Soviet Weaponry on a Pedestal: Military Equipment Monuments in the Time of the Russian War in Ukraine – Part 2
Part 2: Practices During the Full-Scale War, 2022–2024
By Denys Shatalov and Mykola Homanyuk
Active interference with Soviet WWII-memorials began in Ukraine with the outbreak of the full-scale war in February 2022. From the usual old monuments to the participants of the Second World War, the public perception has now shifted to seeing them primarily as markers of Soviet ideology and Soviet militarism in the space of Ukrainian cities. From this perspective, the monuments of the Second World War are no longer associated with the Ukrainian past and the commemoration of Ukrainians’ participation in the war, but with Soviet occupation, similar to the interpretation of countries of the former socialist bloc after 1989. In this respect, military equipment-monuments become unacceptable because of their form, as they are associated exclusively with Soviet (and thus hostile) practices. While the sculpture-monuments of the Second World War erected between the 1950s and1980s can be interpreted as Soviet not only because of the context of their construction and plaque-texts, but also because of their general aesthetics, the monument-weapons are defined as Soviet by their very form, because such form of monuments is commonly perceived as exclusively Soviet practice.
Soviet monuments of the Second World War, whether sculptures or military equipment, are often associated with the present-day aggressor, Russia, which actively uses the mythology of the Great Patriotic War to justify its invasion of Ukraine and positions itself as the successor of the USSR.[1] Furthermore, military equipment on pedestals can be perceived as an outdated commemorative practice not aimed at honoring the memory of people, but at promoting its own military power. When placed in a peaceful urban context, it is frequently perceived as inappropriate.[2]
The other point of view is also present in the public discourse: the perception of monuments as memorials in honor of ancestors who participated in the Second World War. In these cases it refers to both Ukrainians and their association with a specific family experience.

Photo by Mykola Homanyuk, 2024.
The variants of interference with military equipment on pedestals that we have seen since February 2022, generally reflect the positions outlined below: dismantling, de-Sovietization, and Ukrainization.
Dismantling
The full-scale Russian invasion triggered a campaign to dismantle all objects that could be associated with Russia or the Soviet-Communist ideological legacy (this also applies to the perception of Russia as a continuation of the Soviet Union). Thus, after the 2014-2016 period, in the spring of 2022 a new wave of dismantling Soviet monuments began. This time, it also affected the memorials of the Second World War, both sculptures and military equipment on pedestals. As for the ideology of this process, we find the use of the term “communist tank” very telling: it justifies the need to dismantle military equipment monuments[3]. However, while civic activists who see their mission as ensuring the complete decommunization/decolonization[4] of public space sometimes demolish sculptures without an official permission, the dismantling of military equipment monuments is always done officially, through the efforts of local authorities.[5] This is probably due to “technical” reasons – a high-tonnage tank cannot be overthrown from its pedestal only with the help of muscle power and then smashed with a sledgehammer. In this case, the painting of monuments can be interpreted as a compensatory action for the inability to physically remove the object.[6]

Photo by Mykola Homanyuk, 2024.
In addition to the cases in which monuments are dismantled because they are interpreted as Soviet ideological objects, there is another practice. The dismantling of a military equipment monument installed on a pedestal in a settlement may be primarily aimed at improving its space. In such cases, it is only a matter of moving the equipment to a more appropriate place, from the point of view of a local community, and not of removing it completely. For example, a T-34 from the railway station square in Trostianets (which was also damaged by shelling during the battles for the city in the spring of 2022) is planned to be moved to the mass grave of Soviet soldiers,[8] and a tank from the center of Zhytomyr will be transferred to the territory of the Monument of Eternal Glory, where samples of artillery weapons from the Second World War are already on display.[9] Another option is to relocate military equipment from pedestals to museums.[10] This practice of “clearing space” from war artifacts can be compared to the transfer of Soviet soldiers’ graves from urban spaces to cemeteries, a process that also began in 2022. Just as a cemetery (not a city square) is a space for the dead, a museum or mass grave of the Second World War participants (not a central street) should be a place for old weaponry. It is important to note that the first option – “decommunization” through dismantling – is primarily carried out in the regions traditionally opposed to the Soviet legacy (Galicia and Volhynia), whereas the second option – relocation – also involves other regions.

