Fragmented Lives: 10 Pieces of the Ukrainian Displacement Puzzle

By Lidia Kuzemska

We are quickly approaching the third anniversary of forced displacement from Ukraine due to the Russian full-scale invasion – a tragic benchmark no one wanted to believe in, let alone reach. I think it is time to reflect on how the situation related to the displacement of Ukrainians abroad has evolved during this period, and what trends can be expected in the near future.

With this introductory post, I invite you to a conversation about the complex and entangled puzzle of Ukrainian displacement. At the heart of it are fragmented lives of 6.7mln Ukrainians currently displaced abroad and 3.7mln inside the country (IOM-UN Migration, 2024b). Their lives are punctuated not only by the fact of displacement per se, but also by the changing policies and attitudes of their host and home countries and societies, by strained cross-border family dynamics and blurred future aspirations. Most of all, they are fragmented by the uncertainty of what comes next: in a year, when the war ends, when the life can become ‘whole again’. I have selected only ten pieces of this puzzle and welcome your responses and additions in the form of comments or blog posts. Here you will find information on how to contribute. Now, to the puzzles:

• The waiting loop continues, causing uncertainty and short-termism of plans of displaced Ukrainians

Almost every researcher collecting data about displaced Ukrainians highlights that uncertainty is a red thread in their findings (Andrews et al., 2023; Deineko & Aasland, 2024; Gréen & Odynets, 2024; Lazarenko, 2024; Mackova et al., 2024; Mikheieva & Jaroszewicz, 2023; Moroń et al., 2024; Mozetič et al., 2023; von Lowis et al., 2024). Should I stay in this host country, move elsewhere, or return to Ukraine (when? where to? how?)? What about my family and friends in Ukraine and new acquaintances here? Should I look for a permanent job and accommodation in a host country or not? Should I keep Ukrainian school for my children or give it up as the pressure of dual education is too great? How long will this uncertainty last? Not surprisingly that many displaced Ukrainians postpone their key life decisions to when the war ends, but this deferral has its cost, especially for those in their formative years.   

• Displaced children and their education are particularly negatively affected by the uncertainty

Worldwide, the situation regarding access to higher education for refugees is grim. In 2021, an estimated 3 percent of refugees were enrolled in higher education, compared to a global gross enrolment rate of 38 percent in 2018 (Martin & Stulgaitis, 2022), due to a range of barriers, primarily the lower number of secondary school graduates among refugees, the low number of places available and the lack of necessary resources (funding, transportation, family support) (UNHCR, 2019). Displaced Ukrainian children might face similar challenges. Already now, “a significant part of refugee children and youth from Ukraine remain out of school […] with secondary school age children and youth […] at particular risk of being out-of-school or remaining in online or remote education for long periods of time” (UNHCR, 2024a). Even though the situation varies across countries, the low enrolment of Ukrainian children in local schools is linked to their limited capacity for inclusion, language and administrative barriers, parents’ return expectations and access to online education in Ukraine (Figure 1). In short, thousands of children are at risk of learning loss, which in turn affects their future prospects (UNHCR, 2024a; UNHCR Regional Bureau for Europe, 2023a). In addition to the administrative and institutional barriers, the difficult access to educational opportunities and the necessary cross-cultural support also has an impact on the mental health of children and young people and their social contacts with peers in the host countries (FRA, 2023; Goździak & Popyk, 2024; Šeďová et al., 2024; Toros et al., 2024).

However, political decisions to decrease the uncertainty are still lacking.

• The temporariness of displaced Ukrainians’ legal status persists

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine,the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) was adopted based on the assumptions of the EU Member States (EU MS) and the Ukrainian government  that such hospitality to the residents of Ukraine was a necessary political gesture of solidarity, yet only temporary and limited in scope – for a maximum of three years with eventual post-war return(Carrera & Ciger, 2023; Ciger, 2022; Wagner, Seges Frelak, & Katsiaficas, 2023; Wagner, Seges Frelak, Katsiaficas, et al., 2023). Other host countries quickly followed the EU’s example and introduced their own temporary protection schemes (e.g. Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada and the United States (Molano et al., 2024; Xhardez & Dagher, 2024) or special permissions/visas (the UK, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, Japan (Hernes et al., 2023; ONS, 2022; UNHCR-Ipsos, 2024; Yamagata, 2023)). Almost all these legal schemes envisaged a maximum duration of three years, but now that the end of the deadline is approaching, the question is who, how and when, will be able to transition to a permanent resident status. The EU could have been an example to follow of what comes next for the displaced Ukrainians residing in Europe for longer than the anticipated three years threshold.

