New Peacebuilding Agents: Are Diasporic Individuals a Considerable Civilian Capacity for the Establishment of Lasting Peace in the Aftermath of Violent Conflict at Their Places of Origin?
by Anita Janassary
Abstract: In August this year the XXXI. Olympic Summer Games took place and as in every year in which nation-wide major sporting events are conducted the discussion on fluidity of citizenship recurs. Athletes do not necessarily compete for the country which nationality they hold at birth. Rather, athletes do increasingly compete for the country in which they have settled down or for the country which citizenship their ancestors hold at birth. Growing numbers of persons who seize the opportunity to become naturalized show that life as diasporic person is not an isolated phenomenon, but involves a large part of the world population. However, diasporic persons are still primarily confronted with negative judgements which are backing them into a corner of conservative “alien” conflicts. Thus, this article argues that it is time to utilize the capacity of diasporic persons not only for sporting events but for matters of civil conflict management and consider diasporic persons as international peacebuilding agents at their place of origin. This claim takes recent sociological and anthropological studies into account which suggest that diasporic individuals bear a hybrid profile which combines an international professional background and local expertise – both crucial in gaining local support for international peacebuilding efforts and ultimately resulting in the establishment of lasting peace in the aftermath of violent conflicts.
Since the end of the Cold War, peacebuilding in particular has gained increasing importance as a civilian conflict management tool. Against a background of continuing violent conflicts, hopes for a new peaceful and war-free world order following the Cold War’s cessation did not last long. However, since concepts which put a strong emphasis on military involvement seemed to have failed to build peace, a political debate on civilian or peaceful measures emerged. In 1992, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced the Agenda for Peace and stressed the role of peaceful measures1 in preventing the (re-)lapse of conflicts into violence. He offered a civilian conflict management concept which roadmapped peacebuilding through state-institution-building efforts and the establishment of rule of law in conflict-prone regions by international and regional intergovernmental organizations.
Today, the Agenda for Peace is more than two decades old and international peacebuilding2 efforts are implemented not only by the UN but also by other intergovernmental actors. However, since there is no significant decrease in the number of violent conflicts worldwide or in the number of international peace operations, despite the existence of successful international peacebuilding efforts3, the question amongst practitioners and scholars of how to improve the concept of international peacebuilding continues to be pressing. The growing number of research papers and peacebuilding evaluation reports which point out the importance of peacebuilding personnel demonstrates a recent shift of focus within the peacebuilding discussion from what or rather which peacebuilding measures should be implemented to who should implement them.4 It has been pointed out that the first follows a top-down-approach and results in a one-size-fits-all concept by using implementation templates regardless of local conditions, while the latter follows a bottom-up-approach and therefore emphasizes the importance of local contexts when managing conflicts. This shift is called the local turn in peacebuilding studies and opens the floor for a discussion of peacebuilding agents who would not previously have met established criteria. For example, in 2009 the UN first officially mentioned diasporas as potential reservoir for peace operations5 personnel while simultaneously indicating that the involvement of diasporas in conflict management is sensitive:
“Using and supporting national capacity should be the first preference for international assistance. Representatives from the diaspora can also be an important resource of knowledge and expertise, although experience shows that mobilizing the diaspora is potentially a politically sensitive undertaking that must be carefully managed.”6
Persons with local ties such as diasporic individuals, returnees and other local capacities are often seen as potential catalyzers for violent conflict. This view reflects the fact that impartiality is considered a key factor for sustainable peacebuilding. Therefore, international peacebuilding projects are commonly managed by international staff who is considered impartial owing to their general lack of local ties. Consequently, local staff usually is being assigned to subordinate posts. However, international staff members often do not possess local expertise and therefore cannot analyze local context in-depth. The local turn in peacebuilding studies implies that sustained results can only be achieved when the local context is not only understood on a profound level but also given utmost consideration. Thus, practitioners and researchers are facing the question how this can be assured.7 The involvement of peacebuilding staff members who can offer a unique hybrid profile which combines local expertise and the professional background required is one way forward. It is my argument that such capacity can be found in particular amongst diasporic individuals who are willing to return (temporarily) to their place of origin and work for intergovernmental peacebuilding organizations.
