The June 2026 Watershed: Betrayal of South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Promise
By Edwin Mutyenyoka
This piece examines the paradoxical reality of post-Apartheid South Africa, where a state founded on human rights and Pan-African solidarity now actively scapegoats and discriminates against migrants. The state enables xenophobia through three interconnected actions: neoliberal economic policies and corruption that cripple public services, the securitization of non-citizens via legislation that ignores international protections and deflective political rhetoric that encourages xenophobic vigilantism. Challenging a narrative of pure victimhood, the piece highlights migrant agency by showing through interviews and focus groups in Johannesburg how migrants negotiate, resist, and reshape necro-politics. They use litigation, community organizing, informal economies and solidarity networks to complicate notions of identity and belonging. The tensions between the securitization of migration, political rhetoric and vigilante action ‒ central themes of this contribution reached a critical juncture in June 2026. Here, South Africa experienced its most organized and widespread anti-immigration protests in recent history. These events provide a stark empirical illustration of the piece’s central argument regarding the state’s complicity in enabling xenophobia, even as the government publicly condemned the violence. The contribution concludes that the state’s exclusionary project represents an unfortunate betrayal of its post-apartheid promises, even as migrant agency and solidarity from below continually redefine the landscape of the modern migration state.
Introduction
Imagine public infrastructure built in the mid-20th Century to serve a tiny fraction of white colonial settlers, now straining under a population ten times larger. Into this context of rapid urbanization, service delivery failure and mass unemployment, influential political leaders repeatedly communicate that migrants cause the nation’s socio-economic woes. This narrative also fueling legislation aimed at withdrawing legally binding commitments to protect migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. Encouraged by these stances at the macro level, vigilante anti-immigrant civilian groups emerge, arbitrarily confronting and abusing immigrants. Absurd as these scenarios may sound, they accurately represent post-Apartheid South Africa (Akinola, 2018).
Whereas studies have identified three major theoretical underpinnings for anti-immigration sentiments ‒ isolation, frustration-aggression and scapegoating ‒ this contribution focuses on the latter. I provide empirical evidence from Johannesburg and problematize the scapegoating, targeting and persecution of migrants. Here, I specifically analyze the role of the state in engendering three interconnected phenomena: neoliberal economics, multi-level xenophobia and the vulnerability of non-citizens. I demonstrate how the post-Apartheid state’s role in eroding Ubuntu ‒ a traditional Pan-African moral philosophy upon which the nation was built ‒ breaks its promises and social contract.
Drawing on newspaper reports, interviews and focus group discussions with migrants, refugees and South African natives in Johannesburg, this piece provides a description of longstanding and emerging issues. The “June 30th Deadline”, which saw the most organized and widespread anti-immigrant protests as well as mass displacement of immigrants in South Africa in recent history, represents a critical juncture. I argue that the state fosters neoliberal policies, migrant securitization and anti-immigrant sentiments. While these (in)actions substantially reshape state capacity, categorizations, securitization, the social contract and social cohesion, this contribution also analyzes migrants’ agency. Migrants and refugees, although often on the weaker end of societal power dynamics, are active rather than passive subjects (Carter & Fuller, 2015; Harris, 2003). I highlight anecdotes from migrants trading and residing in Johannesburg’s peripheries to shed light on how these groups forge informal networks of resistance and solidarity in a hostile destination society.
Methodology and Reflexivity
This contribution is guided by an exploratory qualitative design rooted in an interpretivist paradigm. Primary data from interviews focus group discussions and participatory observations were supplemented by newspaper articles as well as mainstream and social media. Primary empirical data has been collected since March of 2022 in and around Johannesburg. A total of 30 face-to-face interviews and two Focus Group Discussions were carried out with 16 undocumented immigrants, 20 documented economic immigrants and 25 South African citizens. To complement these perspectives, 18 key informant interviews were held with community leaders, officials from the Department of Home Affairs and civil society organizations.
