maintain its own narrative. Assad’s few statements regarding the massacre in Hama clearly show that he intended to continue to use its effects as an important factor in maintaining his power.[9] In consequence, witnesses and survivors of the massacre were still waiting for public acknowledgement of their suffering and justice.

The fall of the Assad regime has opened up a crucial opportunity to document the atrocities of the Hama massacre 43 years later and to bring the main perpetrators to justice. A comprehensive reappraisal of these crimes is essential not only for accountability but also for understanding the regime’s deeply entrenched power structures. The massacre in Hama was not just a singular atrocity, but a defining event that shaped the regime’s oppressive strategy.

In the present transitional period, many are calling for justice and accountability as the basis of a future Syrian society. Writer Samar Yazbek stresses that acknowledging the crimes and violations inflicted on hundreds of thousands of Syrians is essential for healing.[10] Similarly, the political thinker Yassin al-Haj Saleh emphasises the relevance of a visionary policy of memory as much as a visionary policy of moving towards the future.[11] A statement by Syrian intellectuals, artists and politicians in late January 2025 calls for fair transitional justice procedures and uncovering of the truth about the regime’s crimes against humanity as the path to forgiveness and national reconciliation.[12] Even though the massacre in Hama took place several decades ago and the Assad regime has committed numerous other human rights violations over the past 14 years, it must be included in efforts to document and prosecute the crimes in a transitional justice process considering its immense impact on Syrian society. This sentiment is especially strong among witnesses and survivors of the massacre from Hama. Many of them shared their memories publicly for the first time on the occasion of the massacre’s 43rd anniversary in early February 2025, often holding pictures of their killed or disappeared relatives and demanding justice for them. Khaled al-Khani, who has been advocating for justice for the victims of the Hama massacre, underscores that there can be no reconciliation within the Syrian society without justice.[13] In interviews, other Syrians from Hama clearly expressed their desire for systematic documentation of the massacre and for those responsible to be held accountable. After the end of the Assad regime, many witnesses of the massacre feel free and safe for the first time to speak openly about their experiences without fear of arrest or discrimination,[14] which was almost unthinkable until December 2024.

Following the fall of the regime, Syrian society is faced with a variety of challenges. Addressing the Assad regime’s atrocities of the last 54 years openly at last and seeking justice for its victims is central for social reconciliation and a basis for the establishment of a new collective identity after the end of the dictatorship. The massacre in Hama is one of the most striking examples of the extent to which the regime based its rule on violence and fear. Remembering and coming to terms with these events is therefore more important today than ever before.


Notes

[1] Syria TV (28.08.2018): „Kayfa waṣafat al-riwāʾiyya Manhal al-Sarrāj āthār madhbaḥat Ḥamā 1982“. https://tinyurl.com/7tbs2vz9 (accessed 24.01.2023). Min. 18:30.

[2] Sumayya(02.02.2012): „Jurāḥ al-dhākira…fī dhikrā Ḥamā”. In: Qiṣaṣ min al-thawra al-sūriyya. https://tinyurl.com/yc2fm4n3 (accessed 24.01.2023). All translations from Arabic are by the author of this text.

[3] al-Sarraj, Manhal (2012): ʿAṣī al-dam. Beirut: Dār al-Ādāb. p. 225.

[4] Interview Khaled al-Khani, 18.05.2020.

[5] Ismail, Salwa (2018): The Rule of Violence. Subjectivity, Memory and Government in Syria. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 199.

[6] Hanano, Amal (2014): „From Hama to Daraya”. In: Sardar, Ziauddin/Yassin-Kassab, Robin (ed.): Syria. London: Hurst. p. 89.

[7] Interview, anonymous, 08.09.2020.

[8] Naharnet (24.07.2012): „Masʾūl Īranī bāriz: Ḥulafāʾ Sūriyā ‚lan yasmaḥū bi-taghyīr al-niẓām‘ fī Dimashq“. https://tinyurl.com/5n79xzpt (accessed 15.12.2023).

[9] Asad, Bashshār al- (20.06.2011): „Khiṭāb Bashshār al-Asad fī jāmiʿat Dimashq ʿan al-waḍʿ fī Sūrīyā”. In: Voltairenet. URL: https://tinyurl.com/rm7yzsmz (accessed 02.04.2019); Asad, Bashshār al- (17.03.2022): „al-Raʾīs al-Asad li-l-muʿallimīn fī ʿīdihim: Naḥtāj li-inshāʾ jīl yuwājihu al-taḥaddiyāt lā yahrab minhā.. ghayrī yaʿrif maʿnā al-ʿiṭāʾ – fīdiyū“. In: SANA. Al-Wakāla al-ʿarabiyya al-sūriyya li-l-anbāʾ. URL: https://sana.sy/?p=1607081 (accessed 27.07.2023)

[10] Yazbek, Samar (08.01.2025): “al-ʿAdāla al-intiqāliyya fī Suriyya…’al-mawt wa-‘l-adhrāʾ’”. Al-ʿArabī al-jadīd. https://tinyurl.com/2vy7awh6 (accessed 31.01.2025)

[11] Sakīnī, Diyānā (29.01.2025): “Yāssīn al-Ḥājj Ṣāliḥ li-‘al-Nahār’: Ḥurriyat Suriyā hashshat wa-yajib ʿadam al-taʿajjul fī nisyān mā intahā”. Al-Nahār. https://tinyurl.com/mry5kcdj (accessed 31.01.2025)

[12] Al-Jumhūriyya (31.01.2025): “Mabādiʾ asāsiyya min shaʾnihā an tuḥaṣṣin Suriyya al-jadīda”. https://tinyurl.com/ye266zbx (accessed 31.01.2025)

[13] Interview Khaled al-Khani, 22.01.2025.

[14] For example: Omareen, Zaher (13.12.2024): „Return to Damascus…the Long Road Home”. The Markaz Review. https://tinyurl.com/mujrx4jw (accessed 31.01.2025); Shahdawi, Yazan (09.01.2025): “The Legacy of Hama’s Massacre”. New Lines Magazine. https://tinyurl.com/23s9vkw5 (accessed 31.01.2025)


About the Author

Anna Christina Scheiter holds a doctorate in Arabic Studies. After studying Oriental Studies (BA) and Arabic Literature and Culture (MA) at the Philipps University of Marburg, she completed a doctorate in Arabic Studies with a dissertation on literary representations of the 1982 Hama massacre in Syrian literature. Her dissertation with the working title “‘Hama’ as a Memory Figure. Taboo, Silence and the Fight for Sovereignty of Interpretation in Syrian Literature” will be published as a monograph in 2025. Her research interests include modern Arabic literature and cultures of remembrance, especially in the context of political violence and authoritarian systems, as well as the role of arts and culture in transitional justice processes.


Citation: Anna Christina Scheiter, „Ḥamā lam tamut” (eng. “Hama did not die”) – Remembering the Hama Massacre after the Fall of the Assad Regime, in: TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 06.02.2025, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/54743


OpenEdition suggests that you cite this post as follows:
Forum Transregionale Studien (February 6, 2025). „Ḥamā lam tamut” (“Hama did not die”) – Remembering the Hama Massacre after the Fall of the Assad Regime. TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research. Retrieved March 25, 2025 from https://doi.org/10.58079/139ju


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