However, in June 2024, the EU decided not to decide about a long-term perspective and announced the extension of the existing TPD until March 2026 with a possibility of future yearly extensions. Such a decision allowed Member States to avoid difficult choices, namely: a) a much-feared scenario of Ukrainians applying for refugee status en masse and overwhelming national asylum systems, b) the unlikely renegotiation of the EU Long-Term Residence Directive to include those who resided under the TPD scheme, or c) the creation of a new special reconstruction permit for Ukrainians (Asscher, 2023; ECRE, 2024; Guild & Groenendijk, 2023; Ineli Ciğer, 2024; Vaitovich, 2024). Nonetheless, the legally questionable decision to extend the TPD beyond its three-year term seems to be the easiest compromise for all parties involved, including the Ukrainian government, which is weary of permanency being another argument for Ukrainians to stay abroad. At the same time, the EU’s (non)decision led to the fourth piece of the puzzle.  

• Fragmentation of the EU Temporary Protection implementation

In the absence of a unified EU vision of what comes after the TPD, countries have begun to introduce their own integration strategies targeting working age groups of Ukrainians who are likely to stay and trying to limit secondary migration of Ukrainians from other EU Member States (Desiderio & Hooper, 2023; Guzi et al., 2024; Hernes & Danielsen, 2024; IOM-UN Migration, 2024a). The Asylum Information database for each European country that contains special reports on the TPD implementation demonstrates a changing legal landscape that makes access to social support increasingly conditional upon employment, whereas in some countries the social support (e.g. housing, financial benefits) has already ended. Concurrently, language proficiency and the recognition of diploma and skills remain key obstacles for integration of the displaced into local labour markets. To provide integration services, key host countries – Germany, Poland and Czechia – have recently asked the EU Commission for additional funding and a fairer distribution of Ukrainians across the EU, partially to also counter domestic political narratives about displaced Ukrainian posing an undue burden on national budgets. In addition, first pilot projects for the voluntary return of Ukrainians started or are planned in Czechia, Ireland and Switzerland. The fragmented implementation of the TPD results in different levels of protection and support for the displaced, with each country only looking after “their” Ukrainians and limiting new arrivals in the event of another wave of displacement. As much as an EU-wide post-TPD solution would be preferable, the lack of political will and time to find such a solution will most probably lead to each host country unilaterally shaping the future of the displaced Ukrainians on their soil. Considering how fragile European public opinion is to questions of migration, the fifth piece of the puzzle seems particularly important.

• Public support towards the displaced Ukrainian in the EU is still high, but attitudes are changing in the neighbouring countries.

In view of the ongoing externalisation, the EU’s increasingly harsh asylum and border policies, push-backs and other violations of asylum and human rights obligations (Abdou et al., 2022; Akkerman, 2021; Atrey et al., 2022; Czaika et al., 2023; Fassi et al., 2023; Ferreira et al., 2022; Guild et al., 2022; Hahn, 2022; Partipilo, 2022), the swift triggering and relatively successful implementation of the TPD to support the displaced from Ukraine in Europe are exceptional. It demonstrated that with a strong political, media and popular support, governments, local communities, civil society and ordinary citizens can work together in a relatively successful way to accommodate and support large-scale sudden influx of forcibly displaced persons (FRA, 2023; UNHCR Regional Bureau for Europe, 2022). Certainly, without popular support, the TPD implementation would have been impossible. However, whether such support was of selective and discriminatory nature in comparison to other groups of forcibly displaced persons has also been discussed in the literature (Carrera & Ciger, 2023; Ciger, 2022; Dauvergne, 2024; Drazanova & Geddes, 2024; Garavello, 2022; Giancaspro & Lucenti, 2024; Hoffmann & Hameleers, 2024; Ibañez Sales, 2023; Thränhardt, 2023).