As a Zimbabwean, who was once undocumented and documented in South Africa before migrating to Germany, my positionality has not only informed my consistent interest in the country as a researcher. My personal and social ties to South Africa continue to be reinforced by networks of family and friends, some of whom are directly impacted by stricter migration policies and xenophobic vigilantism today. Nevertheless, a Reflexive Thematic Approach (RTA) was adopted as both a structuring and analytical tool (Wæraas, 2022). Following RTA tenets, I had the flexibility to shift between induction and deduction, in vivo and descriptive codes as well as semantic and latent codes to mitigate potential biases resulting from my positionality.
The Post-Apartheid Welfare State and South Africa as a Migration Country
Under earlier welfare programs established as far back as the South African Republic in 1882, the practice of excluding less-skilled workers “meant that nearly all black people were excluded” (Van der Berg, Siebrits & Lekezwa, 2010: 4). A fundamental shift occurred at the advent of democratic rule in 1994, when determinants of access moved from race-based to need-based criteria.
Notwithstanding its beleaguered apartheid history, South Africa’s modern social security system has increasingly committed to a state-led role in ameliorating poverty on a means-test basis (Midgley, 2003; Moore & Seekings, 2019). The South African Social Security Agency Act 9 of 2004 declares, “Everyone has the right to have access to social security, including appropriate social assistance.” The social protection system comprises various social assistance and social insurance programs, complemented by national, provincial, and municipal-level programs such as Free Basic Services to those deemed indigent. Statistics South Africa (2019) estimated close to 4 million households registered as indigent, receiving Free Basic Services.
As a quintessential social democratic regime, the modern South African social security system has higher levels of de-commodification and is characterized by well-funded public welfare benefits financed by taxes (Barchiese, 2007; Neves & du Toit, 2013; Plagerson et al., 2019). Grants redistribute income between generations, among the insured according to risk, and across time (van der Berg, 2007). With every sixth child receiving the Child Support Grant, it is the most common cash grant (SASSA, 2023). Similarly, the State Old Age Grant and Disability Grant form the main pillars of the program.
Following the end of apartheid, South Africa adopted the mantras of Ubuntu, ‘A Rainbow Nation,’ and endorsed Pan-Africanism, ideas of racial and cultural equality (Boynton, 2015). The 1996 Constitution ensured that most rights would be applicable to “all people,” redressing the earlier denial of citizenship and protection to people of African descent (Klotz, 2012: p.193). Around the same time, increasing political and economic instability in SADC states incentivized emigration to South Africa (Crush & McDonald, 2002; Georgi & Schatral, 2012; Wotela & Letsiri, 2015).
With vibrant dualism of the formal and informal economy, South Africa became a traditional regional destination for documented and undocumented transnational workforce. Post-Apartheid South Africa, being an ‘immigration country’ with a regional ‘visa-on-arrival’ border regime, saw streams of ‘overstayers’ and irregular immigration (Crush, 1999). These streams make migration stocks in the country difficult to estimate. International migrants into South Africa come from other African countries, fleeing economic hardship, conflict or instability in countries such as Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Nigeria and Somalia among others. Non-African low-income immigrants mostly come from South East Asian countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. These immigrants often end up in segregated inner-city neighborhoods and predominantly find work in the precarious informal economy, taking on low-skilled jobs as laborers, domestic workers, or in the retail and hospitality sectors.
The Erosion of State Capacity and Service Delivery: Neoliberalism and Corruption
Data from South Africa supports the idea that the post-Apartheid state’s capacity to fulfill its social contract has been critically weakened by neoliberal policies, rampant corruption and withdrawal of humanitarian aid. This is evidenced by persistent failure in public infrastructure and service delivery. The nation’s power grid, water systems and public amenities ‒ many built for a small white minority ‒ are collapsing under strain from a vastly larger population, a direct result of chronic under-investment and ‘state capture’ (Chipkin et al., 2018).
