Why Ukrainians Return: Motivations of Return Migration and its Implications

By Alexander Sicheneder

As of January 2023, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had displaced eight million Ukrainians from the country, creating the largest refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War.[1] The potential permanent loss of nearly 20% of its population would be catastrophic for the country’s future, especially concerning Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction process. Already today is clear that Ukraine will have to rely heavily on the workforce of its citizens.

For the time being, migration out of Ukraine seems to have halted. In fact, 2024 could mark the first year of population growth since the start of the full-scale invasion. Estimates suggest that over 1 million people may have returned to Ukraine between 2023 and 2024.[2] However, despite the presumably large number of returnees, relatively little is known about them. Research on this important matter is scarce and restricted to only a few studies. To better explore this underdeveloped field, I set out to understand the reasons behind the return of those who went back to Ukraine.

Study Design

To achieve this, I applied an explorative, mixed-methods research design using a self-assessment online survey combining qualitative with quantitative insights. The survey targeted Ukrainians who fled after February 24, 2022, and have since returned. I tried to reach potential survey participants either directly through social media posts and personal contacts in Ukraine or indirectly through existing connections in the Ukrainian diaspora or other contacts with ties to Ukraine. Additionally, all respondents were encouraged to share the survey link with others who had fled and returned to Ukraine. Since the survey was distributed via an anonymous link, it is not possible to determine exactly how it was circulated. The data collection period was from 13 October 2023 to 28 April 2024. During this time, I gathered responses from 132 participants, 98 of whom completed the survey in full.

To maintain theoretical openness, I based my analysis on a framework by migration scholar Franck Düvell[3] who draws from various migration theories to propose a ‘universal theory of migration’. Düvell identifies economic, social, political, and individual factors as key drivers of migration. Since my aim was not to capture unique, individual return reasons, my analysis focused on the economic, social, and political dimensions. In doing so, the study aims to provide insights that could be valuable in designing policies crucial for the country’s post-war development.

Demographic composition of the sample

• Home regions: Only one respondent returned to an area currently under Russian occupation (Donetsk), which reflects a very low representation of returnees to Russian-occupied areas within the survey sample.
• Gender: 94.7% of the participants in my survey were female. This is significantly higher than the proportion of women among Ukrainian refugees under temporary protection in Europe, which is 68%.[4] This high imbalance can be explained by the martial law imposed in Ukraine on 24 February 2022. My results suggest that once abroad, only very few men return to Ukraine, probably for fear of being drafted into the war.
• Age: Roughly half of the respondents are between 26 and 45 years old. The average age of the respondents was 38.2 years. Therefore, the average age of my respondents was slightly lower than the average age of the Ukrainian population as of January 2022 (42.2 years)[5].
• Educational Level: Most respondents reported having completed postgraduate education (Master’s or Doctorate). Only four respondents had incomplete secondary education, while the remainder had at least completed secondary education. These findings are consistent with broader studies on Ukrainian refugees, which found that 76% of women and 71% of men who fled Ukraine had obtained higher education qualifications.[6]
• Migration Background: The majority of respondents (114 people) had no prior migration experience before fleeing Ukraine, with most having been born in Ukraine, and the same applying to their parents. Thus, the flight due to Russia’s full-scale invasion was the first migration experience for most of the survey participants.

The Framework of the Migration Experience

• The host countries of the survey participants: 97% of my respondents remained on the European continent during their flight. This is roughly consistent with UNHCR, which states that 92.7% of refugees from Ukraine currently registered worldwide remained on the European continent.[7] About half of my respondents fled to Germany or Poland. The figure below shows the countries to which the respondents fled.

