Migration and the New Pact for the Mediterranean: A Tunisian Perspective

Imene Gannouni Khemiri in Conversation with Julius Dihstelhoff

This interview was conducted following the MECAM Policy Talk 2026, “The Future of Mediterranean Relations: German and Maghrebi Perspectives on the New Pact for the Mediterranean,” held on 25 June 2026 in Berlin.¹ Moderated by Dr. Julius Dihstelhoff, Director ‘Germany’ of the Merian Centre for Advanced Studies in the Maghreb (MECAM), the event brought together scholars, policymakers, and practitioners to discuss the opportunities and challenges of the European Union’s New Pact for the Mediterranean from both German and Maghrebi perspectives. Building on the debates of the Policy Talk, this interview further explores the migration dimension of the Pact and reflects on the future of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment.

The Mediterranean has never been merely a geographical space separating Europe and North Africa. Throughout history, it has connected societies through mobility, trade, political exchange, and cultural interaction while emerging as an increasingly contested geopolitical space (Furness 2026). Today, questions of migration, security, energy, economic transformation, and regional stability converge across its shores, placing Euro-Mediterranean cooperation at the centre of the European Union’s (EU) external relations. In this interview, Julius Dihstelhoff, MECAM Director ‘Germany’, speaks with Imene Gannouni Khemiri, Assistant Professor at the University of Manouba and MECAM Alumna. Drawing on her research on migration governance, media representations, and Euro-Tunisian relations, she discusses the New Pact from a Tunisian perspective and reflects on what a genuinely reciprocal Euro-Mediterranean partnership might look like.

Julius Dihstelhoff (JD): Dear Imene, the New Pact for the Mediterranean arrives at a particularly significant historical moment. Thirty years after the Barcelona Process, the EU once again presents a renewed vision for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Yet many observers have noted that the Pact introduces relatively few genuinely new policy instruments. One could therefore argue that the Pact’s novelty lies less in its individual initiatives than in its ambition to reconnect previously fragmented policy fields within a broader geopolitical strategy.

From your perspective, how should we understand this new Pact? Does it represent a genuine turning point in Euro-Mediterranean relations, or is it better understood as the latest chapter in a much longer history of cooperation between Tunisia and the EU?

Imene Gannouni Khemiri (IGK): I think both interpretations capture an important part of the picture.

On the one hand, the EU presents the Pact as an ambitious attempt to reshape Euro-Mediterranean cooperation around the principles of co-ownership, co-creation, and shared responsibility. It also introduces several new operational initiatives, including closer cooperation among Justice and Home Affairs agencies through the MED-OP framework and a broader geographical perspective that increasingly includes partners from Sub-Saharan Africa, the Gulf, and Türkiye. At the same time, there is a strong element of continuity. I’d like to take Tunisia as an example here. Tunisia has been closely linked to the EU for decades. It was the first Southern Mediterranean country to conclude an Association Agreement with the EU in 1995, followed by a Privileged Partnership in 2012. More recently, the 2023 Memorandum of Understanding further deepened cooperation in areas ranging from macroeconomic stability to migration and mobility. Seen from this perspective, many of the Pact’s individual instruments are not new. What distinguishes the Pact is its attempt to bring different policy fields together within a more coherent strategic framework that responds to today’s changing geopolitical environment.

Whether this amounts to a genuine transformation, however, will ultimately depend on its political implementation. Many of the structural asymmetries that have characterised Euro-Mediterranean relations for decades remain firmly in place. This is exemplified by the framing of migration as a security problem for the EU, while southern Mediterranean countries are expected to act as gatekeepers responsible for enforcing EU border regimes. Its success will therefore be judged by whether its language of partnership translates into genuinely reciprocal political practice.

JD: That distinction between strategic innovation and institutional continuity is particularly interesting because it raises a broader question about the architecture of the Pact itself. Officially, the New Pact rests on three equally important pillars: people and mobility; sustainable and integrated economies; and security, preparedness, and migration management. Politically, however, these pillars seem to fulfil different functions. While the first two project a language of partnership and shared opportunity, migration continues to be discussed through the vocabulary of security and stability.

To me, this raises a more fundamental question: Over the past two decades, scholars have analysed European migration policy through the concept of securitisation—the process by which migration is framed less as a social, economic, or humanitarian phenomenon than as a matter of security requiring exceptional political responses. To what extent do you see this logic reflected in the New Pact for the Mediterranean?

