Populism in a Global Perspective: Who Needs Democracy?
By Katarina Ristić, Therese Mager, Constanze Blum and Man Zhang
The rise of populism in the “West” has prompted extensive academic research which often appears oblivious to populism’s historical origins and non-western genealogies. Focusing on populism as a threat to western democracies, much of the research on populism neglects variations and the different contexts within which populism operates in different world regions. In our seminar “Critically Engaging with Populism as a Global Phenomenon,” which we taught during the summer 2024 term for MA students enrolled in Global and European Studies at Leipzig University, we sought to offer broader insights into populism in a global perspective. We addressed populism by starting with the main scholarly debates in the literature, then focused in more detail on four cases, namely France, the Western Balkans, South Africa, and China.[1]
In order to integrate the global perspective called for by this selection of cases, we had to broaden the scope and meaning of basic concepts – “democracy” turned into variations of liberal and “people’s” democracies, for example – but we also had to include authoritarian regimes. The prevalence of research on populism as right-wing populism required adjustment, not only to accommodate appeals for “leftist populist politics” as argued by Chantal Mouffe (Mouffe, 2018) and present-day examples of left-wing populism (such as the post-Great Recession parties Podemos, Syriza, and La France insoumise), but also to incorporate historical examples, like the left-populist rhetoric surrounding the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) in China. Historicizing populism brought additional complexity to the concept, considering its links to fascism on the one hand and its socialist origins on the other. Despite all the puzzles and ambivalences we encountered, we left the classroom with the impression that our understanding of populism was deepened and that we had opened up new avenues for further engagement with the topic. In this article, we would therefore like to share some of our questions and reflections about historicizing populism through a global lens.
What is Populism?
In the course, we drew on two main approaches to populism. The first, introduced by Cas Mudde, defines populism as a thin-centered ideology, focusing on anti-elitism and the radicalization of two antagonistic and homogeneous groups (Mudde, 2004). This ideational approach can be distinguished from discursive approaches, which emphasize the role of language and rhetoric in the identity construction of “the people” (Brubaker, 2017; Laclau, 2005). Famously, Laclau theorized a minimalist definition of populism, seeing it as a discursive strategy of constructing an antagonistic political frontier which enables the constitution of “the people” through the mobilization of the “underdog” against “those in power” (Laclau, 2005: 75). Importantly, there is no pre-existing group which is mobilized by populism. Instead, populist discourse creates “the people,” hence allowing for both left- and right-wing variations.
Mudde’s definition of populism as a thin-centered ideology operates well when associated with the classical concept of liberal democracy, in which conflicts are managed through representative institutions and the electoral process. Accompanied by nativism and authoritarianism, it constitutes the core of the radical right today (Mudde, 2007). Right-wing populism disrupts liberal democratic systems because it attempts to circumvent representation by claiming its direct connection to the people, denouncing elites and slowly eroding or dismissing institutional constraints on its power (Müller, 2017). Claiming to be legitimized by the supreme good – the will of the people – populist parties attack some of the most important foundations of liberal democracy such as the freedom of speech/research, a free press, the freedom of assembly, the separation of powers, and judicial independence, thus (potentially) eroding the system. This interpretation of populism is most common in scholarly literature dealing with the current “populist moment” in Europe and the United States, as it captures the main features of right-wing populism and its crusade against pluralism and multiculturalism.
Of the cases we studied in our course, the populist far right in France best fits this approach. We focused in particular on the National Front (renamed the National Rally in 2018), which in many ways can be considered the first successful far-right party in postwar Europe. Within a few years following its establishment in 1972, the National Front under Jean-Marie Le Pen had put nativism and anti-immigration rhetoric at the heart of its agenda, all while seeking to present a moderate enough image to be allowed to operate in a liberal democracy. Calling himself and his party the champions of the “people’s will” – the lone underdogs against a unitary cabal made up of a corrupt elite – Le Pen often demonstrated hostility toward some of the laws and strictures of French democracy and attacked opponents using racist and anti-Semitic language. His vertical leadership and cult of personality have continued in many ways under his daughter, Marine Le Pen, who relies heavily on populist rhetoric while also focusing on “normalizing” her party (Mayer 2018). She and her deputy Jordan Bardella constantly claim to embody the needs and desires of le peuple and have promised swift reforms to the French constitution through referendums once in power; meanwhile, xenophobic statements from party leadership and rank-and-file members, along with international alliances with authoritarian and hard right figures, belie their efforts to appear inoffensive and committed to liberal democracy.