• The respondents’ time abroad: Most respondents to my survey fled in either February or March 2022. In the subsequent months, the number of flights was significantly lower. From July 2023 onwards, no further flights were recorded in the survey. The return to Ukraine began very soon. As early as March 2022, my survey recorded one person returning to Ukraine. Starting in May 2022, the number of recorded returns to Ukraine remained consistently higher than the number of recorded flights. This could be attributed to the Ukrainian army’s success in reclaiming control over the territories in the northern oblasts of Ukraine, which started in April 2022. Thus, slightly more than half of the respondents indicated that they had returned between April 2022 and October 2022.
  Following October 2022, the rate of return to Ukraine remained relatively consistent, though at a reduced level. This supports the assumption put forth in the existing literature that the probability of refugees returning to their country of origin diminishes the more time they already have spent in the host country.[8] Among the people who stated the month and the year of their flight and return, the average time abroad is 6.8 months. This confirms the findings of the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) study, which found that returnees had been displaced abroad for an average of six months.[9] Despite returning, more than half of the respondents had revisited their host countries at least once, indicating the ongoing volatility of the situation in Ukraine.

Reasons for Return: The Economic Dimension

Return migration is frequently attributed to structural failures of economic integration.[10] Responses to the survey reinforce this perspective, as most answers relating to economic reasons were framed negatively. For instance, one respondent who sought refuge in Poland and found accommodation in a private housing shared:

“It was terrible. Hell of a job, expensive housing. Simply a nightmare.”

Another respondent, a university graduate who fled to the Czech Republic, echoed this:

“The main reason [to return] was of economic nature. The inability to find a job at the right level, to rent a house and pay rent on my own.”

Both responses underscore the economic burden resulting from the lack of adequate work and housing opportunities. While housing issues are not referenced in all answers featuring the economic dimension of their return, inadequate employment was a recurring theme. This is illustrated by another respondent who attended a technical college in Ukraine and relocated to Belgium:

“In the host country, it was very difficult to […] find a job according to my education.”

In general, the majority of respondents provided similar responses when addressing the economic dimension. The sole survey respondent who framed her answer positively was a 47-year-old woman who fled to Germany right after the war started but returned to Ukraine after two months:

“I have a husband, parents, and a job in Ukraine. So I returned to my life at the first opportunity”.

Even though this answer is framed positively, one can assume that the job in Ukraine would probably not have been a reason to return if the respondent had found an (appropriate) job in her host country. Based on the responses, it is likely that the difficult economic situation abroad was one factor in the respondents’ decision to return.

Quantitative data suggests that the economic struggles faced abroad have long-lasting consequences for returnees. While respondents rated their economic standing slightly above average before leaving Ukraine, they reported it being slightly below average upon returning. A Wilcoxon rank sum test confirmed the statistical significance of this shift, indicating a real decline in the respondents’ economic position within Ukrainian society.

Reasons for Return: The Political Dimension

The existing literature suggests that returnees are often driven by a strong sense of patriotism for their home country.[11] This notion is evident in the responses of many survey participants. A 29-year-old respondent who fled to the Netherlands exemplifies this sentiment:

“I love Ukraine and feel happy here. It might not be in a good place right now; it might be dangerous. But it’s mine. And this is my responsibility as well to finish this war. You can’t really buy a home, can you? Because it’s priceless. And also, Ukraine is a country of freedom. And I feel freedom here much more than anywhere I ever have been in my life.”

The answer is an indication of the patriotic feelings of the respondent. While this response is very explicit with the statement “I love Ukraine”, the feeling of patriotism also emerges in other answers. A 78-year-old male respondent, for instance, simply states:

“Home is home; home is better than anything.”

The feeling of patriotism is oftentimes followed by a sense of personal responsibility for Ukraine. For example, a 23-year-old survey respondent from the Oblast of Kharkiv writes:

“My house is occupied. But Ukraine is also my home, a very big home. I do everything possible to help my country.  Now I work in a charity fund in the red zone, in cities that are under enemy fire. I want to help people like me who have lost everything. In particular, it depends on me what Ukraine will be like.”

Statements like this one align with research that shows that higher patriotism can result in increased pro-social behaviour, leading to a higher likelihood of helping each other and altruism.[12] It seems likely that patriotism played a role in motivating some to return to Ukraine and contribute to the country’s reconstruction.

These findings are underpinned by a quantitative analysis, which suggests that the respondents have increased their sense of patriotism throughout their stay abroad. The survey participants were asked to indicate their level of pride in being a citizen of Ukraine both prior to their departure and following their return to Ukraine. On average, participants rated their pride closer to “fairly proud” before fleeing. After their return, in contrast, the average of respondents assessed their proudness closer to “very proud”, the highest possible answer category. This is a statistically significant shift, confirmed by a Wilcoxon rank sum test.

