Dual-Intent Approach to Ukrainians Abroad: A Post-Script to the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2024

By Lidia Kuzemska

Berlin was an epicentre of Ukraine-focused events in June 2024. Apart from the massive Ukraine Recovery Conference with over 3400 participants gathered with the intent “to strengthen the resilience of Ukraine for as long as needed” (URC, 2024), numerous pre, side and post-events took place across the city. Smaller publics, targeted discussions and less scripted opinion exchanges were also a chance for Ukrainians abroad to reflect on their role in the recovery of their homeland.[1]

Ukrainian and German officials alike also considered this diverse group – established diaspora and those who arrived due to the Russian full-scale invasion – as one of their audiences of interest during the URC “marathon”. The long-apparent contradiction between the interests of Ukraine and host countries in benefiting from the economic potential of Ukrainians was finally explicitly addressed with an action plan (seemingly) agreed upon by both sides. Not surprisingly, as the shortage of human capital in both countries is of paramount concern (Libanova, 2024; Weigle, 2023), 1.1 million Ukrainians who found refuge in Germany is considered as an important, as yet untapped asset (see Figure 1) for the local labour markets in Europe (Brücker et al., 2023; Byelikova, 2024; Honorati et al., 2024; Panchenko, 2022).

At the same time, the Ukrainian government stresses that the return of its citizens is essential in efforts to sustain the country’s enormous effort to keep fighting the aggressor, keep the economy running and maintain unity amidst the understandable disparity of everyday challenges between those inside and outside its borders. “We need them [Ukrainians displaced abroad] to come back to Ukraine, especially youth 14-35 [years old]. They should be qualified and trained for both Ukrainian and German markets”, said Anton Chestokov, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Youth and Sports speaking at the pre-URC conference “Diaspora and the Global Ukrainian Community – Strong Partners in the Recovery of Ukraine”. He emphasised that “the country has a 5.4 million people gap”. Similarly, during the URC side-event “Resilience, Reconstruction, Prosperity: Perspectives for Ukraine’s Economy” Ukraine’s Deputy Prime-Minister and Minister of Economy Yuliia Svyrydenko said: “I want to send a signal to Ukrainians abroad to return back [home]. We need you now [in Ukraine].”

Sitting next to her was her German counterpart, Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development Svenja Schulze. Answering the question about the risk of competition between Germany and Ukraine for the displaced Ukrainians, Schulze said: “We benefit from very well-educated Ukrainians, it helps us. If they go back, that helps Ukraine. For this, we need to create perspective for Ukraine. People want to come back. Until then, we [Germany] can also benefit.”

Both German and Ukrainian sides framed the return of the displaced as a part of “winning the peace” strategy. It should give people the sense of perspective and hope for their future in Ukraine. However, until then, what should they be doing now in Germany? Considering the uncertainty of safe return conditions – security situation, work and accommodation opportunities, state of the social infrastructure (UNHCR, 2024) – it seems the official consensus for now is to promote the dual-intent approach to the displaced Ukrainians.

This approach consists of five elements (OECD, 2024):

1. Investment in the human capital development of Ukrainians during their displacement.

2. Mutual recognition of skills and qualifications obtained in Ukraine and abroad.

3.  Ukrainian language training in host countries for children and young adults.

4. Retention and facilitation of financial and digital ties with the home country.

5. Building a legal framework for regular migration pathways for Ukrainians after the war, including skills mobility partnerships.

This approach aims to “prepare for both indefinite stay as well as for possible return of refugees by deliberatively seeking to minimise possible return barriers” (OECD, 2023) and is different from usual integration policies by embracing the uncertainty of the stay-return intentions. Here Germany is no exception, but rather an example of how things might be agreed between the Ukrainian Government and other EU countries regarding Ukrainians abroad. In short, one of the URC’s results is the launch of a “Skills Alliance for Ukraine to help train the skilled workers that Ukraine needs for reconstruction due to Russia’s war of aggression, with Germany and international partners announcing investments of over 700 million euro” (URC, 2024).