Photo by Mykola Homanyuk, 2023.
“De-Sovietization”
Although the practice of dismantling monuments is not unique, there is no evidence of a “tank fall” comparable in scale to the “Lenin fall” of 2014–2015. However, in places where equipment is left standing on pedestals, it is subject of interference through “de-Sovietization”. Red stars and other markings containing Soviet symbols, including guards’ emblems, are painted over. We see different types of implementation. Sometimes it is a formal execution: a T-34 tank at the entrance to Kazanka in the Mykolaiv region has been left with white circles on its turret only, while. the Soviet star on the guards’ emblems has been covered. Similarly, the guards’ emblems were painted over with bright green spray paint on a tank in Mykolaiv.[11]
At the same time, it is common for Soviet symbols to be painted over with blue and yellow colors. Without knowing the motivation of the certain performers such cases can be interpreted in different ways. It seems that it is the same practice as painting over banned (or de-legitimized) symbols, like the case of Kazanka or Mykolaiv, but the painter simply had the right colors.The covering of red stars on tanks, aircrafts, and trucks with national colors evokes associations with the practices of handling trophy vehicles. Enemy identification marks are usually painted over with noticeable national symbols. This is primarily intended to avoid the enemy’s identification of the equipment. The stars on old tanks and vehicles can also be regarded as enemy markings, especially in view of the use of similar stars as identification marks in the Russian Armed Forces, and the general discourse on Soviet totalitarianism as an enemy regime for Ukrainians as well. Therefore, by their presence alone, they seem to provoke replacement with Ukrainian symbols, rather than complete erasure. In contrast, we have not encountered cases of Ukrainian symbols being painted over previously empty surfaces of military equipment monuments.
Such “nationalization” could simplyhave a tactical purpose: the Soviet stars are painted over as a quick interim action until the monument’s future is decided. This is indicated by the lack of interference with the texts on the pedestals, although they may contain direct references to the Soviet discourse. The example of the IS-2 tank in Dubno is illustrative. Back in July 2022, local authorities announced that it would be up for sale for $500,000. For two years now, the tank has been waiting for a buyer on a painted blue-and-yellow pedestal with national colors on the turret: according to the mayor, it is the new owner who should dismantle the tank.[12]

Photo by Mykola Homanyuk, 2024.

Due to the absence of Soviet symbols, neither the tank nor the pedestal were interfered with after February 24, 2022.
Photo by Denys Shatalov, 2024.
“Ukrainization”
A T-34 tank at the entrance to Kropyvnytskyi had the red star on its turret replaced with yellow and blue circles. They reproduce the markings of contemporary Ukrainian military aviation. Of course, this may simply be the result of a more careful and “creative” covering of Soviet symbols. But at the same time, this case of nationalization visually appears to be more than just a “tactical” action to remove prohibited symbols. There is a temptation to view it as a manifestation of a more profound appropriation of the monument. Visually, it is detached from its historical context, a Soviet Red Army armored vehicle that fought here in 1943–1944. On the other hand, the presence of a contemporary Ukrainian Armed Forces emblem creates a new context of the “Ukrainian tank”. This visual appearance of the tank, with Ukrainian symbols, generally corresponds with the presentation of Ukrainian participation in the Second World War in contemporary public discourse, with the emphasis that Ukrainians fought Nazis alongside other Allies Nations , taking these actions out of the Soviet context.

Photo by Mykola Homanyuk, 2023
While the case of the tank in Kropyvnytskyi allows for various interpretations, we also have several examples where we can clearly see the complete “Ukrainization” of the equipment on the pedestals. In particular, these are the cases of the aircraft in Cherkasy and Kramatorsk and the tank in Zvyagel (Novohrad-Volynskyi).