In my ongoing research I aim to answer the question: How does the involvement of diasporic individuals as staff members in international peacebuilding impact local support for these efforts? In this paper I outline the central thoughts of this research project.
The Peacebuilding Concept
As one of the first scholars on the subject, Johan Galtung discussed the various conflict management tools which are employed by national, regional and international governmental or intergovernmental organizations. In his article Three Realistic Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, Peacebuilding8 he distinguishes between peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding approaches to maintaining peace or preventing the eruption of conflicts. He defines peacekeeping as efforts which endeavor to keep conflict parties separate and peacemaking as measures which aim to transfer conflict dynamics so that the conflict parties become occupied with other matters and eventually are no longer opposed. Galtung introduces the peacebuilding concept as an associative approach. In comparison to the concepts of peacekeeping and peacemaking he does not explain peacebuilding as the sum of measures undertaken to prevent the relapse of a violent conflict but as a structure which enables communities to manage their conflicts peacefully. Understood this way, peacebuilding seeks to bring conflict parties together rather than separate them, viewing the latter as undesirable since it avoids managing or resolving conflicts which are then liable to re-erupt when dissociative measures come to an end.
Former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali picks up on Galtung’s thoughts in his Agenda for Peace, although he does not describe peacebuilding in reference to a structure. He argues that the concept of peacebuilding is the “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”9. His understanding of peacebuilding as an action undertaken allows for the chronological ordering of approaches to maintain international peace and security:
“Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peace-keeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples.”10
This brief quote from Boutros-Ghali shows that it is difficult to describe peacebuilding as a time-limited action when giving it the attribute of being preventive. Prevention has no ending in its mission to avert an undesirable event: in the case of peacebuilding this would be the relapse of a conflict into violence. While Boutros-Ghali emphasizes the chronological order of the different methods which aim to maintain or restore peace by adding the modifier post-conflict to the term peacebuilding, he also reaffirms the preventive character of peacebuilding. Consequently two questions arise: Do peacebuilding organizations define peacebuilding as a structure or an action? And if it is defined as an action, when does peacebuilding end?
I argue that up to now, most intergovernmental organizations define peacebuilding as an associative approach which stands for an action to establish local capacity — institutionally but also socially — which supports non-violent conflict management.11 Consequently, any violent conflict is evident for the lack of such capacity and the need for peacebuilding. From the associative understanding viewpoint, it follows that peacebuilding measures require a minimal dialogue between conflict parties. However, this is not possible in situations of large-scale violence, thus peacebuilding is usually implemented in the aftermath of violent conflicts. The preventive elements in Boutros-Ghali’s definition of peacebuilding are not due to the blurred application of the terms structure or action, but rather arise from the commonly applied broad and functional understanding of the term „conflict“. This understanding describes conflict as an inherent phenomenon within communities and as an expression of antagonistic interests between (at least) two parties. The causes of conflict, however, do not necessarily lie within a community’s structure although the conflict itself impacts this structure. Its functionality derives from the ability of conflicts to change or adapt community structures. However, conflicts can also be translated into violence or repression, especially when processes of adaption or change are blocked.
According to this broad definition, the character of conflicts inherently implies that the period after a conflict is, at the same time, before a conflict. And if conflicts are permanently in danger of being translated into violence or repression, peacebuilding has to be continuing. It is the modifier post used in conjunction with conflict which causes confusion because it implies clear starting and end points to a conflict. But, if anything, it actually indicates the temporality of external and thus international peacebuilding efforts. Their temporality is caused by such efforts dependent on the limited resources of intergovernmental organizations12 and the understanding of international peacebuilding as measures to establish local capacity. This capacity (e.g., institutions, trained professionals, civil society organizations etc.) is ultimately supposed to take over peacebuilding action, latest after the withdrawal of international assistance.
International peacebuilding actions are temporarily limited, however the results of these actions are supposed to be lasting and therefore bear a preventive character. Often the applied concepts of peacebuilding are vague and there is no consensus amongst implementing organizations what measures should be undertaken when conducting peacebuilding. Nevertheless, there is one common aspect in contemporary international peacebuilding efforts: state institution building measures. Studies which analyze the success and failure of international peacebuilding often conclude that state building measures are marginalizing local conditions, even though the implemented measures are supposed to benefit the local populations in post-conflict regions.