Crumbling public healthcare, failing education and the ongoing electricity crisis of “load-shedding” demonstrate how neoliberal austerity and corruption have eviscerated state capacity. In October 2025, a report by the Special Investigative Unit exposed embezzlement of over 2 Billion Rands (107 million Euros) at Tembisa Hospital by a syndicate of bureaucrats. Such corruption creates a daily experience of scarcity, which the state deflects by scapegoating migrants.
Taking housing as a case in point, many ‘deserving’ South Africans live in mikhukhus (makeshift structures). According to the NIDS-CRAM Survey, South Africans from Limpopo (50%) and Eastern Cape (30%) showed most disgruntlement with South Africa’s low-cost housing scheme aimed at addressing housing needs among the poor ‒ the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) (Ranchhod & Daniels, 2021). Bongi, a middle-aged South African woman living with her children in her mother’s one-bedroom RDP house, bemoaned:
They [the government] promised me and my children a house, most people with whom we registered for this corrupt program many years ago have already been allocated houses and are no longer living like rats the way we do here. Even Makwerekwere [foreigners] have RDPs, I do not know how!
Councilor Marema confirmed such grievances to be a source of locals’ disgruntlement and a perceived reason for recurrent anti-corruption and anti-immigrant protests. Whilst we could not confirm that non-citizens were allocated publicly funded houses, the research found that many locals consider the extension of the social contract to immigrants by the government as a threat to their own welfare.
Political Rhetoric and the Rise of Xenophobic Vigilantism
Incendiary political rhetoric amplifies scapegoating by high-level leaders blaming migrants for socio-economic woes (Tsheola and Segage, 2015). This has created a permissive environment for xenophobic vigilantism embodied by March and March, a grassroots civic movement led by Jacinta Ngobese-Zuma, and Operation Dudula, vigilante groups with a history of anti-foreigner rhetoric. In August 2022, the Limpopo MEC for Health Dr. Phophi Ramathuba confronted a pregnant Zimbabwean patient during one televised visit to a local hospital, saying:
“You speak Shona [a Zimbabwean language]? And how do you end up being in Bela Bela [a South African town], when you are supposed to be with Mnangagwa [the Zimbabwean President]. You know he doesn’t give me money to operate you guys? And I am operating you with my limited budget” (IOL News, 25 August 2022).
Such rhetoric fuels xenophobic attitudes among front-line health care workers despite Section 27 of the Constitution allowing “everyone” the right to healthcare (Cronje, 2020).
Due to lack of access to preferred employment, most immigrants engage in hospitality and informal trading. However, even in locally despised so-called 3D (Dirty, Demeaning and Dangerous) jobs, immigrants face pushbacks. Takaindisa (2021) noted that Finance Minister Tito Mboweni’s statement that “after lockdown, the proportion of South Africans working in a restaurant must be greater than that of non-South Africans” explained ‘coronationalism’ and reinforces xenophobic attitudes.
Backtracking on International Commitments
While the late adoption of the 1951 Geneva Convention and the Refugee Act of 1998 had generously extended rights to asylum seekers, the Amendment Acts of 2008, 2011, 2017, 2020 as well as the 2024 White Paper on Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection have increasingly threatened these rights (Republic of South Africa, 2024). The proposed White Paper on International Migration and Refugee Amendment Act seeks to withdraw from international conventions, ending the right to apply for asylum and mandating detention. By seeking to replace the constitutional right to asylum with temporary visas, the state legally codifies exclusion (Moyo and Zanker, 2020). These legislative shifts frame migration as a security threat, legitimizing withdrawal from binding commitments.
Throughout engagements in Johannesburg, acts of solidarity and Ubuntu were observed, albeit sparse between native and transnational communities. However, dominant xenophobic narratives largely cast aspersions on Thaddius Metz’s (2007: 333) interpretation that “an action is right just insofar as it is in solidarity with groups whose survival is threatened.” The pervasive anti-immigrant sentiments and violence challenge the notion of Ubuntu as a moral theory of rightness. Gogo Maloa, a 65-year-old Alexandra-born native, stated:
They [immigrants] know that if they do not have an ID or a known residential address no one will track or ever find them. They are the most dangerous people in Alex. So, our children here are engaging in [Operation] Dudula in order to protect us.