The Soviet Su-7 jet fighter installed in the ‘30th Anniversary of Victory’ Park in Cherkasy has undergone changes, though even before the outbreak of the full-scale war. In 2019, it was repainted during the reconstruction of the park’s monuments. Instead of the standard for the 1960s Soviet aircraft’s silver color and red stars, it now has a blue and yellow livery. The caption on the pedestal was also changed. The Soviet version reads that the plane was installed in honor of the pilots of the 8th Aviation Division, which liberated the city in 1943. The new version now has the words “Glory to the Heroes,” which look like a paraphrase of a popular modern slogan and allows for different interpretations of which heroes it refers to, of World War Two or of modern Ukrainian Armed Forces.[13]
In the summer of 2023, the MiG-17PF jet fighter installed in Kramatorsk in 1973 was completely repainted. It was covered with the blue pixel camouflage used by modern Ukrainian combat aircraft and the emblems of the Ukrainian Air Force added.[14] The nationalization also affected the dedication. Now the plaque on the pedestal states that the monument was erected on September 8, 1973, “as a sign of respect for Ukrainian pilots”. On the previous version (not necessarily the first), the text was different: “Glory to Soviet pilots – people of a proud and courageous profession” and it stated that it was installed in honor of the 30th anniversary of the liberation of the city (September 8, 1943 is its actual date).[15] Similarly, in September 2022, modern pixel camouflage of Ukrainian military vehicles was applied to a Soviet IS-3 tank in Zvyagel.[16]
Of course, there is no guarantee that the repainted military equipment will not be dismantled later, either due to a change in the position of the local communities or to regulations by government agencies. But in this case, the efforts used to “Ukrainianize” the monuments indicate a will to preserve them, and show that communities perceive military equipment on pedestals as part of their own space and recognize such monuments as an embodiment of their own memorial tradition.

Photo by Illia Shatalov, 2024.
Conclusions
The fate of Soviet military equipment monuments in Ukraine is in line with general contemporary trends in the treatment of the Soviet memorial heritage of the Second World War and its memory. . After the outbreak of the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war on February 24, 2022, we are facing two main directions of interventions in the space of Soviet military equipment monuments: dismantling or preserving through symbolic de-Sovietization and nationalization. These two options can be considered as possible answers to the general question of the future of Soviet heritage and its relation to present-day Ukraine, which is given by contemporary Ukrainian society.
Military Equipment of the Ongoing War as Commemorative Objects
Observing the fate of military equipment of the previous war during the new military conflict provokes a comparison of situations. Therefore, we would like to share our short notes on the use of military equipment as memorial objects of the Russo-Ukrainian war, during 2014–2022 and the two years of its full-scale phase (2022–2024), below.
In the summer of 2014, Ukrainian communities began memorialization of Ukrainian soldiers killed in the Anti-Terrorist Operation zone[17] (ATO) actively. Initially, these were just temporary memorials, but since 2016, permanent monuments and various memorials have been erected in different communities. However, military equipment was not used as monuments to honor the memory of those who died in this war, primarily due to the unwillingness to copy the Soviet approach to Second World War memorialization.
There were exceptions. In 2016, in the village of Hurivshchyna (Kyiv region), a Soviet BRDM-2 (or more precisely, an anti-tank missile carrier on its basis) was also placed underneath the cross of the “fighters for the Freedom of Ukraine”-memorial (erected in 2013). The vehicle was presented as a monument for Ukrainian soldiers killed in the ATO, but due to the lack of explanatory texts, it can be interpreted as another “Afghanistan” memorial, which is typical for the use of BRDMs. Moreover, it is a modification that was not actually used in the ATO (BRDMs use was limited, as they were seen as outdated vehicles). During the fighting in 2022, the BRDM monument was damaged by shelling, and when it was restored, the holes in the armor were even accentuated by a red paint outline. Apparently, representatives of the local community wanted to emphasize the “military experience” of their memorial.
Since 2014, museums became the main space for placing equipment of the Russian-Ukrainian war as memorial objects. This is in line with the position that is currently being articulated regarding the monuments to the Second World War: war artifacts should not be placed in the city center, but at special sites. In the summer of 2014, samples of Russian military equipment captured in Donbas were placed on the ground of the National Museum of the History of Ukraine in the Second World War. Later, pieces of equipment used by the Ukrainians since 2014 were placed in a different location of the museum complex.