The comparatively smooth and manageable hosting of Ukrainians in the EU is still largely supported by the European public opinion (Figure 2), even though several countries – especially Ukraine’s neighbours – started to tighten their welfare benefits to the displaced while civil society and citizens’ support is also decreasing (Habitat for Humanity, 2023; Podgórska et al., 2023; Prokop et al., 2023; Staniszewski, 2023).

According to the European Council of Foreign Relations’ survey in twelve EU countries conducted in January 2024 (Figure 3), some negative trends are especially noticeable in neighbouring Poland, Romania and Hungary, where more than a third of respondents answer that they perceive displaced Ukrainians in their country as a threat rather than as an opportunity (Krastev & Leonard, 2024).

As the anti-migration political agenda is getting stronger in the EU and beyond, it is crucial that Ukrainians are perceived as making a positive contribution to their host societies and not be viewed as benefit seekers and threat to the most vulnerable groups in the host countries. Each upcoming election in these key Ukrainians-hosting country (2025 Parliamentary elections in Germany and Czechia, 2025 Presidential elections in Poland) might bring the issue of Ukrainians’ supposedly excessive support into political debate and result in further negative rhetorical, if not policy, consequences, and discussions about the need for their eventual return to Ukraine.

• Decreasing trend of Ukrainians’ return aspirations

Over the last two years, the surveys show that declared aspirations of return among displaced Ukrainians in the EU are still high, but gradually decreasing (Factum Group Ukraine, 2023; RatingGroup, 2023a; UNHCR, 2024b; UNHCR Regional Bureau for Europe, 2023b; Zaika & Vakhitov, 2024). The level of actual planning to return is low. Despite big discrepancies in socio-economic support, there are low secondary movement aspirations and plans of the displaced, even within the same host country. Ukrainians displaced abroad increasingly expect the war to last at least for a year or longer, so return is less and less conditioned on the war ending alone. A constellation of personal circumstances and levels of local integration will increasingly define stay-return aspirations (Figure 4).

Keeping families together is a strong argument in favour of return, even if the war continues. The optimistic perception of economic recovery and long-term security (e.g., NATO membership) of Ukraine positively correlates with higher return aspirations (Figure 6). Less integrated individuals (unemployed, with lower language skills) are also more inclined to return. Ukrainians that invested more of their time and effort into integration, are more likely to stay and integrate (Figure 5). The vulnerable groups (e.g. people with disabilities or low-income families) will probably stay if they continue receiving socio-economic support in the host countries. If not supported, these less resourceful groups will most probably return to Ukraine due to healthcare and cost of living needs.

The displaced from the temporarily occupied territories, areas of active combat and destroyed by the war often have nothing to return to and will most probably remain in the EU since the level of post-return support in Ukraine is not guaranteed and might be very lengthy. Even after the war ends, an estimated number of 1.5-2.3mln Ukrainians might stay in the EU, plus 0.5mln persons coming from Ukraine through the family reunification (Düvell, 2024). Return plans are very much in focus of the Ukrainian government as well – which constitutes the seventh piece of the puzzle.

• Apparently growing divergence between the stated interests of the Ukrainian government and those of Ukrainians abroad

Due to mobilisation and displacement, the Ukrainian state is facing acute shortage of fighting and working hands on top of public discussions about the dramatic demographic situation (Kulu et al., 2023; Libanova, 2024; Pyshchulina & Yuchyshyn, 2023). Over the last year, Ukrainian officials made several public statements regarding the displaced Ukrainians abroad – men specifically – that aimed to encourage their return and contribution to the country’s effort on military and economic fronts. “It is not clear who are we fighting for, if people are not here”, – said President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in August 2023. In the 2024 New Year’s address he asked even starker: “I know that one day I will have to ask myself: who am I? To make a choice about who I want to be. A victim or a winner? A refugee or a citizen? And everyone knows the answer. And the answer is Ukraine.“ He later reiterated that people should return to Ukraine at least to pay taxes, a message that the Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba also publicised abroad among Ukrainians and the host countries’ governments.