Another local, MaMpho, echoed these sentiments about immigrants:
We suffer more than them [immigrants]. How can they be worse than us when they have all the jobs, own all the vending stalls and spaza shops [local convenient shops]? Our children cannot compete for jobs with a Zimbabwean or Mozambican… I do not have issues with hardworking ones with documents, the problem is the illegal ones who steal from and rob our people.
The sentiments were constant and consistent in virtually all the interactions with native South Africans, highlighting widespread disdain of those perceived as ‘outsiders’. It is also noteworthy that evidence from Alexandra Township showed that the ‘as long as they are documented’ mantra appeared to be instrumentalized by those who uttered it to rationalize their general disdain, particularly for non-white non-citizens.
As I argue, cumulative scapegoating, violent exclusion and state abandonment represent a direct repudiation of Ubuntu and betrayal of Pan-African solidarity.
The Critical Juncture
The protests that rocked major South African cities in June 2026 were spearheaded by a coalition of anti-immigrant groups, primarily March and March and Operation Dudula. They issued an ultimatum setting June 30, 2026, as an unofficial deadline for all undocumented migrants to leave the country. The groups framed undocumented migration as a national crisis, accusing migrants of “invading” South Africa, committing crimes, outcompeting citizens for jobs in an economy with a youth unemployment rate exceeding 62.5% and overburdened public services (OECD, 2025). March and March leader, Ngobese-Zuma, characterized the campaign as “a national march to freedom, a rolling mass action” until undocumented migrants were deported, while publicly distancing her movement from calls for violence, stating, “we are not calling for violence… no one will be killed on June 30”. This rhetoric, however, directly contradicted the lived experiences of migrants on the ground and the government’s own security assessments. Migrants described the situation as living in constant fear. One Malawian migrant told Anadolu Agency,
We are being hunted like wild animals. There is no humanity anymore.
The ultimatum triggered a mass exodus of foreign nationals, with several African governments, including Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda, organizing voluntary repatriations (CGTN News, 2026; DW News, 2026). By June 30, South Africa’s Border Management Authority (2026) reported that approximately 25,000 people had been repatriated in recent weeks. Thousands more, predominantly Malawians and Zimbabweans, gathered at refugee reception centers and police stations in Cape Town, Johannesburg, and Durban, seeking assistance to leave, with many reporting that landlords had evicted them or employers had fired them out of fear of vigilante attacks or official sanctions (Pindula News, 2026). The violence preceding the deadline had already claimed at least five lives, including Mozambican, Ethiopian and Malawian nationals, with many more deaths feared unreported.
A Sudanese refugee who had fled conflict in Khartoum echoed this sentiment, stating, “I fled conflict in my country, Sudan, hoping to find peace here. But I have again found myself in the same situation,” adding that he had asked his children to stop attending school out of fear of attack.
The government’s official response was one of condemnation tempered by constitutional commitment. President Cyril Ramaphosa rejected the legitimacy of the unofficial deadline in his weekly newsletter, stating, “South Africa is a constitutional republic governed by the rule of law. The exercise of rights by any citizen in a constitutional democracy cannot be determined by intimidation, threats or ultimatums.”
On June 30 itself, thousands of protesters marched in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban and Cape Town, many clad in traditional Zulu attire and carrying sticks and shields, chanting “abahambe” (“they must go”).
Migrants’ Agency in Hostile Host Societies
Evidence reveals migrants are active participants forging resilience and solidarity. The Covid-19 pandemic, another critical epoch for migration-related vulnerability, had starkly illuminated this agency. Migrants engaged in social, political and legal action in response to disproportionate vulnerability during the pandemic.