The idea of engaging those displaced abroad in the “Skills Alliance for Ukraine” echoes the existing Skills4Recovery programme that is co-funded by Germany, Estonia, Poland and the EU. It runs inside Ukraine with the aim to support the vocational education and (re)training of Internally Displaced Persons, veterans, youth and other groups in skills needed for recovery, such as construction, logistics, agriculture, services and manufacturing. Operating in six regions with a network of 30 institutions in 2023, the programme helped to reskill 506 participants in 23 professions with 65% of them securing a new employment (OECD, 2024). Bringing together more than 50 partners, the new “Skills Alliance for Ukraine” aims to train and support over 180,000 Ukrainians over the next three years. The primary target groups remain the same, but the Alliance “also supports Ukrainians abroad. Providing Ukrainians who fled their country with training in areas that are important for Ukraine’s reconstruction and ensuring mutual recognition of qualifications will help Ukrainians who return to their home country to find work more easily” (BMZ, 2024).

Leaving aside the questions of efficiently scaling up and implementing such initiatives on the EU-wide level, bureaucratic hurdles of national systems for qualification and skills recognition, availability of resources to reach various groups of potentially interested participants and creating the motivation to reskill (and all the challenges the process will entail) for the displaced, I think such a dual-intent approach to Ukrainians abroad has two major weaknesses, both connected to its utilitarian focus.

The dual-intent approach reflects a wider shift among the EU countries to reframe the displaced Ukrainians as primarily an added value to the local economies rather than as escapees from the war in need of support. A growing number of legal initiatives that encourage Ukrainian citizens to move from the Temporary Protection Status to the national work-based residence permits for example in Poland, Austria, Czech Republic, or discussions about the Bürgergeld for the displaced Ukrainians in Germany demonstrate that host countries want as many Ukrainians as possible to join the local labour market as soon as possible. Such an approach is understandable, but it leaves unanswered the question of what will happen to those displaced Ukrainian citizens who cannot be gainfully employed, for example people with disabilities, elderly or people with caring responsibilities? Will they be allowed to stay and if so with what status? Will they be encouraged to return to Ukraine (prematurely?) or, worse, to the Russia-occupied territories?

Another challenge of regarding displaced Ukrainians as primarily economic assets to be “re/up-skilled for reconstruction” is the neglect for a wider range of issues that are currently debated within the Ukrainian diasporas: political voice and participation in the wider debates about their roles within the host and home societies and internationally. The dual intent approach misses a crucial element – political rights and aspirations of Ukrainians abroad. Beyond their economic potential and cultural needs, what is the political role of the Ukrainian diaspora abroad? This question is especially pertinent now, when it is officially reframed as the Ukrainian Global Community with its own ambassador-at-large Mariana Betsa appointed in November 2023.

Addressing the Ukrainian diaspora in Germany at the pre-URC event “Diaspora and the Global Ukrainian Community – Strong Partners in the Recovery of Ukraine”, Betsa said: “We need you for recovery. We need to intellectually return people – their expertise, knowledge to the country”. She emphasised that every Ukrainian – whether inside or outside of the country – should feel part of Ukrainian society. The new ambassador formulated three priorities for the Ukrainian state in its cooperation with Ukrainians abroad (Ukrinform, 2024):

• preservation of Ukrainian identity, linguistic, educational, cultural and religious rights and “prevention of assimilation of Ukrainians abroad”
• support for the diaspora’s role in protection and lobbying of Ukraine’s interests around the world
• engagement of Ukrainians around the world in reforming and restoring the country including through the return to work in the country

Such appeals are long overdue as Ukrainian diasporas have been incredibly active well before the full-scale invasion and became one of the drivers in supporting Ukraine after February 2022 through their volunteering efforts, fundraising, hosting and caring for the displaced, advocacy and public rallies, keeping the war on the radar of EU publics (Lazarenko, 2024). The Ukrainian diaspora in Germany in particular advocates for systematic leveraging of its resources, expertise and networks for the recovery of Ukraine as such engagement can foster social cohesion between Ukrainians abroad and inside the country and it will strengthen its transnational civil society (Keudel et al., 2024).

Seeing diaspora more than just a “skill set to be used”, but as a “bridge” between national and local networks of knowledge, expertise, and resources, as advocates for their communities and businesses, as everyday cultural diplomats and brands ambassadors was echoed by both Ukrainian and German speakers during the URC “marathon” in Berlin.