Opened in 2016, the Dnipro Anti-Terrorist Operation Museum’s outdoor exhibition “By the Roads of Donbas” offered visitors an installation featuring the environment of the 2014–2015 battles. It used burnt-out cars, a turret from a destroyed tank, a ZU-23 anti-aircraft gun, a 120-mm mortar (which had previously been part of the exhibition about the WWII), and an armored personnel carrier. Later, the museum also received another Armored Personnel Carrier and two BRDMs.[18] However, the equipment near the ATO Museum was not limited to these samples. Members of various units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces donated their damaged vans and pickups to the museum, and soon an area dedicated to such vehicles appeared between the outdoor exhibition and the main museum building.[19] Such transfers were simplified by the cars’ status: purchased with volunteers’ or the soldiers’ own funds, these vehicles were not officially registered with military units, so special procedures were not necessary. In 2023, the ATO Museum (at that time already reconceptualized as a museum of the Russo-Ukrainian war) received a burned Russian BTR-82. Meanwhile this year, the museum lost one of its BRDMs, which was given for restoration and was transferred to an active military unit.[20]

Photo by Valeria Lavrenko, 2022.
These two options – the damaged automobiles of Ukrainian soldiers and the burned enemy vehicles – are the only equipment of the ongoing war presented in the public space of Ukrainian cities during the full-scale invasion.
Captured enemy equipment, in a condition unsuitable for restoration and use by the Ukrainian defense forces, placed in the city space, becomes a demonstration to citizens of the strength of the Ukrainian army and evidence of the failure of the Russian “blitzkrieg”. This idea was presented at a “parade” of destroyed enemy-equipment on Khreshchatyk, the main street of the capital, installed in August 2022 on the occasion of Ukraine’s Independence Day.[21] Since the summer of 2022 exhibitions of damaged enemy vehicles were organized in various large cities (in particular, the authors had the opportunity to visit them in Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Kryvyi Rih, and at the Marshal Konev Hill memorial near Kharkiv). Those located in city centers will obviously not become permanent objects. During the opening of the exhibition in Kryvyi Rih, its temporary status was immediately declared and plans to send the equipment as scrap metal for melting were announced.[22]

Photo by Denys Shatalov, 2022.
Paradoxically, damaged automobiles are the only modern Ukrainian military equipment that can be found in the urban space today. Wrecked with shell fragments and perforated with bullets, they are placed in public spaces for “promotional” purposes as an invitation to raise funds for new vehicles for a certain unit. There is no memorial function here. All the other military equipment is currently used at the frontline.

Photo by Mykola Homanyuk, 2024.
Denys Shatalov wrote this essay as part of the Sustaining Ukraninan Fellowship at the Centre for Advanced Studies Sofia and Mykola Homanyuk as part of the Gerda Henkel Foundation Scholarship.
Footnotes
[1] On the Russian treatment of WWII monuments in occupied Ukrainian territories see Mykola Homanyuk and Mischa Gabowitsch, “Occupation and De-occupation of War Memorials in Ukraine. Commemorative Practices in Russian-Controlled Territories, 2022–2023”, In: Kunsttexte Nr. 1 (2024), https://doi.org/10.48633/ksttx.2024.1.102637
[2] For such argumentation see Denys Shatalov, “The Second World War and future monuments to the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war in Kryvyi Rih”, In: Images and Objects: Russia’s War against Ukraine (ed. by Miglė Bareikytė and Natasha Klimenko). Berlin, 2024 (upcoming).
[3] For a typical example of the argumentation for such dismantling, with the equation of Soviet equipment-monuments to markers of the “Russian World”, see bug.org.ua, “Demontuvaty tank u Volodymyri! Nastav chas pozbutysya vid radyans’koho smittya i ‘rus’koho mira’ v misti”, https://bug.org.ua/news/volodymyr/demontuvaty-tank-u-volodymyri-nastav-chas-pozbutysya-vid-radyanskogo-smittya-i-ruskogo-mira-v-misti-653544/, accessed 15 July 2024.