Paul Lederach was one of the first scholars who argued against the over-emphasis of international high politics in peacebuilding and for a closer look into local peacebuilding capacities. In his book Builiding Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in divided Societies (1997), Lederach agrees with Boutros-Ghali when he emphasizes that the most critical period for any peacebuilding action is immediately after a violent conflict. However, Lederach goes one step further and makes a plea for a continuing maintenance of “[…] processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships”13. He indicates that peacebuilding measures have to be continued and should not cease after international peacebuilding comes to an end because social dynamics require a permanent and ongoing adaption of peacebuilding action to changing local contexts. Thus, he argues that local capacities should be strengthened in order to ensure that peacebuilding efforts continue after the resources of international and intergovernmental organizations are withdrawn. This recommendation not only takes into account that the peacebuilding resources of intergovernmental organizations are limited, but also points out that local capacities and local conditions have been underestimated as peacebuilding assets.
The marginalization of local conditions in international peacebuilding is inter alia the result of a common operational method of such organizations. With the objective of being more effective and efficient, individual measures often follow a blueprint or standardized template first implemented (successfully) somewhere else which has the status of best or good practice. However, plenty of studies14 and practitioner reports15 have highlighted the recognition of local conditions as a crucial peacebuilding factor and concluded that international standardized practices are a weak starting point for peacebuilding measures. These findings have been transferred into peacebuilding organizations’ policies.16 Consequently, the range of peacebuilding measures has become broader to include activities which are supposed to increase the participation of local populations in designing community structures.17 Furthermore, peacebuilding personnel have been urged to take national and/or local conditions into account. Nevertheless, they often fail to do so because, due to a lack of sufficient local expertise, they are not capable of recognizing all the relevant factors. Ultimately, peacebuilding measures, even when deliberately designed to enhance local population participation, are all too often applied to international standards rather than being adapted to local conditions so that the marginalization of the local18 persists.
The underestimation of the local in contemporary international peacebuilding is reflected in the emphasis on the professional background19 of peacebuilding staff, while local expertise is not viewed as a requirement for peacebuilding personnel. This presumption is transmitted into the human resources structures of international peacebuilding organizations. The result is that local candidates are not considered for managerial posts not only because they often lack the professional background, but also because they are considered partial, or at the very least perceived as such by the local population, and therefore not approved as suitable. While peacebuilding organizations such as the UN Peacebuilding Fund stress the importance of national or local ownership and the recognition of local conditions when conducting peacebuilding measures, these measures continue to fail to involve local expertise in implementing peacebuilding efforts because of an inability to locate suitable candidates.
Diasporic Individuals as International Peacebuilding Agents
During recent years, debates amongst practitioners have emerged regarding how to best overcome this gap20 without lowering the professional standards required of peacebuilding personnel. The challenge of finding persons who are able to convey the local population’s interests to peacebuilding agents opens the ground for a discussion of peacebuilding agents who have not been considered candidates prior to now like diasporic individuals. It is my argument that diasporic individuals possess a hybrid profile which combines local expertise with the required professional background which may make them capable of acting as bridge-builders between the local population and international peacebuilding staff and thus are able to aggravate local support for international peacebuilding actions.
If adapting international peacebuilding best or good practices to local conditions is crucial for the achievement of sustainable results, and international peacebuilding staff often lack the capacity to perform this task while local peacebuilding personnel are not given the power, how is it possible to ensure the involvement of local expertise in international peacebuilding? Whenever diasporic individuals and their ability to overcome this missing intersection between the local and the international are debated, an ambivalent picture of these potential peacebuilding agents is drawn. On the one hand, diasporic individuals are seen as go-betweens in peacebuilding, perfect candidates for peacebuilding staff, not only fluent in local languages and knowledgeable of local habits, customs and practices, they will either know of local networks or at least be able to find and access them. On the other hand, diasporic individuals are seen as biased, incapable of impartiality and even if impartial, perceived as partial, which stands in opposition to the peacebuilding principle of impartiality. While arguments veer between these extreme generalizations, it is also unclear who is considered as diasporic. The underlying concept of diaspora in these debates is responsible for the perception of diasporic individuals as either go-betweeners or biased conflict-catalyzers.