IGK: I believe securitisation provides one of the most useful analytical lenses for understanding the migration dimension of the Pact.

If we look closely at the third pillar, migration is embedded within a broader discourse of security, preparedness, and regional stability. Irregular migration is discussed alongside border pressures, organised crime, trafficking, and wider security challenges affecting the Mediterranean.

This framing reflects the securitisation of migration (Buzan et al., 1998). Rather than approaching migration as a complex phenomenon driven by different factors, the Pact presents it as a challenge to regional security and public order. Unsurprisingly, this framing privileges security-oriented policy instruments such as border management, surveillance, preventing irregular departures, and combating smuggling networks. These are undoubtedly legitimate components of migration governance. The difficulty arises when they become the dominant lens through which migration is understood. Structural drivers—including unemployment, regional inequalities, limited legal mobility opportunities, or socioeconomic exclusion—receive considerably less attention. From a Tunisian perspective, this creates an important imbalance. Migration cannot be reduced to border control. It is closely linked to development, labour markets, education, and social inclusion.

JD: Your analysis suggests that the debate is ultimately not only about migration itself, but also about the political language through which migration is governed. Once migration is primarily framed as a security issue, this shapes not only policy instruments but also the relationship between Europe and its Southern partners.

Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the debate on externalisation. European policymakers often describe cooperation as a shared effort to manage migration more effectively along the entire migration route. Critics, by contrast, argue that the EU is increasingly shifting responsibility for migration governance beyond its own borders.

How do you assess the role of externalisation within the New Pact? To what extent does it represent continuity with earlier European migration policies, and what does it mean for Tunisia?

IGK: Externalisation is, in my view, one of the defining features of the Pact’s migration agenda.

Although the document repeatedly refers to partnership and shared responsibility, many of its proposed measures effectively extend European migration governance beyond EU territory. This is particularly evident in the “whole-of-route approach,” which shifts migration management away from Europe’s external borders towards countries of origin and transit.

In practical terms, this means strengthening border management, preventing irregular departures, combating smuggling networks, facilitating return and re-admission procedures, and supporting migration governance in partner countries. While these measures are presented as cooperative, they also relocate significant responsibilities to countries such as Tunisia.

From the perspective of migration studies, this reflects the broader logic of externalisation, whereby the EU extends its border controls into its southern Mediterranean neighbours. In this way, border governance increasingly takes place outside the Union through financial support, technical assistance, institutional cooperation, and capacity-building (Stock et al. 2019). To stick with the example of Tunisia, the country therefore becomes not only a partner in migration governance but also an important site where European migration policy is implemented. This raises questions of sovereignty, burden-sharing, and political accountability. Tunisia is expected not only to manage its own migration dynamics but also to contribute to regulating movements towards Europe. Whether such cooperation is perceived as a genuine partnership therefore depends on whether migration control is accompanied by equally meaningful commitments to legal mobility, economic development, and long-term investment.

JD: That last point seems particularly important.

Externalisation is often discussed as a technical instrument of migration management. Yet your analysis suggests that it is equally a question of political order. It shapes not only where borders are governed but also how responsibilities are negotiated between Europe and its neighbours. This brings us to another key concept that runs throughout the New Pact: co-ownership.

The European Commission repeatedly presents the Pact as a partnership built on mutual interests, shared responsibility, and joint decision-making. At the same time, however, the language of partnership has become increasingly contested and many observers continue to point to enduring structural asymmetries.

From your perspective, does the Pact offer a genuinely new understanding of partnership, or do established hierarchies continue to shape Euro-Mediterranean cooperation despite the introduction of a new political vocabulary?

IGK: I would argue that this is perhaps the central question surrounding the Pact as a whole.

The language of co-ownership undoubtedly represents an important normative ambition. It acknowledges that today’s Mediterranean can no longer be governed through unilateral European initiatives alone. Effective cooperation increasingly depends on recognising that southern Mediterranean countries are political actors with their own priorities, interests, and strategic agency. Yet achieving a genuine partnership requires more than shared terminology.