Populism, Democracy, and Authoritarianism
However, historical investigation of populism reveals that it is misleading to approach populism as a phenomenon intrinsically linked with modern democracies or with radical right parties. Commonly cited as one of the earliest examples of a populist moment, the Narodniki movement in 19th-century Russia materialized as the project of intellectuals reaching out to the peasantry and “going to the people” while envisioning a future democracy (Ely, 2021). The influence of Russian populism (narodnichestvo) from its earliest beginnings in the Balkan region can hardly be underestimated: agrarian socialism and its ideal of the egalitarian peasant commune became the leading political movement in the region. Agrarian populists began frantically translating and publishing the works of revolutionary philosophers like Nikolay Chernyshevsky and Mikhail Bakunin while also reimagining society on the basis of local tradition, such as the “Zadruga” (cooperative extended family) touted in the writings of Svetozar Marković (Marković, 1872). In the overwhelmingly agrarian and illiterate societies of Eastern Europe, “peasantism” was the main form of populist national mobilization in the beginning of the 20th century (Daskalov and Mishkova, 2014).
Moreover, populism accompanied decolonization in the 1960s, with numerous postcolonial regimes experiencing a populist turn (Ionescu and Gellner, 1969). These states adopted socialism, understood in these cases as a “people’s democracy,” where the ruling communist parties embodied “the will of the people” and dismissed electoral democracy as an elitist perversion of true democracy.
Broadening our understanding of democracy to include both “people’s democracy” and “representative democracy” allows for greater insight into variations of populism on a global scale. Through this perspective, liberal democracy becomes a type rather than the standard measure for democracy as such. Importantly, it is the “liberal” part of “liberal democracy” that requires the rule of law, the protection of individual and minority rights, systems of checks and balances, independent governing bodies, and other institutional constraints – posing a limit to the majoritarianism of unrestricted populism. Formed as an outcome of elite negotiations rather than as the expression of the “people’s will,” liberal democracy is established with the aim of mutually constraining the power of ruling elites (Bobbio, 2006). In that sense, the majoritarianism of the unrestricted “people’s will” stands in opposition to the power limitations of liberal democracy. This tension is captured by Margaret Canovan in her distinction between the “two faces of democracy”: on the one hand, she points to the “pragmatic” democracy of procedural rules, elections, and the separation of powers, while on the other she identifies a “redemptive” democracy which claims to capture the real will of the people in its idealistic expression (Canovan, 1999). While the “redemptive” face may serve to legitimize the “pragmatic,” this pragmatism alone cannot provide a successful resolution to complex societal crises (read: multiple crises) unless supported by the vox populi.
Consequently, “illiberal democracy” (Zakaria, 1997) is not a contradiction in terms, but rather the result of an extreme application of the principle of majoritarianism, which remains at the core of democratic rule once it is divorced from the constraints of liberalism. Of course, the line separating illiberal democracy from authoritarianism is a messy one; there are good reasons to claim that states undergoing a populist turn are actually adopting authoritarian methods despite regular elections, demonstrated in particular by the “state capture” by which all manner of institutions, from judicial and educational systems to the media, are seized by the stakeholder(s) in power (Chipkin et al., 2018). As we noted from the examples in our seminar, this kind of transition is already complete in the Western Balkans, where the regimes in place are taking over institutions and repressing individual liberties with very little interference from formal elections; political scientist Florian Bieber therefore speaks of an “authoritarian turn” in the region after 2012 (Bieber, 2020). Despite regular elections and multiparty systems, the villainization of the opposition, suppression of basic freedoms, and various forms of institutional capture all but guarantee victory for the populist leaders in power.
Even more so than in the case of the Balkans, populism within an authoritarian regime is the dominant framing of populism in China (Tang, 2016), where power is centralized in the hands of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and democratic processes are minimal or absent. Unlike in democratic or semi-democratic systems, where populist movements may challenge the political establishment by appealing to the will of the people, Chinese populism is shaped and controlled by the ruling party (which our co-author Man Zhang calls “state populism”). The CCP has historically utilized populist rhetoric and tactics to mobilize support, portraying itself as the true representative of the people’s interests while framing political adversaries as enemies of the state. This form of populism does not oppose the regime; instead, it reinforces authoritarian control by directing popular anger toward external or internal “enemies,” such as corrupt elites (as seen in Xi Jinping’s ongoing Anti-Corruption Campaign) or perceived foreign threats (such as tensions with the United States).