In international peacebuilding practice the territorial meaning of the term is commonly applied. Definitions of diaspora which emphasize territory usually define diasporas or diasporic individuals in relation to places of origin and settlement and thus are incapable of recognizing them as independent actors. Because of the territorial understanding, diasporas and diasporic individuals are often problematized as conflict-catalyzers in relation to their places of origin or settlement.21 Above all, this understanding does not allow for research into the deployment of diasporic individuals as peacebuilding personnel in their places of origin because it highlights the interim-status of diasporas and diasporic individuals. This implies that the diasporas and diasporic individuals will eventually disappear, either by a return to a place of origin or by integration into the community of the place of settlement; and hence are no longer considered diasporic.
Thus, when analyzing diasporic individuals in conjunction with international peacebuilding in their places of origin, I plead for the application of a definition of diaspora which stresses de-territorialized features of diasporas and diasporic individuals. This allows for their identification as autonomous actors because this approach describes diasporas and diasporic individuals as entities which produce transnational social spaces. In these spaces members of transnational communities, such as diasporic individuals, negotiate and translate values, ideas and practices which are seemingly geographical bounded to their places of origin or settlement. These aspects are dissociated and reorganized in transnational spaces and result in the production of hybrid identities which bear transformed and synthesized values, ideas and practices. Since, hybrid identities persist even if external input is blocked, diasporic individuals can be identified as autonomous actors independently from their actual locality.
Basch et al.22 interviewed diasporic individuals and provided evidence for the specific diasporic identity and diasporic experiences. In their case studies Basch et al. show that diasporic individuals possess an identity which is different to both those of their communities of origin and settlement and share social experiences which are not part of the social experiences of the other two communities. In an attempt to describe the cosmopolitan attitude Mau et al.23 analyzed how members of transnational communities are characterized or rather perceived by others:
“They share an open and tolerant world view that is not bound by national categories but is based on an awareness of our increasing economic, political and cultural interconnectedness, which they perceive as enriching rather than threatening. As a consequence, they tend to support evolving forms of global governance or supranational political regulation. In other words, cosmopolitans are individuals who are positive about the greater role of international bodies and their accountability for global problems.”24
Referring to the studies of Mau et al. Steven Vertovec notes quite correctly: “[W]e might say, being a member of diaspora or transnational community doesn’t automatically produce cosmopolitan attitudes, but certainly the potential for this is high.”25 With Vertovec’s remark in mind and recalling the studies of Basch et al., Mau et al., Autesserre, and Vah Jevšnik, I argue for the analysis of diasporic individuals as possible peacebuilding agents in their places of origin in order to clarify whether and when they can translate interests of the local population to intergovernmental peacebuilding organizations and thus aggregate local support for international peacebuilding efforts, or –in other words – to act as bridge-builders.
In my ongoing research project, I analyze the involvement of diasporic individuals in international peacebuilding efforts at their places of origin. Since there is not much data collected on this topic yet, I am conducting an empirical-qualitative study by comparing three single cases of international peacebuilding: Serbia, Kosovo plus Bosnia and Herzegovina. In selecting these cases I considered three main factors. Firstly, I decided to compare three cases in one world region, since they share similar conflict history (at least to a certain degree). Secondly, all cases should still be undergoing international peacebuilding efforts. Thirdly, all peacebuilding missions should have a considerable number of peacebuilding personnel in light of my assumption that there is no high number of diasporic individuals working in international peacebuilding yet.
Additionally, it is challenging identifying diasporic individuals in international peacebuilding due to two main reasons. First, human resources departments do not usually keep relevant data to enable identification of international staff as diasporic individuals because they are not considered suitable candidates for managerial posts.26 Nevertheless, there are diasporic individuals who are hired as international staff because they hold an additional nationality along with their diasporic one. Secondly, human resources data are sensitive and it is therefore difficult to get access to it as an outsider. To identify persons who fit the hybrid diasporic profile and work in international peacebuilding as international or local staff, I could and can only rely on word-of-mouth information. In the end, more than half of my interviewees of the over 70 interviews I have taken fit this profile.
