“Do Not Wait For a War to Learn How to Deal With Disinformation” – Conversation with Taisiia Ratushna

Olha Haidmachuk in conversation with Taisiia Ratushna

Disinformation and fake news are a significant component of war. Moreover, the information field is often attacked not only during the hot phase of military confrontation, but also long before it, and far beyond its spatial boundaries. What is known about the Ukrainian experience of how to cope with disinformation attacks? Olha Haidmachuk and Taisiia Ratushna discuss this question together.

Olha Haidamachuk (OH): Dear Taisiia, in your article published 2025 about fake news and disinformation as additional wartime risks for Ukrainians you invite us to rethink threats to information security: “the information security of a state in the modern world is an integral part of its national security, since information becomes a weapon aimed at causing significant harm to the enemy”¹. The question is, are information weapons capable of protecting against aggressive attacks?

Taisiia Ratuschna (TR): Thank you, that is a very interesting and complex question. When we consider information warfare, we need to recognise that information operates in a highly dynamic, open, and interconnected digital environment. As I argue in my article, a state’s information security is an integral and non-negotiable component of its broader national security. In contemporary warfare, information can indeed become a weapon, capable of influencing public perceptions, generating fear and uncertainty, undermining trust, and weakening social cohesion.

However, if we address the question directly, my answer would be no. Information weapons, or even sophisticated information-security measures, cannot fully protect a society from aggressive information attacks. In an open, hyper-connected digital landscape, it is virtually impossible to prevent an adversary from launching coordinated disinformation campaigns or trying to influence public consciousness. Social media makes this particularly challenging because information can spread extremely rapidly, cross national borders, and reach large audiences before institutions have time to respond.

At the same time, this does not mean that information security is ineffective. Its primary function is not to create an impenetrable shield, but to reduce vulnerability and limit the consequences of information attacks. One case discussed in my article illustrates this particularly well.

The first concerns the false claim that Russian forces had completely encircled Kyiv during the early stages of the full-scale invasion. The purpose of such a narrative was not simply to spread false information; it could generate panic, fear, and demoralisation among the population. In a situation of extreme uncertainty, such claims can be particularly powerful because they reinforce people’s existing fears and can spread rapidly through social networks.

The important point, however, is that although the initial spread of the false information could not be completely prevented, its impact could be reduced. A rapid response from Ukrainian officials, together with the active dissemination of verified information refuting the claim, helped to minimise its potential consequences. This case demonstrates that effective information security is not necessarily about preventing every false message from appearing. It is also about the speed, credibility, and reach of the response. When reliable information reaches citizens quickly and comes from sources they trust, it can counteract panic and prevent a false narrative from developing into a broader social reaction.

Therefore, I would distinguish between preventing information attacks and building resilience to their consequences. The former is extremely difficult, and perhaps impossible, in an open digital environment. The latter is both possible and essential. Effective fact-checking, timely institutional communication, media literacy, access to reliable information, and public trust can all reduce society’s vulnerability to manipulation.

From this perspective, information security should not be understood as a complete shield against hostile information. Rather, it should be understood as a set of social and institutional capacities that enable individuals and societies to recognise manipulation, respond to it effectively, and maintain trust and social cohesion under conditions of information pressure.

So, information can certainly function as a defensive resource, but its greatest protective potential lies not in eliminating hostile information, which is virtually impossible, but in making society more resilient and less vulnerable to its effects.

OH: Using the example of fake news about Ukrainian refugees in Europe who were allegedly illegally connecting to European power grids to mine cryptocurrency, you show how Russian propaganda uses classic stereotypes about “dangerous migrants” to undermine support for Ukraine among foreign audiences². What is the root of this stereotype about “dangerous migrants” and how dangerous can this stereotype itself be for a host society?

TR: The stereotype of the “dangerous migrant” is much older than contemporary Russian propaganda. Propaganda activates and adapts an existing social stereotype to a particular political context. From a sociological perspective, this stereotype is rooted in a broader process of constructing an “Other”: people who are perceived as coming from outside the community are more easily associated with threat, competition, disorder, or the misuse of collective resources.

Migration can become particularly vulnerable to this type of framing because it intersects with several sensitive issues in host societies: employment, access to welfare, housing, public services, cultural identity, and social security. In periods of economic uncertainty or political instability, migrants can therefore become convenient targets for blaming a clearly identifiable group for broader structural problems.

This is precisely what makes the example of the false story about Ukrainian refugees allegedly connecting illegally to European electricity grids to mine cryptocurrency particularly interesting. The claim was not simply that some individuals had committed an illegal act. It constructed a much broader narrative in which Ukrainian refugees were presented as people who abuse the resources and hospitality of the host society for their own benefit. The technical detail about cryptocurrency mining made the story appear concrete and plausible, while the underlying message was much more familiar: migrants are taking advantage of the host society and imposing costs on its citizens.