However, citizens in China also display a remarkably high level of public engagement, even when the issues are not directly related to their personal interests. This increased engagement involves the leveraging of various issues as outlets for expressing accumulated public dissatisfaction. With the widespread accessibility of online platforms, the public can now more easily participate in social affairs and demand solutions to societal problems. When institutional avenues fail to resolve their grievances, individuals often turn to these platforms to attract public attention. By aiming to provoke widespread discussion and seeking immediate resolutions through a strategy known as “make a big fuss” (nao da), this form of emotional mobilization pressures higher authorities to intervene directly, bypassing local officials. In recent years, this approach has gained increasing prominence in China. Scholars argue that for the Chinese political system, this populist expression serves as a “pressure valve,” releasing the pressure of the “social volcano” to avoid the eruption of even greater populist anger (He et al., 2023; Tang, 2016), which is key to the sustainability of the CCP regime.
In this light, Nadia Urbinati’s analysis of populism – left or right – as a majoritarianist rule which dismantles democratic institutions and rules (Urbinati, 2019) provides a better understanding of global populism than Mouffe’s enthusiastic approach, which expresses hope that (left-wing) populism can deepen and expand democracy. Mouffe’s failure to engage with historical cases of left-wing populism seems to be a precondition for the rosy picture of populist politics that she offers (Mouffe, 2018). Nevertheless, once democratic institutions are dismantled and power is secured in the hands of populist leaders, the political system starts to resemble totalitarian regimes of the past. One should not forget the ardent support that fascist regimes enjoyed in their heyday; a remarkable and disturbing fact of totalitarianism, according to Hannah Arendt, is not the general attraction of the masses to evil and crime, but “the true selflessness of [a movement’s] adherents” (Arendt, [1951] 2017). The genuine popular support that such movements can gain, and the dedication to violence that they are able to produce, remain among the most threatening elements of populism.
Populism and Fascism
While the family resemblance between fascism and right-wing populism has drawn considerable attention, many scholars insist on divergences between today’s populism and the totalitarian, state-centered features of its historical predecessor. At the same time, the similarities between them have led Federico Finchelstein to claim that populism represents a form of “fascism adapted to democracy” (Finchelstein, 2017). Dani Filc points out several key differences between the two, starting with the idea that for fascism, the nation rather than the people constitutes the primary collective subject, wherein the “people” appear as an ethno-cultural unit subordinated to the state. Moreover, notes Filc, fascism is elitist, with clear hierarchies and the supremacy of a leader, setting it apart from the (professed) anti-elitism of populism. Current populist parties’ acceptance of democratic procedures and elections as well as a general lack of violence are the final notable differences (Filc, 2010). Matt Golder suggests that the terms “radicalism” and “extremism” serve to distinguish between populists within the system (radical) and those seeking to overthrow it, sometimes by violent means (extremist) (Golder, 2016). Nonetheless, these arguments are not all convincing; for example, one can point to the populist leader as an embodiment of the people’s will and of the state or nation.
In the cases from our seminar, we noticed clear connections between historical fascism and the rise of right-wing populism in the 1970s and 1980s. Looking at the French case, for example, we observed the connections between the post-fascist radical right (which in France was formed by disgruntled colonialists and former World War II collaborators) and what is known as the “Nouvelle Droite,” a metapolitical intellectual and cultural movement that first blossomed in the 1970s. Embodied primarily by a small circle of far-right thinkers, the Nouvelle Droite explicitly sought to reconceptualize the “right” in a postwar world that would no longer tolerate fascism and fascist language. Rather than discriminate on the basis of biology, they advocated “differentiation” on the basis of “culture”; rather than focus narrowly on nationalism, they called for a focus on regionalism, with a particular attachment to the notion of a pan-European identity that required protecting (Bar-On, 2011). These approaches to “dealing with difference” were widely adopted by the French National Front in the 1990s, and today, far-right politicians across Europe can be heard promoting “diversity” by calling for “culturally” heterogeneous peoples to remain separate – as per the principle of “ethno-pluralism.” This reflects a trend noted in the literature by which the rigid neofascism of the postwar years is slowly softening in appearance and gradually becoming mainstreamed in a digestible populist form. Indeed, the language of the early postwar radical right on Holocaust denial and the relativization of atrocities has been toned down in the latest populist wave.