Nearly all of my diasporic and non-diasporic interviewees were convinced that international peacebuilding staff are no less partial than diasporic individuals. This impression is supported by similar indications of other studies and practitioner reports. Nevertheless, international peacebuilding missions and their organizations do not seem to be perceived more positively among local populations as a result of the involvement of diasporic individuals. Many factors point to the ambivalent impact on the local support towards international peacebuilding through diasporic involvement, that is to say that the engagement of diasporic individuals is viewed differently depending on the field of activity as well as on the length of time after a conflict and therefore has a varying impact on local support. Comparing the three cases, there are indications pointing to a correlation between the intensity of the former conflict and the impact diasporic individuals have on the outcome of peacebuilding efforts.
I have argued that diasporic individuals are relevant research subjects for peacebuilding studies due to their presumably unique peacebuilding capacity which results from a hybrid profile combining international background and local expertise. Contemporary studies show that both aspects are crucial for successful peacebuilding efforts. Diasporic individuals may act as bridge-builders and be able to bring the local into international peacebuilding, a promise the policies of peacebuilding organizations are already making but often failing to deliver. My ongoing research efforts will offer insight into the still rather hidden capacity of diasporic individuals.
Anita Janassary graduated in political science at Freie Universität Berlin and works as Junior Researcher at the Centre for Area Studies at the University of Leipzig. Previously, she was assigned project manager at the German Center for International Peace Operations in Berlin and implemented human resources related projects funded by the German Foreign Office as well as the German Development Agency (GIZ). She is co-author of the practitioners handbook “Roster management handbook” (2011, available online). Currently, she is working on her dissertation project dealing with the impact on local support through direct diaspora involvement as staff members in internatonal peacebuilding organizations in the Western Balkans. The publication of her work is expected in 2017.
Citation: Anita Janasaary, New Peacebuilding Agents: Are Diasporic Individuals a Considerable Civilian Capacity for the Establishment of Lasting Peace in the Aftermath of Violent Conflict at Their Places of Origin?, in: TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 29.08.2016, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/4977.
- The UN Charter mentions peacefull means when referring to non-military activities in the management of violent conflicts. These activities are often also called civilian to emphasize their non-military character and their independence from military action because peacefull conflict management could also be defined as a complementary measure in realtion to military action. [↩]
- Despite acknowledging that peacebuilding efforts can be conducted by national governmental or non-governmental organizations, in this paper the term international peacebuilding refers to peacebuilding efforts conducted by international or regional intergovernmental organizations. [↩]
- Bearing in mind that success in the context of peacebuilding can mean different things, for example a peacebuilding action could be called successful when it manages to build negative peace (absence of large-scale violence) which lasts a certain time or positive peace (stronger social structures which support peaceful conflict management), some peace operations are commonly referred to as having been successful e. g., the UN Mission in Sierra Leone and the UN Transnational Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium. [↩]
- Examples of research publications or peacebuilding evaluation reports are: Autesserre, Séverine, 2014: Peaceland. Conflict Resolution on the Everyday Politics of International tervention. New York: Cambridge University Press; Horst, Cindy et al., 2010: Participation of Diasporas in Peacebuilding and Development. A Handbook for Practitioners and Policymakers. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo; Vah Jevšnik, Mojca, 2009: Building Peace for a Living. Expatriate Development Workers in Kosovo. Ljubljana: ZRC Publishing; Von Carlowitz, Leopold, 2004: Migranten als Garanten? Über die Schwierigkeiten beim Rechtsstaatsexport in Nachkriegsgesellschaften. In: HSFK Standpunkte – Beiträge zum demokratischen Frieden 2004 Vol. 6, 1–12. [↩]
- Peace operations or peace missions are undertakings of intergovernmental organizations to maintain or rebuild peace which may include peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding measures. They are not limited to military or civilian activities. For further insights see for instance Doyle, Michael W./Sambanis, Nicholas, 2006: Making War and Building Peace: The United Nations Since the 1990’s. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [↩]
- UN – United Nations, 2009: Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict. Last accessed 20 February 2014, 15. [↩]