[4] “Decolonization” here refers to the process of removing Soviet markers from Ukraine’s space, in particular by dismantling memorials associated with communist figures and Communist party history, and renaming toponyms named after them, which started after the Revolution of Dignity (the Maidan protests) in 2014. After the outbreak of full-scale war in February 2022, in Ukraine, the process of renaming toponyms and dismantling monuments to Russian figures, which became known as the “decolonization process” began.
[5] bug.org.ua, “Tankovpad prodovzhuyetʹsya: u Ternopil’s’kiy oblasti demontuvaly shche odyn pamyatnyk-tank”, https://bug.org.ua/news/tankovpad-prodovzhuyetsya-u-ternopilskij-oblasti-demontuvaly-shhe-odyn-pamyatnyk-tank-653898/, accessed 15 July 2024; bug.org.ua, “U Rivnomu demontuvaly pam’yatnyk z radyans’koyu tekhnikoyu”, https://bug.org.ua/news/u-rivnomu-demontuvaly-pamyatnyk-z-radyanskoyu-tehnikoyu-654040/, accessed 15 July 2024; Valentyna Pustíva, “V Mukachevo demontirovali sovetskiy tank-pamyatnik”, https://korrespondent.net/ukraine/4468290-v-mukachevo-demontyrovaly-sovetskyi-tank-pamiatnyk, accessed 15 July 2024; @DecolonizatorUA, “U seli Nezvys’ko na Prykarpatti demontovno radyans’ku harmatu”, https://twitter.com/DecolonizatorUA/status/1783552306543223028, accessed 15 July 2024; Media ahentstvo ACC, “U Chernivtsyakh demontuvaly tank-pam’yatnyk na vulytsi Haharina”, https://acc.cv.ua/news/chernivtsi/u-chernivcyah-demontuvali-tank-pamyatnik-na-vulici-gagarina-video-82243, accessed 15 July 2024; bug.org.ua, “Slidom za radyans’kymy zirkamy na ploshchi u Volodymyri demontuvaly tank” https://bug.org.ua/news/volodymyr/onovleno-slidom-za-radyanskymy-zirkamy-na-ploshhi-u-volodymyri-demontuvaly-tank-656609/, accessed 15 July 2024.
[6] @DecolonizatorUA,“U Mykolayevi patriotychna spil’nota vymahaye demontuvaty sovyets’kyy tank”, https://twitter.com/DecolonizatorUA/status/1786362923918495887, accessed 15 July 2024. We know of similar cases in Rivne and the village of Bilozerka, Mykolaiv region.
[7] In spring of 2024, this tank was painted with inscriptions demanding its dismantling, and white crosses were added in the place of the painted over Soviet emblems. But after that, the pedestal was cleaned, probably by utility workers, but the crosses remained. Apparently, for the authors of the “addition”, this is a reference to a tactical emblem on the AFU ground vehicles used since the fall of 2022. But applied to a tank from the WWII era, they also evoke associations with a trophy tank used by the Wehrmacht.
[8] Eymos Chappl, “Pam’yatnyk Druhiy svitoviy viyni – tank T-34 u Trostyantsi vyrishyly demontuvaty”, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/tank-trostyanets-vtorhnennya/32403254.html, accessed 15 July 2024.
[9] ArmiyaInform, “U Zhytomyri znyaly z postamentu radyans’kyy tank T-34”, https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/05/05/u-zhytomyri-znyaly-z-postamentu-radyanskyj-tank-t-34/, accessed 15 July 2024.
[10] Behemot, “U Pavlohradi radyans’kyy tank iz pochesnoho mistsya pereyide do muzeyu, shchob ne lyakaty naselennya”, https://beg.dp.ua/radjanskij-tank-pereide-do-muzeju/, accessed 15 July 2024; rayon.in.ua, “U Novohradi-Volyns’komu khochut’ perenesty v inshe mistse radyans’ki harmatu y tank”, https://history.rayon.in.ua/news/553525-u-novogradi-volinskomu-khochut-perenesti-v-inshe-mistse-radyanski-garmatu-y-tank, accessed 15 July 2024; Viktoriya Otamanchuk, “Demontovanyy v Kam’yantsi radyans’kyy tank vstanovyly v Kyyevi”, https://vsim.ua/Podii/demontovaniy-v-kamyantsi-radyanskiy-tank-vstanovili-v-kiev-11686198.html, accessed 15 July 2024; Oksana Kolomiyets’, “U Volochys’ku demontuvaly tank na chest’ vyzvolyteliv vid nimets’ko-fashyst·s’kykh zaharbnykiv”, https://ye.ua/syspilstvo/62405_U_Volochisku_demontuvali_tank_na_chest_vizvoliteliv_vid_nimecko_fashistskih_zagarbnikiv.html, accessed 15 July 2024.