Looking at the case of former Yugoslavia, we noted the rise of the populist right in the 1980s accompanied by the delegitimization of anti-fascist struggle, as well as an equation of left- and right-wing liberation movements during World War II through the public rehabilitation of pro-fascist regimes and their leaders (Stojanović, 2017). “Flirting with fascism” has remained one of the common topics in the study of Croatian nationalism since the 1990s (Pavlakovic, 2008). Although scholars disagree on whether wartime political parties in Croatia and Serbia should be characterized as nationalist, right-wing populist, or fascist, populist mobilization is generally seen as prevalent.
Populist Violence
The association of fascism with populism is often introduced as a historical lesson meant to warn against the right-wing populist potential to perpetuate violence. The Holocaust represents the ultimate threat that fascist regimes pose to minorities within a state, and even beyond its borders. But one does not have to turn to historical fascism in order to find evidence that populist enemy production can induce mass violence. Once released from the restraints of the legal system and the international order, while fully justified by the “people’s will” (as interpreted and incarnated by populist leaders), such regimes easily lead to systematic persecution and violence. A case in point is former Yugoslavia and the three wars that devastated the region during the 1990s. Ethnic cleansing and genocide, the most brutal outcomes of populist right-wing mobilization, arose as a logical consequence of the politics of exclusion and the “pure” ethnic states envisioned by politicians, rather than from the irrational seduction of violence or from the expression of eternal hatred. In other words, they exemplify the fulfillment of right-populist promises.
Former Yugoslavia is not the only case where right-wing populist mobilization has led to violence. The outbursts of violence led by bottom-up mobilization in South Africa, such as through the political group Operation Dudula, are yet another example – and show how violent rhetoric against foreigners can lead to physical violence. Emerging as a self-styled vigilante group with a strong law-and-order narrative in mid-2021, Operation Dudula quickly turned toward xenophobic rhetoric, primarily directed against other African migrants in South Africa. Its leadership has organized anti-foreigner protests across the country and regularly invokes the need for “active citizenship,” thus weaponizing grassroots democracy against migrants who are juxtaposed with “ordinary South Africans” (Sinwell et al., 2023). The movement gained traction across the country throughout 2022 and 2023 and has since registered as a political party.
Increasing hate speech against foreigners, both on and offline, has had real ramifications. Thirty-eight people were killed in xenophobic incidents in 2022 alone, for example through lynching. Attacks on the property of (suspected) migrants have become commonplace, as shown by the burning down of Yeoville market in Johannesburg, a place where many (non-South) African traders sell their produce, in June 2022. Xenowatch, a platform that monitors xenophobic violence in the country, has registered a total of 680 xenophobia-related deaths in South Africa and over 5400 shops looted since the end of apartheid, though many more cases go unreported.
The rise of Operation Dudula recalls Mouffe’s warning that containing the political in institutional channels risks inducing excluded citizens to search for other forms of engagement, such as through anti-liberal and populist movements (Mouffe, 2006). However, anti-foreigner rhetoric has also increasingly been deployed in the formal political sphere. The recent 2024 electoral campaign is a particularly compelling example of how xenophobic populism (Blum, 2022) has made its way into mainstream politics. Even though Operation Dudula itself did not play a prominent role during the campaign, a strong anti-immigration discourse and the scapegoating of migrants have become central rhetorical and programmatic elements for several political parties. The Patriotic Alliance under the leadership of Gayton McKenzie, for example, ran its electoral campaign on a clear anti-foreigner platform. That blatant xenophobia does not hurt a political career was swiftly demonstrated when McKenzie was named the new Minister of Sports, Arts and Culture by the newly established government coalition. Ironically, he is now (among other things) in charge of the “social cohesion” dossier.