However, the Ukrainian diaspora is still in the process of establishing its voice within the German political sphere. Oleksandra Bienert from the Allianz Ukrainischer Organisationen noted that Ukrainian diaspora organisations are not heard enough by neither the Ukrainian nor the German officials even though numerically Ukrainians are now a sizeable minority in Germany. She stresses that the Ukrainian community should seek more political representation in different federal states and localities through integration councils (Integrationsrat) – elected advisory boards aimed to represent the rights of migrants and non-Germans, everyone can vote for integration council representatives regardless of citizenship. These councils do not have any direct power to make policy decisions, but they can advise policymakers. Similarly, Nataliya Pryhornytska – another prominent representative of the Allianz Ukrainischer Organisationen –  highlights that communication with the local German population is key to keep the attention on Ukraine, to show that cooperation between the two countries has a potential for Germany, not to shy away from talking about challenges (e.g. corruption), but also help tackling disinformation campaigns against Ukraine in Germany (Pryhornytska, 2024).  

For now, the gap between the states’ dual-intent approach to Ukrainians abroad – focused primarily on regarding them as economic and recovery assets – and aspirations of the displaced themselves as political subjects with a voice to be heard (and ideally listened to) is yet to be addressed. The institutionalisation of diaspora cooperation with both German and Ukrainian governments seems a necessary step in this direction.

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Footnotes

[1]This text is written based on my reflections after participating in the following Berlin-based events in April-June 2024 connected to Ukrainian diaspora in Germany and the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC): a) pre-conference of URC “Diaspora and the Global Ukrainian Community – Strong Partners in the Recovery of Ukraine” (19-20 April 2024), organised by the Open platform e.V./ Allianz Ukrainischer Organisationen and CRISP – Conflict Simulation e.V., https://crisp-berlin.org/news/new/the-pre-conference-of-the-ukraine-recovery-conference-2024-1; b) URC side event “Resilience, Reconstruction, Prosperity: Perspectives for Ukraine’s Economy” (10 June 2024) organised by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, London School of Economics and Political Science and the Kyiv School of Economics, https://www.clingendael.org/event/ukraine-recovery-conference-2024-side-event; c) URC side event “Reform and Resilience in Ukraine: Governance for Survival” (12 June 2024), organised by the German Marshall Fund and partners, https://www.gmfus.org/event/reform-and-resilience-ukraine-governance-survival ; d) URC-corresponding event “Rebuilding Ukraine: The Social Dimension” (13 June 2024), organised by the Institute for East European Studies (FU Berlin) and partners, https://www.oei.fu-berlin.de/institut/termine/2024_05_23_RebuildingUkraine.html

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References

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About the Author

Lidia Kuzemska is a sociologist with an interdisciplinary interest in forced migration, internal displacement, borders, and citizenship. She is a 2024-25 Prisma Ukraïna fellow of the Gerda Henkel Foundation at the Forum Transregionale Studien and academic coordinator of the research group War, Migration, Memory. In 2022, she received her Ph.D. from Lancaster University (UK). Her dissertation was entitled “‘Don’t Be Afraid of Our Citizens’: Internally Displaced People Encounter Bordering and Othering in Ukraine” and it focused on the counter-hegemonic citizenship practices of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2014–2016. Lidia also holds an MA in Economy and Society from Lancaster University (UK), an MA in European Studies from the College of Europe (Belgium and Poland), and an MA in Sociology from Ivan Franko National University of Lviv (Ukraine). She is also a research affiliate at the Internal Displacement Research Programme (SOAS University of London) and a peer-reviewer for the Knowledge Platform and Connection Hub (UN Network on Migration).

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Other Recent Articles in the TRAFO Series War, Migration and Memory:

Qianrui, Hu, War, Displacement and the Shifting Meaning of ‘Donbas’: Initial Findings from the Field, 6 August 2024

Guita Hourani, Ukrainian Women in Lebanon: Resilience, Activism, and Transnational Engagement Amid Crisis, 13 June 2024

Lidia Kuzemska, Politics of Distorted Numbers: How Russia is Counting Displaced Ukrainians and Why?, 2 November 2023

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Citation: Lidia Kuzemska, Dual-Intent Approach to Ukrainians Abroad: A Post-Script to the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2024, in: TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 22.08.2024, https://doi.org/10.58079/126ux

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