[11] Inshe TV, “V Mykolayevi na tanku-pam’yatnyku zamalyuvaly chervonu zirku”, https://inshe.tv/mykolayv/2022-09-20/707738/, accessed 15 July 2024.
[12] Ivan Marchuk, Nadiya Kryvko, “‘Khto khoche kupyty – nekhay sam yoho i demontuye’: u Dubni na Rivnenshchyni ne mozhut’ prodaty radyans’kyy tank-monument”, https://suspilne.media/rivne/350796-hto-hoce-kupiti-nehaj-sam-jogo-i-demontue-u-dubni-na-rivnensini-ne-mozut-prodati-tank-monument/, accessed 15 July 2024.
[13] lenta.ua, “U Cherkasakh v rekonstruktsiyu ‘Litaka’ vklaly mayzhe milʹyon”, https://lenta.ua/u-cherkasah-v-rekonstruktsiyu-litaka-vklali-mayzhe-milyon-73218/, accessed 15 July 2024.
[14] Anton Stepura, “Perefarbovane mynule. Litak u Kramators’ku vidteper u blakytnomu pikseli: chy dostatnye onovlennya radyans’koho pam’yatnyka”, https://suspilne.media/donbas/516465-perefarbovane-minule-litak-u-kramatorsku-vidteper-u-blakitnomu-pikseli-ci-dostatne-onovlenna-radanskogo-pamatnika/, accessed 15 July 2024.
[15] Skhídniy Proyekt, “V Kramatorske otremontirovannyy pamyatnik samoletu otkryli pod zvuki orkestra”, https://vp.donetsk.ua/mir/51011-9961, accessed 15 July 2024.
[16] Oleksandr Kravchenko, “Na Zhytomyrshchyni perefarbuvaly tank na pam’yatnyku”, https://lb.ua/society/2022/09/11/529072_zhitomirshchini_perefarbuvali_tank.html, accessed 15 July 2024.
[17] The Anti-Terrorist Operation in Eastern Ukraine officially started on April 14, 2014 in response to Russian-backed separatists taking control in Donbas.
[18] Yura Fanyhin, “Super den’ v Muzeyi ATO”, Facebook post, 31 August 2017, https://www.facebook.com/gobackalive/posts/pfbid0XiFeECQZ1LjNtUEF11ySoxKucxH2KzLxpATEpRzhJTWacTeXW2f5RwEXBKHrJPhNl, accessed 15 July 2024.
[19] Pershyy Muzey ATO Dnipro/ Pervyy Muzey ATO Dnepr/ Ukraine’s first ATO Museum, “Pam’yatayete, my rozpovidaly, shcho zovsim skoro ekspozytsiya Muzeyu popovnyt’sya…”, Facebook post, 17 January 2020, https://www.facebook.com/UkrainesFirstATOMuseum/posts/pfbid02ioVM33YXXD1yisBfP516GdnpAj4Dbc3xi5Qn9oLApZjbosQQK3MYuECyQBUexMhrl, accessed 15 July 2024; dnepr.info, “Dneprovskiy muzey ATO popolnilsya dvumya unikal’nymi eksponatami”, https://dnepr.info/ru/news/dneprovskij-muzej-ato-popolnilsya-dvumya-unikalnymi-eksponatami/, accessed 15 July 2024.
[20] DniproTV, “Bronetekhnika z ekspozytsiyi Muzeyu ATO vidpravyt’sya na peredovu”,https://dnipro.tv/news-dnipro/transport/bronetekhnika-z-ekspozytsii-muzeiu-ato-vidpravytsia-na-peredovu/, accessed 15 July 2024.