Finally, the literature on China also demonstrates how populist mobilization can foment violence, the most prominent example being the Cultural Revolution. The CCP has estimated that approximately 100 million people, or one-eighth of China’s population at the time, suffered from various forms of violence during this period under the rule of Mao Zedong (1893-1976). This violence included, but was not limited to, killings, beatings, imprisonment, excruciating interrogations, forced confessions, torture, sexual assault, confiscation, and public humiliation. Relying on charismatic mobilization and a personality cult (Leese, 2013), Mao Zedong called upon the youth, officially termed the Red Guards, to overthrow the party-state bureaucracy that he and his fellow leaders had established. The late 1960s witnessed widespread violence across the country, described in official narratives as “the people’s war against class enemies” – the corrupted elites. The Chinese Communist Party claimed to represent the vast majority of “the people,” a class-based category that had been carefully constructed through various political movements in the early years of the People’s Republic of China. According to Mao, the people were to carry out what he termed the “people’s democratic dictatorship” (renmin minzhu zhuanzheng) (Mao, 1949) on class enemies, such as capitalists, landlords, rightists, and counterrevolutionaries. This unprecedented mobilization of violence marked one of the most chaotic and brutal periods in modern Chinese history.
From Left-Wing (Inclusionary) to Right-Wing (Exclusionary) Populism
One of the most interesting similarities between several of the cases considered is the gradual transition from inclusive left-wing populism in post-colonies to exclusionary right-wing populism. The distinction between the two, captured by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013), offers a thought-provoking explanation for the differences between anti-colonial populism, which operates as inclusive (to include all oppressed groups), and the exclusionary one in the west, where populist state-building has relied on the nationalist exclusion of undesired minorities and immigrants from (former) colonies (Filc, 2015). This transition is clear in Yugoslavia, where we see the shift from the left-wing populism of socialist Yugoslavia to the right-wing populism of Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Miloševic, facilitated by the transition from socialism to democracy/capitalism; it is also apparent in South Africa, where the inclusivist populism of the anti-apartheid movement has gradually given way to forms of nationalist populism, xenophobic hatred, and violence against immigrants. A similar turn toward nationalism can be observed in China under Xi Jinping, where the shift appears as a new national politics pursued by the CCP itself under the slogan, “never forget 100 years of humiliation.”
Who are “The People”?
The literature on populism warns about the ambiguous notion of “the people” and the different ways in which it can be used in populist discourse. Brubaker (Brubaker, 2017) notes that there are at least three different approaches to this notion: people as plebs, people as demos (sovereign), and people as ethnos (a culturally or ethnically distinct group). The kind of “people” invented by populist discourse determines the extent of its potential instrumentation for polarization and violence.
In former Yugoslavia, although the literature is most often focused on the extreme-right populist mobilization of the 1990s, historians rightly point to a long history of populism in the country, from both the left and the right (Bešlin and Žarković, 2022). Socialist Yugoslavia legitimized itself as an outcome of anti-fascist and anticolonial revolutionary struggle, and social revolutionary populism took on an inclusive form, embracing all nations and nationalities. Still, the state refrained from the creation of “Yugoslavs” or the suppression of minorities, in order to avoid reviving the “national question,” which, according to Yugoslav communists, destroyed both the Yugoslav monarchy and Austria-Hungary; they thus refrained from attempts to unify the nation “either in an ethnic or a political sense” (Jović, 2004). In that sense, one could ask if approaches to left-right enemy production like the one offered by Benjamin Moffitt – who posits that right-wing populism operates with ethnic nationalism and an exclusionary nativist concept of the people, while the left relies more on an inclusivist notion of the people (Moffitt, 2020) – miss the long history of dealing with the “national question” in socialist countries.
The enemy construction of left-wing populist regimes follows class rather than ethnic lines, and the Chinese Communist Party systematically engaged in the elimination of class enemies after the revolution of 1949. Interestingly, Chinese nationalism does not seem to operate by turning one (or more) of the country’s 55 ethnic minorities into enemies (Tang and He, 2010). Instead, party politics remain ethnically inclusive, while nationalism is built on the concept of a shared Chinese identity based on Chinese civilization, a great national history, and a place of prominence in the world. However, recent changes in ethnic policies targeting regions with significant ethnic minority populations, such as intensified surveillance, “re-education” campaigns, and cultural assimilation measures in Xinjiang and Tibet, suggest a shift in the approach to inclusivity. Meanwhile, enemy production in other social sectors remains mainly class defined, even under a capitalizing economy. High-profile figures like Ma Yun, the founder of Alibaba, and party bureaucrats accused of betraying the “people’s will” are the primary targets of today’s popular protests. The discovery that nationalism rather than proletarian solidarity and equality can serve as the glue for society is clearly apparent in all of our examples as a principle of populist politics.