Many structural features of Euro-Tunisian cooperation remain remarkably stable, even despite political changes within Tunisia. Over the past three decades, from the 1995 Association Agreement through the post-2011 democratic transition and into the 2023 Memorandum of Understanding and the 2025 Mediterranean Pact, the EU has maintained its strategic partnership with Tunisia, whose role as a gatekeeper has endured across authoritarian regime, democratic experimentation and the recent phase of renewed political centralisation. Migration management continues to occupy a central place in the relationship, while legal mobility pathways remain comparatively limited. Likewise, the Pact introduces no substantial new financial instruments. Its implementation largely relies on existing funding mechanisms and on the willingness of Member States to provide additional political and financial support.

In this sense, the Pact may represent a significant discursive innovation without necessarily constituting an equally significant institutional transformation.

Ultimately, the credibility of co-ownership will depend on implementation. Genuine co-ownership means that the interests of both sides are reflected. From a Tunisian perspective, socioeconomic development, educational and professional opportunities, scientific cooperation, and reciprocal political dialogue are central. Only then can co-ownership become political reality rather than diplomatic rhetoric.

JD: What strikes me in your reflections is that the discussion gradually moves beyond migration policy itself. If partnership is ultimately measured by reciprocity rather than declarations, then migration becomes only one dimension of a much broader political relationship. It is not simply about managing mobility; it is about creating conditions under which cooperation is perceived as fair, mutually beneficial, and strategically worthwhile on both shores of the Mediterranean.

Public debate often focuses on irregular migration itself, while comparatively little attention is paid to the structural conditions that motivate people to leave in the first place. Yet migration decisions rarely occur in isolation. They are embedded in broader socioeconomic realities. If the EU seeks a genuinely sustainable migration policy, should migration governance be understood less as a matter of border management and more as a question of development?

IGK: I think that is precisely where the debate needs to shift.

Border management may influence migration routes in the short term, but it cannot remove the structural conditions that shape migration decisions. In Tunisia, these conditions are closely linked to socioeconomic realities, particularly among younger generations.

High youth unemployment, persistent regional inequalities, limited investment, and uneven economic development continue to generate considerable pressure for outward migration. These challenges have accumulated over decades and cannot be addressed through migration policy alone. This is also where I see one of the Pact’s greatest opportunities.

Investment in renewable energy, digital industries, agriculture, education, and regional infrastructure is not only economic policy; it is also long-term migration policy because it expands opportunities where people live. From this perspective, migration governance should move beyond managing mobility towards creating the conditions under which migration becomes a genuine choice rather than an economic necessity. This also requires addressing Tunisia’s persistent regional disparities. Development has long been concentrated along the coastal regions, while many interior governorates continue to face higher unemployment, weaker infrastructure, and fewer educational opportunities (Bousnina 2023). More balanced territorial development would therefore contribute not only to economic cohesion but also to more sustainable migration governance.

JD: Our discussion so far has highlighted that migration governance cannot be separated from broader questions of development, opportunity, and political partnership. At the same time, the Mediterranean is simultaneously a space of origin, transit, destination, and return, where different forms of mobility intersect. Tunisia illustrates these complexities particularly well. In recent years, public debate has increasingly focused on the growing presence of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in cities such as Sfax. This has generated humanitarian concerns, domestic political tensions, and difficult questions about Tunisia’s own role within regional migration governance.

Against this background, does the New Pact adequately address these realities? Or does it leave important gaps from a Tunisian perspective?

IGK: I believe this is one of the Pact’s most important shortcomings. Much of today’s migration debate in Tunisia centres on migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa. Many have fled armed conflict, political instability, economic hardship, or the growing effects of climate change. Increasingly, however, migrants find themselves stranded as routes become blocked and opportunities to continue their journeys disappear. While the Pact recognises the importance of protecting migrants and repeatedly refers to a rights-based approach, it offers relatively few concrete mechanisms for addressing these prolonged transit situations.

This is significant because such situations affect both migrants and local communities. Limited institutional capacities, scarce resources, and the absence of coordinated regional solutions can easily contribute to rising social tensions.

From my perspective, a genuinely comprehensive Mediterranean migration policy should therefore include regional protection mechanisms for migrants who become stranded in transit countries. If migration is understood as a shared regional challenge, humanitarian responsibility must also be shared more equitably.

JD: Your answer points to another important dimension of the debate.