- Examples of practitioners’ discussion on the topic of the involvement of diasporas in peacebuilding: ADPC – African Diasporas Policy Center, 2006: Conference Report. Diaspora and Peacebuilding in Africa. Amsterdam. Last accessed 23 March 2015; ISPI – International Stabilization and Peacebuilding Initiative, 2012: E-discussion Report. Participation of Diaspora in Peacebuilding and Development. Last accessed 23 February 2015. [↩]
- Galtung, Johan, 1976: Three Realistic Approaches to Peace. Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, Peacebuilding. In: Impact of Science on Society Vol. 1, No. 2, 103–115. [↩]
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 1992: An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping. United Nations, 5. [↩]
- Ibid. [↩]
- See for example the recent UN delineation of peacebuilding: “Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner” (UN PBPS/DPKO – United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Section /Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines. New York: United Nations, 18). Or the EU description of EU’s Peacebuilding Partnership: “The Peace-building Partnership envisages building the capacities of relevant organizations in pre-crisis situations, for instance to develop early-warning systems, to provide mediation and reconciliation services and to address inter-community tensions. It also addresses measures for improving post-conflict and post-disaster recovery” (EEAS PbP – European External Action Service: The EU’s Peace-building Partnership. Last accessed 3 April 2015). [↩]
- Funding and other contributions such as human resources in intergovernmental organizations are in permanent (at least yearly) negotiation amongst participating states. [↩]
- Lederach, John P., 1997: Building peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington/D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 19. [↩]
- e. g., Autesserre, 2014; Vah Jevšnik, 2009. [↩]
- e. g., Horst et al., 2010; Anderson, Mary B. et al., 2012: Time to Listen. Hearing People on the Receiving End of International Aid. Cambridge/Massachusetts: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. [↩]
- See for example the UN Civil Affairs Handbook (UN PBPS/DPKO – United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Section /Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2012: Civil Affairs Handbook. New York: United Nations, 66) or the recent address of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Astrid Thors in which she emphasized the importance of local ownership to achieve sustainability (OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2015: OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. Last accessed 1 April 2015) or the UN Peacebuilding Fund’s Application Guidelines (UNPBF – United Nations Peacebuilding Fund: What is Peacebuilding? Last accessed 24 February 2015). [↩]
- Two examples of peacebuilding measures which go beyond state-institution-building are civil society building and democratization. [↩]
- The term the local refers to anything local such as local conditions, local personnel or local population. [↩]
- The term professional background refers, among other things, to thematic or technical expertise gained “through formal education: ‘thematic knowledge’ or ‘technical expertise’ […] relies on an in-depth understanding of particular aspects of intervention work [inter alia, peacebuilding]. These may be general aspects, as in conflict-resolution, development, or humanitarian aid, or they may be specialized ones, as in project management, public finance, or agricultural engineering” (Autesserre, 2014, 69). [↩]
- e. g., ISPI, 2012. [↩]
- On the tendency of the problematization of the diaspora phenomenon see for example: Braziel, Jana/Mannur, Anita, 2009: Nation, Migration, Globalization. Points of Contention in Diaspora Studies. In: Braziel, Jana/Mannur, Anita (ed.): Theorizing Diaspora. A Reader. Malden: Blackwell, 1–22; Shain, Yossi (2002): The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution. In: SAIS Review Vol. 22, No. 2, 115–144; Vorrath, Judith, 2012: Engaging African Diasporas for Peace. Cornerstones for an Emerging EU Agenda. In: EU ISS Occasional Paper, No. 98, 2–43. [↩]
- Basch, Linda G. et al., 1994: Nations Unbound. Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-states. London: Taylor & Francis. [↩]
- Mau, Steffen et al., 2008: Cosmopolitan Attitudes through Transnational Social Practices? In: Global Networks Vol. 8, No. 1, 1–24. [↩]
- Ibid., 5. [↩]
- Vertovec, Steven, 2010: Cosmopolitanism. In: Knott, Kim/MacLoughlin, Seán (ed.): Diasporas. Concepts, Identities, Intersections. London: Zed Books, 63–68, 64. [↩]
- Often local persons are excluded from applying for international jobs: For example diasporic individuals cannot apply for an international post in EU missions unless they are in the possession of an EU passport or have gained the nationality of a third contributing country (cf. EULEX – European Rule of Law Mission Kosovo: Job Opportunities. Frequently Asked Questions. Last accessed March 3, 2015). Similar human resources requirements are mandated for political missions of the OSCE (cf. OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe: Employment. FAQ. Last accessed April 23, 2014). The distinction of national/local and international posts is not limited to the EU or OSCE and can be found in international organizations as well as in non-governmental organizations (cf. Autesserre, 2014, 84–87). [↩]