In South Africa, the official end of apartheid in 1994 saw the formation of a democratic government under the African National Congress (ANC), headed by Nelson Mandela, whose appeal to the people was inclusivist and reconciliatory in an attempt to bring together a great variety of racial and ethnic groups under his leadership. Nonetheless, following decades of economic hardship, corruption scandals, and challenges for the young democracy, political leaders from different factions are engaging more and more in exclusivist right-wing populist tactics, pitting the historically defined race groups within the country against one another, as well as (increasingly) “South Africans” against “foreigners.” In all three of these cases, we can observe a transition from left- to right-wing discourses, each firmly rooted in populist “we the people” rhetoric.
Conclusion
In this blog article, we explored how a global and historical perspective sharpens our conceptual understanding of populism. Through our seminar, we found that populism can appear in radically different contexts and under highly varying conditions, but that there are some common features. Chief among them are emotional appeal, rhetoric focused on “we the people,” anti-pluralism, and majoritarianism, and in this way, we find Roger Brubaker’s work well suited for diverse cases (Brubaker, 2017). However, populist leaders share a proclivity for seeking ways to remain in power, and on this point, we agree with Jan-Werner Müller’s assertion that populist stakeholders ultimately use state capture to neutralize institutions and stay in power for as long as possible (Müller, 2017) – well past what the constraints of a healthy liberal democracy would normally allow.
An additional aspect of global populism that requires further study is how populist parties work together, forming connections and alliances, and how they create a counter-project to what is generally termed the “liberal world order.” A small body of research has already explored the question of a “nationalist international,” both during the interwar period and during World War II, with another limited body of research focused on the present day; however, this topic is deserving of further study. With far-right nationalist parties gaining momentum in numerous democracies, we can now find abundant examples of cross-border collaboration, as embodied, for example, by the three far-right groups currently operating in the European Parliament, or the various high-profile radical right-wing conferences which have multiplied since 2016 (such as CPAC Hungary in 2022, 2023, and 2024, or the Europa Viva 24 summit which took place in Madrid this past May). Research on the spaces between populist stakeholders, in addition to atomized comparisons, can help us to better understand the alternative globalization projects pursued by hardcore anti-globalists. As demonstrated in this text, this is but one of many contradictions in the complex matrix of global and historical contexts within which populism appears.
About the Authors
Katarina Ristić is a senior researcher and lecturer at the Global and European Studies Institute (GESI) and at the Research Institute Social Cohesion (RISC), Leipzig University. Her research focuses on contemporary Southeast European history, with emphasis on transitional justice, memory and social media.
Therese Mager is a junior researcher at the Research Centre for Global Dynamics (ReCentGlobe) at Leipzig University. Her research areas include contemporary French history and right-wing populism, with a particular focus on French far-right political stakeholders and their transnational networks.
Constanze Blum is a postdoctoral researcher at the Leipzig section of the Research Institute Social Cohesion (RISC), Leipzig University, Germany. Her work focuses on transnational approaches to social cohesion and populism(s) with a focus on Southern and East Africa.
Man Zhang is a postdoctoral researcher at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. From 2021 to 2024, she was a postdoc at the Research Centre Global Dynamics and a research fellow at the Research Institute Social Cohesion, University of Leipzig. Her research focuses on modern and contemporary Chinese history, with a particular emphasis on political and sexual violence in the People’s Republic of China. She has published several book chapters and articles.
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Footnotes
[1] The Course was given by Katarina Ristić and Therese Mager, while Constanze Blum and Man Zhang gave guest lectures on South Africa and China.
Citation: Katarina Ristić, Therese Mager, Constanze Blum and Man Zhang, Populism in a Global Perspective: Who needs Democracy?, in: TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 09.01.2025, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/54152
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Forum Transregionale Studien (9. Januar 2025). Populism in a Global Perspective: Who Needs Democracy? TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research. Abgerufen am 14. Januar 2025 von https://doi.org/10.58079/131nq