For a long time, European discussions have focused primarily on managing migration across borders. Increasingly, however, the challenge appears to lie within states themselves: building institutions, developing coherent legal frameworks, and strengthening governance capacities.

This is particularly relevant in the Tunisian context. Although both post-revolution constitutions recognise the right to seek asylum, Tunisia still lacks a comprehensive national migration and asylum framework.

How important is this institutional gap for Tunisia’s own migration governance—and for its cooperation with the EU?

IGK: It is fundamental.

Effective international cooperation ultimately depends on strong national institutions. Tunisia has made important constitutional commitments regarding asylum and international protection, but these commitments have yet to be translated into a comprehensive legal and institutional framework.

The result is uncertainty—for migrants seeking protection, for Tunisian authorities responsible for migration governance, and for international partners working with them.

Migration governance never operates in isolation. It is embedded within broader political developments. European support for border management and security institutions inevitably interacts with Tunisia’s domestic political environment. Tunisia’s migration governance is increasingly embedded within the EU’s securitisation logic. Since the 2023 Memorandum of Understanding, restrictive migration measures have been implemented under European pressure and funding, contributing to violations of migrants’ rights. Coupled with Tunisia’s domestic drift toward authoritarianism and growing hostility toward Sub-Saharan migrants, these policies have intensified “counter-mobility mechanisms” (Queirolo Palmas and Cassarini, 2025). This approach forms part of the broader EU–Mediterranean partnership, which delegates border enforcement responsibilities to southern partners. Beyond security capacities, institutional cooperation should support legal certainty, transparent governance, human rights protection, and accountable public institutions.

JD: Let me return to the broader question with which we began our conversation. Looking beyond its political language, do you see the New Pact as a genuine departure from previous Euro-Mediterranean initiatives—or rather as continuity under a new strategic framework?

IGK: I would probably describe it as strategic continuity with renewed political ambition.

The Pact undoubtedly offers a more integrated vision of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. It recognises that migration, economic development, education, research, security, and regional stability cannot be treated as isolated policy fields.

That broader perspective is an important step forward. At the same time, many underlying structures remain unchanged. Migration management continues to occupy a central position within EU-Tunisia relations. Legal mobility pathways remain comparatively limited. Much of the available funding still derives from existing European instruments, while implementation depends heavily on political cooperation between Member States and Southern Mediterranean partners.

Ultimately, the decisive question is whether the Pact changes political practice. Many observers in Tunisia continue to ask whether Europe views the Mediterranean primarily as a neighbourhood to be stabilised or as a region of equal partners capable of shaping a shared future. This question cannot be answered by the text of the Pact alone. Its answer will emerge through everyday cooperation.

JD: That distinction is particularly important because it shifts our attention from policy design to political implementation, which brings credibility to the forefront. Policies can proclaim co-ownership, reciprocity, and shared responsibility. Yet these principles acquire meaning only when they are reflected in everyday political practice.

This also brings us back to a broader question. For thirty years, Euro-Mediterranean cooperation has repeatedly promised partnership, dialogue, and shared prosperity. At the same time, both the geopolitical environment and the balance of power across the Mediterranean have changed profoundly. Europe is no longer the only attractive political and economic partner in the region, while countries on the Southern shore increasingly pursue their own strategic agendas.

Against this backdrop, let me conclude with a forward-looking question.

If we were to meet again ten years from now, what developments would convince you that the New Pact has genuinely transformed Euro-Mediterranean relations?

IGK: For me, a genuine transformation would mean that migration is no longer approached primarily through the lens of security but as part of a broader vision of human development, regional cooperation, and shared prosperity. Security will always remain important, but it should no longer define the relationship. I would also hope to see a much closer connection between the different pillars of the Pact. Investments in education, research, renewable energy, innovation, and regional development should not be regarded as complementary policies.

Equally important is the expansion of legal mobility. Academic exchange, student mobility, scientific cooperation, and professional opportunities should occupy a far more central place within Euro-Mediterranean relations. They create economic opportunities and foster long-term networks, mutual understanding, and lasting cooperation.

A transformed partnership would also recognise that migration governance is a genuinely shared responsibility. Countries on both shores of the Mediterranean should work together not only on border management and return policies, but equally on humanitarian protection, legal mobility, and inclusive socioeconomic development.