In addition, official rhetoric has been reinforced since spring 2024 by poorly communicated and chaotic policy changes regarding indiscriminately restricting access of Ukrainian men aged 18-60 to the consular services abroad until they have updated their personal data in the Ukrainian military register (Deineko & Hernes, 2024). The policy change was related to the newly introduced mobilisation law and seems to be more about satisfying domestic demand for equitable mobilisation rather than a well-thought and genuine effort to attract Ukrainians abroad to join the military forces. The rumours about potential extradition of fighting-age men started to circulate among Ukrainians abroad. Initially denied by the Ukrainian officials, these suspicions were later confirmed when the information resurfaced that President Zelenskyy allegedly asked the governments of host countries to bring back Ukrainian men of military age but was refused. Despite the EU stating the forced returns are not possible under the current TPD scheme, in the future, we might see bilateral arrangements between some countries and Ukraine to facilitate return of at least some groups of men (e.g. those who crossed the Ukraine-EU border without legal permission). Apart from the government, how do Ukrainians in the country look at their compatriots displaced abroad – our eighth part of the puzzle?

• The perceived gap between Ukrainians abroad and those who stayed in the country is widening

The attitudes towards Ukrainians displaced abroad are gradually worsening in Ukraine, especially towards males of conscription age and single women without children. According to the survey of the Ukrainian sociological agency Rating Group (CAWI, N=6050 respondents, including 700 IDPs & 750 respondents from Ukraine who are currently abroad) conducted in August 2023, female gender, older age and being accompanied by children significantly determines society’s attitude towards the displaced. 83% of respondents have a warm attitude towards women with children, 78% towards the elderly persons, 60% to students. Even men of conscription age with children are perceived more warmly (37%) compared to men of conscription age abroad without children (13%). The attitude towards displaced women without children is rather positive-neutral: 47% of respondents have a warm attitude, 25% a neutral one, and 27% a cold one. Respondents who are themselves displaced abroad have a much more positive attitude towards all categories of the displaced compared to both men and women who are now in Ukraine (RatingGroup, 2023b).

In another survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in September 2023 (Figure 7), half of respondents in Ukraine hypothesise that when Ukrainians will eventually return they might indeed face some criticism and tensions from those who stayed in the country during the whole duration of war (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2023). At the same time, the probability that they will be discriminated against specifically because they’ve been abroad is low. A survey from July 2024 by Rating Group demonstrated that 67% of respondents are against any restrictions of rights (such as the right to vote, hold certain positions, or conduct business) for Ukrainians who moved abroad, whereas 29% consider this might be appropriate (RatingGroup, 2024). The latter number is relatively high and signals that return and reintegration measures will need to be carefully designed to maintain the social balance in the country.

• The future of Ukrainian citizens displaced and/or deported to Russia and Belarus remains unknown, their return is uncertain.

The forced displacement of approximately 1mln. Ukrainian citizens to Russia began already in 2014 due to military activities, political repression, socio-economic deprivation of the area and dwindling social infrastructure after the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine (Kuznetsova, 2020). Since the full-scale invasion and occupation of more territories of South-Eastern Ukraine in 2022, approximately another million Ukrainian citizens escaped the active combat zone and occupation regime either to the territory of Russia or via Russia to third countries relying on help from NGOs and volunteers (Brednikova, 2023; Kuzemska, 2023). The genocidal deportations of thousands of Ukrainian children from the occupied territories to Russia also remain a complex legal and humanitarian concern (5 am Coalition, 2023; Hook, 2023; Umland & Ioffe, 2024). During both waves of displacement, the Russian government responded with minimal support to the displaced, moreover, such help was conditional upon the acquisition of Russian citizenship and complete political loyalty. Furthermore, the displaced had to undergo ‘filtration’ procedures conducted by the Russian security service, including body searches as well as searches of personal belongings and digital gadgets, interrogations, dactyloscopy, sometimes polygraph and detention (Amnesty International, 2022; Getmanova & Matviyenko, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2022; Humanitarian Research Lab, 2022). With almost zero support from the Ukrainian state or international organisations, Ukrainian citizens in Russia rely on themselves and their limited networks of support.