At the meso level, over 70 Community-Based action networks legally and successfully challenged perceived injustices in access to vaccines and health care (Ranchhod and Daniels (2021). NGOs such as Helen Suzman Foundation litigated against termination of the Zimbabwean Exemption Permit (ZEP), arguing the decision was unlawful (Helen Suzman Foundation, 2026). The litigation resulted in court orders forcing the government to follow a fair process. Commenting on one of the favorable verdicts, the NGO said:
HSF welcomes this step as a necessary measure to provide legal certainty and continuity to over 178 000 ZEP and LEP holders who have lived and worked in South Africa for many years.
Whilst meso level organizations such as the HSF facilitate immigrant agency and challenges xenophobic laws and policies, at micro level migrants construct parallel social insurance systems to mitigate socio-economic discrimination. Lele, a female migrant from Mozambique explained her agency:
Who is supposed to give me anything? We do our work and earn what we earn. When there are no clients, we survive from the savings, if we have them, if not, we borrow from family and friends. What helps me sometimes is Xitiki [informal savings club], whilst it’s at times hard to save up that money and pay others, when it’s your turn to get that money, it helps you.
These informal savings club networks are socio-political spaces where identity and collective power are forged. Precious, Lele’s compatriot and neighbor asserted:
The benefits go beyond material resources. The members become family and friends and we look forward to gathering regularly to celebrate and discuss pressing issues in our community mostly as Mozambican women but we often also have local South African women who become part of us and fight for our rights here. We discuss many things including how to survive the wars Dudula always wages against us and our families here in South Africa.
Through litigation, community organizing and informal economies like Xitiki, migrants demonstrate they are active social actors who negotiate, resist and shape the socio-political landscape and solidarity from below.
The emergence of solidarity networks, such as Kopanang Africa Against Xenophobia and the Siyafuna Sonke Action campaign, which deployed “ruthless solidarity” with migrants, demonstrates the resilience of civil society opposition to xenophobia and the continued, if embattled, presence of Ubuntu ethics in the face of state and vigilante exclusion. As activist, Sharon Ekambaram, of Kopanang Africa Against Xenophobia argued, the government “got the country into this mess by scapegoating migrants for its own failure to address widespread unemployment and inequality.”
This piece has extensively discussed how the post-Apartheid South African state has shaped public attitudes towards non-citizens. Following the end of apartheid, South Africa established a progressive constitutional democracy with a robust social welfare system. However, this commitment to rights and inclusion is being undermined by a state-led retreat from international human rights obligations. Proposed legislative changes dismantle asylum protections, framing migration as a security threat.
Rampant corruption and embrace of neoliberal policies have crippled public infrastructure, leading to failing essential services. This failure is deflected through political rhetoric blaming migrants for socioeconomic crises. Scapegoating has legitimized the rise of xenophobic vigilante groups operating with impunity. This triad of exclusionary laws, economic neglect and tolerated violence represents a fundamental betrayal of the post-apartheid promise. It repudiates Ubuntu, which emphasizes shared humanity and interconnectedness, and abandons Pan-African solidarity.
In direct opposition to the state’s exclusionary project, migrants actively exercise agency by negotiating, resisting and shaping the socio-political landscape from below through litigation, community organizing and creation of informal economies based on social capital. The piece has argued that the state’s exclusionary project represents an unfortunate betrayal of post-apartheid promises, even as migrant agency and solidarity from below continually redefine the landscape of the modern migration state.
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About the Author: Edwin Mutyenyoka is a Post-Doctoral Researcher in the PolMig research project at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute (ABI). His PhD from the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) at Osnabrück University, Germany, examined South-South migration and inequalities in post-colonial African contexts, particularly during crises. Using an in-depth case study of a South African township, his work provided a spatially, culturally and temporally nuanced analysis of social protection access and utilization during the COVID-19 pandemic. Committed to decolonizing knowledge production, Edwin embraces Afrocentric methodologies which emphasize cultural immersion, the indigenization of research tools and the interpretation of data through an indigenous African lens.
Citation: Edwin Mutyenyoka, The June 2026 Watershed: Betrayal of South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Promise in: TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 18.08.2026, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/67317
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