Perhaps most importantly, I would hope to see a change in how the Mediterranean itself is imagined. Moving away from being portrayed as a space of crisis and instability, I would like to see it increasingly recognised as a shared political, economic, and cultural space whose diversity represents a source of resilience rather than insecurity.

If, in ten years’ time, this perception has begun to change, I believe the New Pact will have achieved far more than the adoption of another policy framework.

JD: What I find particularly compelling in your reflections is that they ultimately move our discussion beyond migration itself. Throughout this conversation, migration has emerged less as an isolated policy field than as a lens through which broader questions of governance, development, sovereignty, and political partnership become visible. In this sense, debates about migration are also debates about how Europe and its Southern neighbours imagine their shared future.

Institutions such as MECAM have an important role to play in this process, as they create spaces in which different experiences, priorities, and perspectives can enter into sustained dialogue. Academic cooperation cannot replace political decision-making, but it can broaden the conversations from which better political decisions emerge.

Perhaps this is ultimately what partnership means: not the absence of different interests, but the willingness to negotiate them through dialogue, mutual respect, and a shared commitment to the future. Thank you very much, Imene, for sharing your thoughtful insights.

IGK: Thank you very much, Julius. It has been a pleasure discussing these important questions with you.

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About the Authors

Dr. Imene Gannouni Khemiri is Assistant Professor at the University of Manouba and a former MECAM Fellow. Her research focuses on migration governance, Euro-Mediterranean relations, media representations of migration, and contemporary mobility regimes in North Africa. Her work explores the intersections of migration, security, development, and regional cooperation, with particular attention to Tunisia’s evolving partnership with the European Union.

Dr. Julius Dihstelhoff has served as Director ‘Germany’ of the Merian Centre for Advanced Studies in the Maghreb (MECAM) since April 2025. Previously, he was MECAM’s Academic Coordinator (2020–2025). A political scientist trained at Philipps-Universität Marburg, his research focuses on German foreign policy towards the Middle East and North Africa, political transformation in Tunisia, Euro-Mediterranean relations, regional (re)ordering, and political Islam.

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Footnotes:

1 https://mecam.tn/events/3rd-mecam-policy-talk-in-berlin

Bibliography

Bousnina, Adel. 2023. “Tunisia’s Regional Inequalities of Development: Determinants and Effects: The Results of an Inquiry.” Management and Development for Research and Studies Review 12, no. 1: 662–684.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Furness, Mark. 2026. “Back to the Future: The Pact for the Mediterranean and the Mirage of Euro-Mediterranean Integration.” IDOS Policy Brief, no. 10/2026. Bonn: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). https://doi.org/10.23661/ipb10.2026.

Queirolo Palmas, Luca, and Camille Cassarini. 2025. “Inside the Pushback Apparatus in Tunisia: Countering Mobility, Extracting Its Value and Manufacturing Infrastructures of Solidarity.” Critical Criminology 33: 33–52. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-025-09822-7.

Stock, Inka, Ayşen Üstübici, and Susanne U. Schultz. 2019. “Externalization at Work: Responses to Migration Policies from the Global South.” Comparative Migration Studies 7.

Further Reading

Boubekeur, Asma. 2026. “Governing Asymmetry in Euro-Mediterranean Relations: Stratification, Hierarchy and the Pact for the Mediterranean.” Orient 1: 58–67.

Fontana, Iole. 2026. “Tunisia’s Multiple Roles as a Gatekeeper of (Im)mobility: The Case of the EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies.

Huysmans, Jef. 2000. “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration.” Journal of Common Market Studies 38, no. 5: 751–777.

Sidlo, K. 2026. “New Pact for the Mediterranean: The Future of Euro-Mediterranean Relations on the 30th Anniversary of the Barcelona Process.” IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook. https://www.eumedbridge.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/New-Pact-for-the-Mediterranean.-The-Fut.pdf.

Stanicek, B. 2025. The Pact for the Mediterranean: Co-Creating a Space of Peace, Prosperity and Stability through a Genuine Partnership. European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS).

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Citation: Imene Gannouni Khemiri in Conversation with Julius Dihstelhoff. Migration and the New Pact for the Mediterranean: A Tunisian Perspective. in TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 1.10.2026 from https://trafo.hypotheses.org/?p=69054

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