The danger of this stereotype is that it can turn an individual or fabricated incident into a judgement about an entire social group. Once such narratives are repeated, they can contribute to prejudice, social distancing, hostility, and the normalisation of exclusionary attitudes towards migrants. In other words, the problem is not only whether people believe a particular piece of fake news. It is the cumulative effect of repeated narratives that associate migration with danger, illegality, dependency, or exploitation.

For the host society, this can become dangerous in several ways. First, it can increase social polarisation by creating an “us versus them” distinction. Secondly, it can undermine social cohesion and trust between migrants and the host population. Thirdly, it can influence political attitudes and create public pressure for increasingly restrictive migration policies. Finally, it can make legitimate social problems harder to address, because attention shifts from their structural causes to a supposedly problematic group.

This also creates an important feedback mechanism. Once a stereotype becomes established, new disinformation does not need to create an entirely new prejudice. It only needs to confirm an existing one. This is why the “dangerous migrant” stereotype can be so effective as a propaganda tool: the information may be false, but the social frame in which it is presented is already familiar to the audience.

Therefore, I would argue that the real danger is not only that host societies may believe individual pieces of disinformation. It is that repeated disinformation can gradually normalise a particular way of seeing migrants as a threat. This can weaken solidarity, increase social fragmentation, and ultimately undermine the social cohesion essential to a democratic society.

OH: You point out a serious problem: fake content spreads through mass, highly viral channels, while fakes are often refuted only within information-aware communities³. Do you see ways and means to solve this problem?

TR: This is a complex, multidimensional problem, and I do not think there is a single, universal solution right now. Rather than proposing a definitive answer, I suggest we consider several interconnected dimensions of the problem. The issue I identify in the article is essentially structural. Fake content can be distributed through mass, highly viral communication channels, while its refutation often remains within relatively small, information-aware communities. This creates a significant asymmetry between the reach of disinformation and the reach of corrective information.

For this reason, we need to move beyond the idea that the responsibility for dealing with fake news rests primarily with individuals. Social media platforms and the large technology companies that govern the infrastructures through which information circulates have a particularly important role to play. Platforms are not simply neutral channels. Their algorithms influence what becomes visible, what is amplified, and what reaches large audiences. This means that algorithmic transparency, the detection of coordinated disinformation, the reduction of artificial amplification, and the provision of meaningful context to users are also important questions of information security. At the same time, this must be balanced carefully against freedom of expression and the risk of giving private companies excessive power to decide what information is amplified or suppressed.

This naturally brings us to the role of national institutions and public policy. Governments need the capacity to identify emerging information threats, communicate rapidly and credibly during crises, support independent fact-checking and journalism, and develop appropriate regulatory frameworks. However, contemporary information operations rarely remain within national borders, so these efforts also require international cooperation. Disinformation campaigns can be coordinated across countries and platforms, whereas regulation and institutional responses are often organised nationally. Cooperation between states, international organisations, technology companies, researchers, and civil society is therefore increasingly important.

At the same time, institutional and technological responses cannot substitute for societal resilience. Journalists, universities, educators, civil society organisations, and community networks can help create trusted channels for reliable information to reach people. This matters because one problem identified in my article is that corrections often circulate within communities that are already information-aware. To reduce the impact of disinformation, credible information needs to reach beyond these communities and become visible to audiences that may have already encountered the false narrative.

Only in this broader environment does the individual’s role become fully meaningful. Media literacy, critical thinking, source verification, and the ability to recognise manipulation are undoubtedly important. However, I would resist placing the main burden on individual users. It is unrealistic to expect every person to independently verify every piece of information in an information environment where professional actors, algorithms, and increasingly sophisticated technologies can produce and amplify misleading content at enormous speed.

So, rather than a single solution, this requires a multi-level, mutually reinforcing approach.

Ultimately, this brings us back to the asymmetry identified in my article. It is not enough to produce accurate information or to debunk false claims. We also need to consider how reliable information can achieve sufficient speed, visibility, and reach to compete with disinformation in the same digital environment. In my view, that remains one of the central challenges of information security today.

OH: If viral fakes primarily appeal to the existing fears of the target audience, is this audience capable of hearing someone’s rational refutation of them, addressed primarily to a cold mind, not emotions?

TR: I think this is one of the most difficult aspects of disinformation. If a fake story appeals directly to people’s existing fears, anxieties, or sense of uncertainty, a purely rational refutation may not be sufficient to change how they perceive it. People do not process information through rational evaluation alone. Our perceptions are also shaped by emotions, previous experiences, social identities, and, importantly, by the level of trust we have in the source of information.

This is particularly evident in wartime. When people face fear and uncertainty, emotionally charged information can feel more convincing because it matches what they already fear. A rational correction may provide accurate facts, but it does not necessarily address the emotional need that made the original story persuasive in the first place.