Regarding the situation in Belarus, we have some data from the IOM and IFCR working with the displaced Ukrainians (53 thousands as of  August 2024) that indicate their ongoing humanitarian and social needs (IFRC, 2022; IOM-UN Migration, 2023). Belarus is also included into the UNHCR Regional Response Plan, so the country is at least partially accessible to the international organisations and monitoring missions (UNHCR, 2024c). Yet it is also involved in the forcible transfers of Ukrainians children (Freedom House et al., 2024).

We know almost nothing about the public attitudes in Ukraine towards those displaced to Russia or Belarus (at least I could not find any survey asking this specific question). Yet, accounting for the documented negative impact of residing on the occupied territory and being potentially involved in collaboration with the enemy state on Ukrainian domestic public opinion (RatingGroup, 2024), these displaced Ukrainian citizens might also face tensions and restrictions on their rights upon return, depending on how the legislation about the collaboration with the occupying authorities will be implemented in judicial practice (Syniuk et al., 2024).

To sum up, all the puzzles above bring us to the tenth and final point.

• The Ukrainian state needs a realistic strategy of involvement with Ukrainians abroad

Demography and migration are major issues for both Ukraine and all countries that are hosting Ukrainians, including Russia. The competition for highly skilled and motivated workers is high. As I summarised elsewhere, European host countries decided to pursue a dual-intent approach to Ukrainians abroad – benefit from their skills and labour as long as they stay and facilitate their voluntary return when the war is over (Kuzemska, 2024). To make involvement with Ukraine (be it return, investment, education, remote work, cultural diplomacy, etc.) more probably, the government will inevitably need to have a realistic strategy of what is possible to do given stretched resources and the scale of the task.

In late August 2024, President Zelenskyy announced the intention to create a Ministry of Ukrainian Unity by the end of the year tasked with fostering voluntary return of Ukrainians from abroad, and countering Russian influence on Ukrainians abroad. Even though the timely implementation of such a proposal is doubtful, it can rely on the framework proposed by a recently appointed Ambassador-at-large for World Ukrainian Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Maryana Betsa, who was tasked to liaise with the global community of Ukrainians, advocate their cultural and linguistic rights, and encourage their engagement in Ukraine’s recovery. Other measures, such as the proposed draft law on multiple citizenships allowing Ukrainians abroad to retain their citizenship when they obtain nationality of another country (except Russia) can also be one of the ways to facilitate staying in touch, contributing to Ukraine and potentially encourage return or circular migration.

Together, these ten pieces of the Ukrainian displacement puzzle demonstrate how lives are fragmented not only by the fact of leaving your home, but also by a wider context of changing policy priorities, shifting public attitudes and the continuing Russian war against Ukraine.

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About the Author

Lidia Kuzemska is a sociologist with an interdisciplinary interest in forced migration, internal displacement, borders, and citizenship. She is a 2024-25 Prisma Ukraïna fellow of the Gerda Henkel Foundation at the Forum Transregionale Studien and academic coordinator of the research group War, Migration, Memory. In 2022, she received her Ph.D. from Lancaster University (UK). Her dissertation was entitled “‘Don’t Be Afraid of Our Citizens’: Internally Displaced People Encounter Bordering and Othering in Ukraine” and it focused on the counter-hegemonic citizenship practices of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2014–2016. Lidia also holds an MA in Economy and Society from Lancaster University (UK), an MA in European Studies from the College of Europe (Belgium and Poland), and an MA in Sociology from Ivan Franko National University of Lviv (Ukraine). She is also a research affiliate at the Internal Displacement Research Programme (SOAS University of London) and a peer-reviewer for the Knowledge Platform and Connection Hub (UN Network on Migration).

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Citation: Lidia Kuzemska, Fragmented Lives: 10 Pieces of Ukrainian Displacement Puzzle, in: TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 22.10.2024, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/53378

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