Reasons for Return: The Social Dimension

Migration literature has long recognised the importance of social networks between the country of origin and the host country as a significant factor of migration.[13] Similarly, return migration studies emphasise that, as long as a migrant’s family still lives in their home country, return migration stays a viable option. This is supported by the qualitative answers of the respondents, in which the social dimension was by far the most prevalent.

One woman who fled with her children to Germany reveals:

“The main reason is that my husband stayed in Ukraine, and it was hard for me to be alone with two small children in a foreign country.”

Hereby, the decision to return out of social reasons was featured by mainly negative emotions. Most answers highlighting the social dimension of their return decision were framed negatively. A 20-year-old woman from the Kyiv Oblast shares:

“I realised that it was difficult for me to find common ground with people who never experienced war. I cannot but discuss the morning news; I can’t pretend everything is fine with me when absolutely everything is wrong. And I always had a feeling that I needed my country. I tried to make online purchases to my friends to push out that I support Ukrainian business and economics. I woke up to every nightly air raid alert when I was in a completely secure country because I wanted to be with my people, and in the end, I realised that I had enough of being in a peaceful country; I had to replace those who were mentally exhausted; I had to return with new strength and support my friends and family to reach victory together.”

While the difficulties in socialising in the host country were only explicitly articulated in this response, the desire to reunite with family members who had remained in Ukraine emerged as a recurring theme throughout the answers pertaining to the social dimension. A 23-year old woman from the Oblast of Kyiv states:  

“[W]e are expecting a baby.  It’s hard to be away from your family at this time.”

Also other responses put forth the special hardship of staying abroad with one’s children. For instance, a woman from Donbas who spent seven months in Slovakia stated the following:

“Me and my children had enough of longing for our family and home every day.”

Contextualisation

The collected data shows that all migration factors identified by Düvell are relevant in Ukrainians’ decision to return, but they do not equally so. This is illustrated by the table below, which ranks the importance of return reasons according to the survey respondents. A lower rank signifies a higher perceived importance of the factor. Notably, the table highlights the outstanding importance of the social dimension in the respondents’ decision to return.

Return Reasons	Average rank given by the respondents
Reunification with people who stayed in Ukraine	2.73
Success of the Ukrainian army	3.62
Personsal attachment to the culture and identity of Ukraine	4.27
Insufficient knowledge of the language of the host country	4.79
Access to medical and social services in Ukraine	4.89
Unsatisfactory job situation in the host country	5.46
Insufficient social integration in the host country (little contact with citizens of the host country, etc.)	5.78
Inadequate housing conditions in the host country	6.10
Residence status in the host country	8.55
Lack of political voice in the host country	8.82

Implications for Policies to Attract Returnees

Many Ukrainians who fled the war are highly skilled, and their return would significantly contribute to national rebuilding. This is supported by literature emphasising the importance of return migration for the development and reconstruction of the country of origin due to their valuable experience abroad.[14]

Among the return reasons, the social dimension is the most important. As long as martial law exists and men cannot leave, the migration of a large proportion of Ukrainian refugees remains incomplete. Once the war ends, many Ukrainians will face the opportunity to change their status as an ‘incomplete migrant’: either by returning to Ukraine or by being joined by their dependents abroad. To prevent the latter and make the former as attractive as possible, Ukraine should, according to my survey results:

• Regain as much Ukrainian territory as possible, as the ‘success of the Ukrainian army’ was the second most important reason for Ukrainian returnees in their return decision. Additionally, the return of Ukrainians following Russian withdrawal from regions around Kyiv and other areas indicates that territorial gains positively influence the decision to return.
• Maintain national unity: ‘Personal attachment to the culture and identity of Ukraine’ ranked as the third most important reason for return. My analysis shows that the returnees’ patriotism has increased, likely fostering a greater sense of responsibility towards their country. Ukrainian returnees are therefore expected to play an active role in the country’s post-war period. For that, sustaining unity after the ‘rally around the flag effect’ wears off will be crucial. Ukraine should try to avoid returning to the tit-for-tat that characterised its politics and resulted in a deep mutual distrust within the population before the war. To further strengthen the people’s trust in the country’s institutions and their sense of community, fighting corruption will remain of crucial importance.
• Prioritise the rebuilding of social infrastructure: Access to medical and social services in Ukraine was ranked fifth regarding the most important reason for return. Thus, prioritised reconstruction of schools and healthcare systems will be essential in attracting returnees.
• Stabilise its economy and create jobs: Many respondents reported that their economic position had worsened upon their return due to economic hardship abroad. That economic factors were still not the top motivator for return is obvious, having in mind the deterioration of Ukraine’s economy since the beginning of the full-scale invasion.[15] Policies that ensure the economic reintegration of returnees, such as job matching programs, and the simplified recognition of skills acquired abroad may help returnees to re-improve their economic position and boosting the Ukrainian economy by profiting from the return of fled Ukrainians.

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Footnotes

[1] UNHCR. (2023). Lives on Hold: Intentions and Perspectives of Refugees from Ukraine #3. UNHCR. Retrieved from https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/99072.

[2] UNHCR. (2024a). Ukraine Refugee Situation. Retrieved from https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine?utm.

[3] Düvell, F. (2007). Europäische und internationale Migration: Einführung in historische, soziologische und politische Analysen. Münster: LIT.

[4] Eurostat. (2024). Beneficiaries of temporary protection at the end of the month by citizenship, age and sex – monthly data. Eurostat. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_asytpsm__custom_10229459/default/table?lang=en.

[5] State Statistics Service of Ukraine. (2022). Населення України. Retrieved from http://db.ukrcensus.gov.ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2022/zb_nasel%20_2021.pdf.

[6] Perelli-Harris, B., Torrisi, O., Head, M., & Brackstone, K. (2023). MRS No. 74 – Demographic and household composition of refugee and internally displaced Ukraine populations: Findings from an online survey. IOM. Retrieved from https://publications.iom.int/books/mrs-no-74-demographic-and-household-composition-refugee-and-internally-displaced-ukraine.

[7] UNHCR. (2024b). Ukraine Refugee Situation. Retrieved from https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine?utm.

[8] De Haas, H., & Fokkema, T. (2011). The effects of integration and transnational ties on international return migration intentions. Demographic Research, 25(24), 755-782.

[9] IOM. (2023). Ukraine — Returns Report. IOM. Retrieved from https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ukraine-returns-report-general-population-survey-round-14-september-october-2023.

[10] De Haas, H., & Fokkema, T. (2011). The effects of integration and transnational ties on international return migration intentions. Demographic Research, 25(24), 755-782.

[11] Mohamed, M. & Abdul-Talib, A. (2020): Push–pull factors influencing international return migration intentions: a systematic literature review. Journal of Enterprising Communities: People and Places in the Global Economy, 14 (2), 231-246.

[12] Druckmann, D. (1994). Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social Psychological Perspective. Mershon International Studies Review, 38(1), 43-68.

[13] Faist, T. (1997). Migration und der Transfer sozialen Kapitals oder: Warum gibt es relativ wenige internationale Migranten? Soziale Welt(12), 63-83.

[14] Choudhury, P. (2016). Return Migration and Geography of Innovation in MNEs: A Natural Experiment of On-the-job Learning of Knowledge Production by Local Workers Reporting to Return Migrants. Journal of Economic Geography, 16(3), 585–610.

[15] Trading Economics. (2024). Ukraine – BIP. Retrieved from https://de.tradingeconomics.com/ukraine/gdp.

 

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About the Author

Alexander Sicheneder studied Political Science & Economics and holds a Master’s degree from the Technical University of Munich and a Bachelor’s degree from the Ludwig Maximilian University. His interests are focused among others on the post-Soviet space, international relations and the post-war development of Ukraine.

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Lidia Kuzesmka, Fragmented Lives: 10 Pieces of the Ukrianian Displacement Puzzle, 22 October 2024.

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Citation: Alexander Sicheneder, Why Ukrainians Return: Motivations of Return Migration and its Implications, in: TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 26.11.2024, https://doi.org/10.58079/12ri8

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