[21] Yelyzaveta Servatyns’ka, “‘Parad’ znyshchenoyi rosiys’koyi tekhniky na Khreshchatyku. Fotoreportazh”, https://suspilne.media/273280-parad-znisenoi-rosijskoi-tehniki-na-hresatiku-fotoreportaz/, accessed 15 July 2024.
[22] militarnyi, “U Kryvomu Rozi vidkryly vystavku znyshchenoyi tekhniky armiyi Rosiyi”, https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/u-kryvomu-rozi-vidkryly-vystavku-znyshhenoyi-tehniky-armiyi-rosiyi/, accessed 15 July 2024.
About the Authors
Denys Shatalov earned his Ph.D. in History in 2016 from Oles Honchar Dnipro National University, Ukraine, with a thesis on Ukrainian Cossacks in public discourse from the second half of the 18th to the first half of the 19th century. From 2015 onwards, he has been a research fellow at the “Tkuma” Ukrainian Institute for Holocaust Studies and the Jewish Memory and Holocaust in Ukraine Museum (2015-2020). He has been a Prisma Ukraïna visiting fellow in 2019/20 and a 2022/23 non-resident Prisma Ukraïna Fellow at the Forum Transregionale Studien. He is a member of the War, Migration, Memory research group since 2022. Since October 2023, he is a Sustaining Ukrainian Scholarship Fellow at the Centre for Advanced Studies Sofia and a 2024-25 Prisma Ukraïna fellow of the Gerda Henkel Foundation.
Mykola Homanyuk was born in 1974 in Kakhovka, Ukraine. He graduated from the Kherson State Pedagogical Institute in 1996 and defended his Ph.D. thesis in Sociology at V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University in 2008. Currently, he is an associate professor at the Department of Geography and Ecology at Kherson State University, where he teaches human geography. He is also a chairperson of the NGO Kherson Department of the Sociological Association of Ukraine and runs the independent theatre company Kherson Theatre Lab. In 2003/2004, he was a fellow of the Lane Kirkland’s Fellowship at the M. Coure-Skłodowska University (Poland). In 2018, he won the ADAMI Media Prize for Cultural Diversity in Eastern Europe. In 2022, Homanyuk received the Virtual Visitorship Grant from the Northwestern Buffett Institute for Global Affairs (USA) and was a fellow of the Petro Jacyk Non-Resident Scholars Program at the University of Toronto (Canada). In 2023-2024 he participated in the fellowship program “Ukraine and the Transformation of Eastern Europe”, hosted by the Research Center for the History of Transformations (RECET) at the University of Vienna (Austria). His current research is dedicated to ethnic minorities (Roma and Meskhetian Turks), memorials on temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, modern toponymic practices in Ukraine, and problems of social representation in contemporary documentary theatre. He has been a non-resident Fellow and member of the Prisma Ukraïna War, Migration, Memory research group since 2022 and is a 2024-25 Prisma Ukraïna fellow of the Gerda Henkel Foundation.
Other Recent Articles in the TRAFO Series War, Migration and Memory:
Mykola Homanyuk; Denys Shatalov, Soviet Weaponry on a Pedestal: Military Equipment Monuments in the Time of the Russian War in Ukraine – Part 1, 1 October 2024
Lidia Kuzemska, Dual-Intent Approach to Ukrainians Abroad: A Post-Script to the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2024, 22 August 2024
Qianrui, Hu, War, Displacement and the Shifting Meaning of ‘Donbas’: Initial Findings from the Field, 6 August 2024
Citation: Mykola Homanyuk; Denys Shatalov, Soviet Weaponry on a Pedestal: Military Equipment Monuments in the Time of the Russian War in Ukraine – Part 2, in: TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 08.10.2024, https://doi.org/10.58079/12fn4
OpenEdition suggests that you cite this post as follows:
Forum Transregionale Studien (October 8, 2024). Soviet Weaponry on a Pedestal: Military Equipment Monuments in the Time of the Russian War in Ukraine – Part 2. TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research. Retrieved March 24, 2025 from https://doi.org/10.58079/12fn4