This does not mean that facts and rational argument are ineffective. They remain essential, but the way information is communicated matters enormously. Effective communication needs to acknowledge the concerns and emotions behind the false narrative rather than simply presenting facts that contradict it. Who delivers the correction also matters. People are more likely to accept information from sources they perceive as credible and trustworthy.

I would therefore not frame the issue as a choice between rational and emotional communication. Effective communication needs both. Reliable information needs to be factually accurate, but it also needs to be communicated in a way that is understandable, timely, and responsive to the emotional context in which people encounter it.

So, I would say audiences can certainly hear rational refutations, but rationality alone does not guarantee they will be accepted. To counter emotionally powerful disinformation, we need communication that combines factual accuracy with credibility, empathy, and an understanding of the emotional and social context in which information is received.

OH: How can this Ukrainian wartime experience of coping with fake news and disinformation be useful for societies in peacetime?

TR: I think the Ukrainian experience is highly relevant for societies in peacetime because it shows that information resilience cannot be built only after a crisis has begun. War makes visible vulnerabilities that may remain less obvious in ordinary circumstances.

One of the most important lessons is that societies need to develop the capacity to recognise and respond to disinformation before it becomes a crisis. This means investing in media literacy, independent journalism, fact-checking, trusted public communication, and institutions’ ability to respond quickly when false narratives emerge. These capacities should become part of the normal information environment, not emergency measures.

The Ukrainian experience also demonstrates the importance of trust. During the early stages of the full-scale invasion, people needed reliable information very quickly, and the speed and credibility of communication from public institutions could directly influence how people responded to uncertainty. This is relevant to peacetime societies as well, because trust is much harder to build during a crisis than to maintain once institutions have established a credible relationship with the public.

Another important lesson concerns social media. The Ukrainian experience shows that social networks can simultaneously be a source of vulnerability and a resource for resilience⁴. They can rapidly spread false information, but they can also become an effective infrastructure for crisis communication. A clear example is President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his team’s use of social media, particularly during the first weeks of the full-scale invasion. His regular video addresses and direct communication through social media provided timely information in a moment of extreme uncertainty, helped maintain a sense of connection between the state and the population, and provided an important channel for maintaining communication and a sense of collective connection. In this case, social media were not simply channels for distributing information. They became an important means of maintaining communication, trust, and collective cohesion during a profound crisis. This suggests that the challenge is not simply to restrict social media, but to develop the social and institutional capacities needed to use these platforms effectively in times of crisis.

So, for me, the main lesson for peacetime societies is quite simple. Do not wait for a war or a major crisis to learn how to deal with disinformation. The most resilient societies develop trusted institutions, critical media practices, and effective communication networks in advance. Ukraine’s wartime experience can therefore serve not only as a response to a specific information threat, but also as a warning about the importance of preparing societies for future crises.

OH: Thank you very much for the insightful conversation!

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About the author:

Taisiia Ratushna is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology at Zaporizhzhia National University. She received her PhD in Sociology from the Classical Private University (Zaporizhzhia) in 2010 and has since worked as a researcher and lecturer at Zaporizhzhia National University. Her research interests include communication processes in urban and digital environments, focusing on the role of digitalisation and social media in contemporary society. She studies social media practices among different groups and the role of digital platforms in migration processes, particularly their opportunities and challenges for displaced persons. In 2022/23, Dr Ratushna was a research fellow at the University of Tübingen, Germany. Since 2022, she has been a member of the War, Migration, Memory research group at the Forum Transregionale Studien. In 2024/25, she was a Prisma Ukraïna Fellow of the Gerda Henkel Foundation. In 2026, she started a new research project at the University of Tübingen on transnational family dynamics among Ukrainian forced migrant women in Germany, focusing on digital practices, family responsibilities, and institutional uncertainty. The project is funded through the Philipp Schwartz Initiative of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.

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References:

1 Taisiia Ratushna. Fake News and Disinformation in Social Media During War: Risks for Ukrainian Society. Науково-теоретичний альманах Грані. 2025. 28(3): p. 85. https://doi.org/10.15421/172573

2 Taisiia Ratushna. Fake News and Disinformation in Social Media During War: Risks for Ukrainian Society: p. 87.

3 Taisiia Ratushna. Fake News and Disinformation in Social Media During War: Risks for Ukrainian Society: p. 89.

4 There is Taisiia Ratushna’s essay about Ukrainians’ digital connections on the TRAFO – Blog: Taisiia Ratushna, Ukrainian Migrants’ Digital Connections to Family and Homeland during the War, in: in: TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 10.12.2024, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/53932

Citation:
Olha Haidmachuk in conversation with Taisiia Ratushna.“Do Not Wait For a War to Learn How to Deal With Disinformation” – Conversation with Taisiia Ratushna, in TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 15.09.26, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/68462.

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